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Guilt, we are told by Nebel, bel_on.ss mtri nsi c älly 
to ac tion;1 and it is manifestly through action that such 
declarative terms as "criminality" and "heinous sin" become 
attached semantically to the word guilt. The Oxford 
English Dictionary associates with the word guilt those 
explicit, conceptual terms which enable one to see at once 
the intimate connection between guilt on the one hand and 
justice and the rule of law on the other. Terms such as 
"heinous moral offence ", "responsibility for an action ", 
and "great culpability" cannot easily be mistaken for 
purely abstract or subjective sentiments; clearly, what is 
indicated here is not private opinion but public judgement. 
In like manner the terms "delinquent ", "criminal'', and 
"deserving of punishment" attach to the word guilty. 
Issuing from these fairly objective actions and 
conditions are certain feelings or states of mind. Remorse, 
for instance, is a feeling of deep regret for a sin or a 
wrong committed, and to be remorseful is to be penitent for 
for this wrong. remorse is therefore associated with a 
sense of guilt, but it is by definition a conscious state 
of mind, just as contrition, in so far as it is remorsefulness 
1 G.V.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, 
tr. J.B. Baillie, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 
1931), p. 488. 
2 
is, so to speak, aware of itself, aware of its cause. 
It is quite apparent from the linguistic evidence 
that guilt, conscience, and consciousness have connections 
so intimate that we might almost be justified in assuming 
their mutual identity. The connection between guilt and 
law has its roots far back in man's past, in that funda- 
mental law of primitive tribes: the taboo. "Taboo is a 
command of conscience, the violation of which causes a 
terrible sense of guilt ... "2 For primitive man, 
conscience and consciousness were virtually equivalent. 
Linguistic evidence would seem to verify that conscience 
means precisely that which is known;3 conscience therefore 
belongs to the realm of law; it is indubitable because it 
is a commandment. According to The Oxford English Dictionary, 
the term conscience, having been derived from continental 
sources, assumed the concrete significance of a form of 
self -knowledge, since it meant precisely "to know within 
one's own mind ". The earlier word "inwit" was replaced 
by the term conscience during the Middle English period.4 
2 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, tr. A.A. Brill, 
(George Routledge and Sons Ltd., London, 1919), p. 115. 
3 Ibid., p. 114. In some languages (French, for 
example) one word suffices for both conscience and 
consciousness, thus testifying that conscience belongs to 
what is known most certainly, that is, to law. 
4 The Ayenbite of Inwit by Daniel Michel is an 
interesting example of early English moral and religious 
thought. It contains a large number of ethical statements 
and psychological insights that can be compared, word for 
word, with similar judgements made by Kierkegaard. 
3 
To be "guilty" likewise once had the m_eanin, of being 
conscious or cognizant, and was used as such by Hakluyt, 
Ben Jonson, and Dryden, among other. writers. This again 
confirms the etymological coincidence of conscience and 
consciousness, and suggests also that guilt brings about 
the most intense fora_ of consciousness or self- knowledge, 
as found in the expression "guilty to oneself ", i.e., 
having a lucid self- consciousness.5 .Vhen, today, we speak 
of being conscious of wrong -doing with regard to ourselves, 
we mean that we have guilty knowledge of morally wrong acts 
committed by ourselves. 
The testimony from semantics, therefore, presents, by 
and large, an objective, if not legalistic, understanding 
of guilt. Guilt has always denoted the fact of someone's 
having broken a norm of conduct or a law; it is the result 
of a wrong action or a breach of conduct. The term "sense 
of guilt" is usually used to distinguish the subjective 
result of a wrong action. Hegel's analysis of guilt, as 
suggested above, contains social as well as aesthetic over- 
tones, since for. Hegel it is the action and interaction of 
human beings which constitutes the prime source of energy 
in social life. Hegel lays emphasis on action far more 
than on suffering, which, by itself, cannot be tragic. 
Suffering and misfortune, and therefore guilt, derive from 
actions wherein the individual consciousness comes into 
5 So closely are these concepts united by Kierkegaard 
that he equates innocence with ignorance. 
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conflict with the double aspect (divine and human) of 
ethical reality. This is a case of self -consciousness in 
action, trying to assert its own specific form_ of ethical 
truth over against its opposing aspect of ethical reality. 
Self- consciousness becomes guilty in and through action, 
after which "the guilt acquires also the meaning of crime; 
for as siirple ethical consciousness it has turned to and 
conformed itself to the one law, but turned away from the 
other and thus violates the latter by its deed. "6 In 
acquiring guilt by acting contrary to one ethical law, man 
advances the dialectic of history in the direction of the 
ethical idea. 
Nietzsche, to wham guilt appeared as a "ghastly 
disease ", also traced the origin of guilt to action. In 
this case, however, the action has none of the aesthetic 
overtones conveyed by Hegel. Nietzsche does not look to 
Greek drama or to the polity of the city -state for his 
interpretation of guilt, but rather to less sublime 
psychological evidence in the situation of indebtedness.? 
Hence, in his view also, guilt arises through action, 
although the action itself is without positive ethical and 
philosophical significance in the Hegelian sense. On the 
6 Hegel, on. cit., p. 488. 
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealo y of Morals, 
tr. Horace B. Samuel (T.N. Fou4is, Edinburgh, 1910). In 
Nietzsche's Second Essay there is clear evidence of his 
having profited from Dostoevsky's "Notes From Underground" 
and The House of the Dead. Nietzsche is said to have 
admitted that all he needed to know about psychology he 
learned from Dostoevsky. 
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contrary, so far from being actively resolved into 
progressively higher syntheses, guilt only succeeds in 
creating an appalling sickness. A Christian wrestling 
with a bad conscience is for Nietzsche the extreme of 
madness. There is, at least, linguistic evidence for 
Nietzsche's argument, since the word schuld means both 
guilt and debt. In Old English too, the word guilt has 
been rendered from the Latin debitum in the Lord's Prayer, 
though according to the Oxford English Dictionary there 
seems to be "no real evidence" for assuming an original 
identity of meaning in these two words. 
On the evidence, then, guilt appears to be a result 
of action; even more, if Hegel is correct, guilt and 
action are one. Yet, we have noted that on Hegel's view 
the concept of crime appears subsequent to the act: "guilt 
acquires also the meaning of Crime". ?hat then, is the 
relation of guilt to crime? It appears to one psychiatrist 
that crime is a social concept which could only have arisen 
because of a specifically individual sense of guilt. To 
him it seems "that the very emergence in society of the 
concept of crime has been made possible only because in 
individual psychology this sense of _guilt exists ".8 This 
view,roreover, is not inconsistent with Hegel's, since the 
philosopher recognizes in self -consciousness a simple 
disposition or direction toward ethical reality. We may 
8 Emanuel :filler, "The social and Familial Study of 
juvenile Delinquency" in Mental Abnormality and Crime 
(Macmillan and Co., London, 1945) , p. 222. 
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say, following Aristotle, that it is a passion, only a 
passion which is not a continual struggle and inward 
turmoil, but rather an aspect of consciousness which makes 
possible this inward self- conflict. :ve have only to 
disabuse ourselves of the eonnon notion that the sense of 
guilt means exclusively a gnawing, biting remorse, (ayenbite 
of inwit) to see that this is so. The existence of this 
sense of guilt as a pre -rational aspect of consciousness is 
in itself the possibility of those terrible inner conflicts 
which the modern consciousness has brought to the extremes 
of guilt castigated by Nietzsche. And Nietzsche himself 
understood that the passions interpret ethical reality, for 
"moral valuations are a sort of explanation, they constitute 
a method of interpreting ", and that which interprets is our 
passions. "All virtues are really refined passions ... "9 
Even so believed Aristotle: 
And we may state without any 
qualification that, contrary to the 
opinion of other moralists, it is not 
Rational Principle which originally 
points the way to Virtue, but rather 
the passions. For first of all, there 
must needs arise (as we know there 
actually does) an unreasoning impulse 
towards what is noble and sood ..x.10 
Returning to Dr. Miller's problem concerning the 
relation of guilt to crime, we now find that this relation- 
9 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, tr. Anthony M. Ludovici, 
(T.N. Foulis, Edinburgh, 1909), Aph. 254 -5. 
10 Aristotle, The Magna ':.2oralia, II, 7, 30. 
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ship stands out in somewhat bolder relief. At the risk of 
.oversimplifying the problem, we may state that whereas the 
crime is social, the sense of guilt is individual. Before 
crime as a concept can exist; that is, before an act can 
be understood as a crime, the sense of guilt must be a 
component of consciousness. The risk of oversimplification 
consists in suggesting not only that a collective sense of 
guilt cannot exist, for it surely does exist, but that the 
individual sense of guilt, divested of its tormenting power, 
is a kind of pristine ethical energy, a simple unit, so to 
speak. But this can hardly be the case, since we have 
already asserted that this extra- rational energy or passion 
is none other than the possibility of the tormenting inward 
conflict of guilt, and a conflict presupposes the existence 
of two or more opposing forces. At this point we shall 
turn to psychoanalysis, and to Freud in particular, and 
assert, with him, that this instinctual ethical energy is 
dualistic by nature, and that it is the polarity of those 
fundamental emotions, love and hate, which forms this 
primary ethical energy .11 It is for this reason that the 
notion of criire,as well as the objective guilt which 
attaches itself to the crime, is determined by the relative 
strength of these passions. There is nothing in the 
action itself that determines the guilt which attaches to 
il rreud, Collected Papers, ed. James Strachey, 
(Hogarth Press, London, 1950), Vol. V. "Neither one of these 
instincts is any less essential than the other; the 
phenomena ot` life arise from the operation of both together, 
whether acting in concert or in opposition ". (p. 281). 
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it, but it is the strength of these two passions which 
determines the guilt and therefore the nature of the crime. 
it may also be said here that this same relative strength 
undoubtedly determines the manner.in.which the individual 
reacts toward his own shortcomings and failures; it deter- 
mines, in other words, the nature of his conscience. aith 
this in mind, we are forced to reflect whether that which 
we call coral progress is not often the result of an excess 
of hatred over, love. Is it not a fact that our humanists 
nowadays proudly claim to hate social evils in the same way 
that our older religionists hated sin? 
In wnatever t elc. of _,nomwledge the problem of guilt 
arises today - in psychoanalysis, in philosophy, in juris- 
prudence, or in the social sciences - a certain aura of 
embarrassing confusion seems to- acco.lpany the discussion. 
One mignt almost conclude that a slight sense of guilt must 
necessarily intrude itself into _every attempt to investigate 
guilt; and indeed, such inquiries often tend ironically to 
assume the f:orm of an arraignment: guilt is guilty: or, 
conversely: we_ ourselves a.re guilty. Implicit in nearly 
all attempts to deal with the problem of guilt is the 
apparently naive question whether the sense of guilt is a 
good or a bad thing. lior is this merely the result of a 
difference between a philosophical and a theological out - 
look. It is partly the result of a growing recognition 
9 
that guilt has always been, and is perhaps now more than 
ever, a leviathan among those forces moulding individuals 
and civilizations. Partly it is due to differences of 
opinion as to exactly what the sense of guilt is, how it 
arises ana now it abates; or to differences of opinion 
concerning the efficacy of punishment. And behind the 
wno!e controversy there seems to lurk the suspicion that 
if man is ever to achieve happiness some new and revolution- 
ary method of self -control will have to supplant the 
seemingly perverse and autocratic methods of the super -ego. 
;Jhether this new method might not be more irrational and 
more authoritarian than the old, is not the least part of 
this uneasy suspicion. Perhaps the suspicion itself is 
nothing but the slight sense of guilt mentioned above. 
Joncerning the problem of guilt, Freud said that it was 
at once "the most important problem in the evolution of 
culture" and the terrible price exacted in the form of an 
unhappy consciousness by the progress of civilization.12 
tíere Freud seems to have voiced a certain pessimism along 
with a certain, but less strong, hope. r:uman reason and 
scientific knowledge ought to prevail over superstition and 
instinctual behaviour, but is it probable that they will? 
Freud did not hold out much hope that this would soon be 
the case. 
12 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, 
tr. Joan Viviere (The Hogarth Press and The Institute of 
Psycho -Analysis, London, 1930), p. 123. 
10 
Viewing the problem more optimistically, Jung has 
stated that ... 
When we are conscious of our 
guilt we are in a more favourable 
position, for then we may at least 
hope to change and improve it a 
little here and there .... Therefore 
consciousness of guilt can act as a 
most powerful moral stimulus .... 
without guilt there can be no 
ripening of the soul ...13 
In another context he writes similarly: 
Conscience, and particularly 
bad conscience, can be a gift from 
heaven, a genuine grace, if used 
as a superior self -criticism. Self - 
criticism as an introspective, 
discriminating activity, is 
indispensable to any attempt to 
understand one's own psychology. 
If you have done something which 
puzzles you and you ask yourself 
what has prompted you to such an 
action, you need the motive of a 
bad conscience and its corresponding 
discriminating faculty in order to 
discover the real motive of yoo.r 
behaviour.14 
lith obviously similar views, Jillia, James referred 
to the sense of guilt as if it were the substance from 
which religion fashions its experiences of salvation and 
deliverance. It is from this sense of guilt, James thought, 
that the deepest religious experiences always began. "The 
individual, so far as he suffers from his wrongness and 
criticizes it, is to that extent consciously beyond it, and 
13 C.G. Jung, Essays on Contemporary Events, 
( Kegan Paul, London, 1947), p. 71. 
14 C.G. Jung, Psychology and Religion, 
(Yale U.P., New Haven, Conn., 1938), p. 61. 
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in at least possible touch with something higher, if any- 
thing higher exists. "15 
Pollowing.in this vein, Ernest Jones has observed 
that "To the idealism and self- esteem_ of mankind it is a 
chastenin;; reflection that ... a bad conscience should 
prove to be one of the prime motors in even our loftiest 
strivings. 1116 In recognition of the historical and 
cultural significance of inner moral conflicts, Julian 
Huxley, one of the leading scientific opponents of guilt, 
has written: "... without such conflict, no guilt; and 
without such ;;uilt, no effective moral sense ".17 Money- 
Kyrie states that "moral behaviour may be defined as 
behaviour dictated by a sense of guilt. "18 Another author 
states: "The concept of guilt is closely associated with 
the concept of. justice. Guilt has the quality of propor- 
tion. The greater your wrong the guiltier you are ".19 
Yet, as a Catholic psychiatrist, he denies to psychology 
the last word in what must remain "the mystery of guilt 
and suffering. "20 The psychiatrist, Emanuel Miller writes: 
15 ,dillies. ~: James, The Varieties of Relirious Experience, 
(Longr_ans Green, London, 1952)p. 498. 
16 Ernest Jones, "Evolution and Revolution, The Inter- 
national Journal of Psycho -Analysis, XXII (1941), p. 203. 
17 T.H. Huxley and Julian Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, 
(Chatto.and Vindus, London, 1948), p. 110. 
18 R.E. Money- Kyrie, Psychoanalysis and Politics, 
(Gerald Duckworth . . Co., Ltd., London, 1951), p. 54. 
19 Karl Stern, The Third Revolution ( Michael Joseph, 
London, 1955), p. 173. 
20 
Ibid., p. 225. 
12 
"Every mental conflict which lies at the root of neurotic 
disorder is an expression of a moral conflict, and however 
unconscious this conflict may be, the sense of guilt is 
always to be found there. X21 The anthropologist, Geoffrey 
Gorer :]rites: 
Comparative research from a 
number of contrasting societies 
appears to demonstrate unequivocally 
that the developirent of a strict 
conscience, so that people will 
behave according to ethical 
imperatives (or feel guilt of they 
do not do so), is dependent on the 
parents rewarding and punishing 
their children, ;diving or withholding 
their love, on the basis of conformity 
to consistent principles the child 
can understand ... LOtherwise, the 
child_.] will not develope a strong 
ethical conscience; without such 
incorporated rules he cannot feel 
the type of guilt which produces 
internal discomfort for specific 
transgressions of specific rules.22 
Beatrice .Tebb writes of a "consciousness of sin ", a 
collective rather than a personal sin which arose "among 
men of intellect and men of property" during the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century, and which, in effect, 
convicted those men of failure to alleviate the poverty of 
the masses.23 One might cite here the consciousness of 
guilt among the upper -class intellectuals in Russia during 
the last century. 
21 Emanuel '.'Tiller, loc. cit. 
22 Geoffrey Gorer and John Rickm_nn, The Peo le of 
Great Russia (The Cresset Press, London, 1949 , p. 137. 
23 Beatrice .ebb, My Apprenticeship, (L ngm_ans Green 
& Co., London, -1950), p. 152 ff. 
13 
Another view taken by some philosophers and 
psychologists is that their quarrel is not so much with 
the sense of guilt as such, but with the undue importance 
they believe theology places upon this sense. As might be 
expected, even psychologists find difficulties in keeping 
a consistently clear view in regard to so basic a problem. 
Grace Stuart finds in the psychologist's attitude toward 
guilt "two mutually contradictory opinions ". One of these 
recognizes guilt as a "civilizing motive power" while the 
other attitude emphasizes the necessity to reduce every 
possible tension, both in society and in the individual, 
which might be the cause of guilt.24 
It would seer:: to be asking the impossible that 
philosophy, psychology, and theology should be able to 
reach a consistent and fundamental agreement. So far from 
this being probable, the very language each employs tends 
to widen their differences. In general there seems to be 
a mutual distrust among philosophers and psychiatrists 
concerning the value of each other's field of study. Freud 
seldom bothered to conceal his contempt for philosophy. 
Karl Jaspers, the only living philosopher who is also an 
eminent psychiatrist, has even doubted the possibility of 
a useful rapprochement between philosophy and psycho - 
pathology.25 In so far as it owes its existence to 
24 Grace btuart, Conscience and Reason, (George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., London, 1951), p. 168. 
25 Aubrey Lewis, "Philosophy and Psychiatry ", 
Philosophy, XXIV (1949), 9J -117. 
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philosophy, it would seem that psychology is merely 
repeating one of its favourite phenomena - rebellion 
against the father. 
Jun;, on the other hand, is noted for his role of 
peacemaker between psychologists and theologians, a role 
which is frequently condemned by psychoanalysts. He affirms 
the meeting of theology and psychology at that point where 
every individual neurosis requires a spiritual therapeutic, 
a healthy weltanschauunR. Unfortunately, as Jung also points 
out, the conceptual language used by the theologians and 
psychologists is only in appearance the same language.26 
In his essay "Guilt: Theolo:ical and Psychological," Victor 
White writes: "The 'fields of association' which the word 
'guilt' can conjure up are indeed so different that it is 
no wonder that they can provoke perplexities which amount 
to mutual incoTnprehension. "27 From the philosopher's side, 
we find H.D. Lewis asserting that theology and moral 
philosophy seem to be speaking different languages.28 Sir 
Walter Moberly speaks of a "condition of tension, and often 
of mutual exasperation" between the various professions 
dealing with the problem of guilt and of a resulting 
26 See the introduction by Jung to Victor white, 
God and the Unconscious, (The Harvill Press, London, 1952). 
27 Philip Mairet (ed.) Christian Essays in Psychiatry, 
(Philosophical Library, New York, 1956), p. 155. 
28 
H.D. Lewis, Morals and the New Theology, 
(Victor Gollancz, London, 1947). 
15 
confusion among the lay public.29 This depressing 
picture includes the jurist as well as the philosopher, 
the theologian, and the psychiatrist. A plea for a common 
understanding between the jurist and the psychiatrist has 
been forcefully made by Gregory Zilboorg who sees the 
existence of an inner conflict between law and psychiatry.30 
The necessary formalization of law, in which the law takes 
the side of morality as conceived by society, is in oppo- 
sition to the scientific character of psychiatry. Recon- 
ciliation of this and other antagonisms would mean a 
heightened sense of justice and the eventual treatment of 
the criminal as a human being needing "restorative punish- 
ment".31 In establishing beyond question the intimate 
connection between the sense of guilt and the need for 
29 Sir Walter :üoberly, Responsibility, 
(Oxford U.P., London, 1951), p. 6. 
30 Gregory Zilboorg, The Psychology of the Criminal 
Act and Punishment, (The Hogarth Press and The Institute 
of Psycho- Analysis, London, 1955), p. 125. The recently 
published Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Aental 
Illness and :Iental Deficiency recommends a complete 
revaluation of terms and categories in the approach to 
mental illness. In Soviet Russia, where until fairly 
recently, it was confidently supposed that the problem 
of guilt would disappear entirely, some attempts have been 
made in tne courts to unite the practices of law and 
psychiatry. However, even there the "two tests, psychiatric 
and legal, remain logically as irreconcilable as ever ". 
(Harold J. Berman, Justice in Russia, (Harvard U.P., 
1950), p. 231. 
31 Ibid., p. 137. 
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punishment,32 psychology has pledged itself to reform a 
punitive system so outrageously ancient that it might be 
said to be based to some extent "on the theory and 
practice of Tragic. "33 A similar view is expressed as 
follows: "The concept of criminal responsibility in 
particular (which does not differ in substance from any 
other kind of responsibility) has long bothered lawyers 
and psychiatrists who, in their wrangling over this issue, 
never seem to come to grips with the essence of the 
problem. "34 The writer concludes that "The concepts of 
responsibility and punishment popular in legal and 
psychiatric practice are theological and metaphysical 
anachronisr_s ".35 Another writer confirms the existence of 
this breach by stating that "It is impossible for the 
doctor and the lawyer to reach agreement on the question 
of criminal responsibility while they approach the matter 
from a totally different standpoint, as they still do. "36 
James Dreyer in his article "Philosophy and Psychology" 
admits that relations between these two studies are not as 
32 Freud was of the opinion that psychoanalysis should 
dispense with the term "sense of guilt" and substitute "the 
need for punishment". 
33 Edward (lover, The Dangers of Being _Human, 
(George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1936), p. 74. 
34 J.E. MacDonald, "The Concept of ::Responsibility ", 
The Journal of Mental Science, CI p(1955), p. 704. 
35 Ibid., p. 715. 
36 Angus ivacniven, "Psychosis and Criminal Responsibility;' 
in Mental Abnormality and Crime, p. 57. 
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close as could be desired, but he believes the linguistic 
and conceptual difficulties should be left to the philo- 
sopher rather than to the scientist for clarification.37 
Significant attempts are being grade by psychologists 
to expand a study of personality into an ideal view of 
society. Where this is done the concept of the normal 
personality has about the same relation to the paranoid 
personality that a utopia would have to modern society with 
its multifarious problems. By this view of the normal 
personality, man's sense of guilt is not destroyed; rather 
it is dealt with more rationally; man knows when he is 
guilty, but the tragic mystery of guilt fades away, and a 
type of reparation is made for his guilt, which heals the 
inward conflict without resorting to a vindictive projection 
of guilt.38 
The Christian attitude toward guilt in contradistinction 
to the views of the jurist and the psychologist has been 
defended by Moberly.39 Psychoanalysis in turn has been 
represented by J.C. Flugel who notes the parallels between 
Christianity and psychoanalysis. Following the comparisons 
previously drawn by Oscar Pfister, he observes that both 
37 James Dreyer, "Philosophy and Psychology," 
Universities ,uarterly, IV (1949 -50), pp. 126 -30. 
38 R.E. Money -Kyrle, óp. cit., p.78 ff. The viewpoint 
of Erich Fromm would probably be similar to this. 
39 i:ioberly, 22. cit. 
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have the purpose of reducing guilt by the aid of inter - 
rediar.ies.40 He concludes, however, that "The religious 
emotions must be largely or entirely secularized and be put 
in the service of humanity.i41 
In its insistence upon the importance of a strong 
sense of responsibility to oneself, to one's God and one's 
conscience, although not in the formalization of this 
sense, Christianity bears a resemblance to secular law. 
Indeed, Christianity has played a central part in the 
for,ration and interpretation of law. On the other hand, 
as Flugel has maintained, Christianity is unlike the law 
and resembles psychiatry by its use of spiritual or 
psychological therapeutics. Throughout this pattern of 
aims and methods in psychiatry, in law, philosophy, and 
theology, one sees at once overlapping, and flagrant oppo- 
sition; it is also a pattern in which the notion of 
responsibility is constantly changing. This is bound to 
happen, since the more or less scientific professions have 
turned away from the juridical notions of responsibility and 
punishment toward physiological and psychological treatment. 
The idea of the criminal type has given way in these 
professions to that of the patient, with a corresponding 
40 J.C. Flugel, Man, (orals and Society, (Duckworth, 
London,'1954), p. 272. For a criticism of Flugel's views, 
see White, Cod and the Unconscious, p. 158 ff. See also 
Chapter IX on "The Analyst and the Confessor ". 
41 Flugel, 22. cit., p. 275. 
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shift in the conception of responsibility. Traditionally, 
responsibility stopped, as it were, at the feet of the 
wrongdoer; it now points beyond him to my antecedent 
factors over which, it is said, the subject had no control. 
The ideal in this approach is to hate the crime, not the 
criminal. Thus a more enlightened view of punishment has 
been achieved, but, as Moberly warns, the sentiment tout 
comprendre c'est toutnardonner conceals a dangerous 
contradiction.42 
A word might be said about the problem_ of guilt from 
the psycho- social standpoint, an approach laying emphasis 
on isolation and unhappiness. In some respects scientific 
humanism and psychoanalysis are successfully dealing with 
individual unhappiness and isolation. Individuals who are 
chronically unhappy tend to seek happiness in egoistic, 
selfish ways. Hence, the modern concern to distinguish 
between the egoistic hedonism of the neurotic personality 
and the hedonism of the integrated personality. Yet, the 
fact of integration itself is not as desirable as it first 
appears, since the integrated person may often co pro :r_ise 
his values and desires to a bad environment. Furthermore, 
statements by scientists about integration imply, to some 
extent, personal experience of integration. We often find, 
however, that persons who make these statements owe the 
success of their own hedonistic principles to inherited 
42 Moberly, Q. cit., p. 24. 
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aptitudes or talents which are morally neutral. Thus, it 
does not seem that criticism of the so- called egoist 
hedonist can always be morally justifiable. Attention 
given to the estranged, unhappy personality is certainly 
necessary, but it is equally important not to overlook the 
way in which the individual uses his unhappiness. It is a 
fact that personal unhappiness sometimes redounds to the 
benefit of mankind. 
There would seem to be agreement between C.G. Jung and 
Sir `,'falter Moberly that the sense of guilt deserves an 
approach and an interpretation which is not to be found in 
science. Guilt alone does not make a sick or a diseased 
consciousness, nor does it necessarily imply the previous 
existence of an illness. No one can be immune from guilt, 
but by a certain orientation of the consciousness the 
individual may accept guilt without harm to himself and may 
discover finally a higher and more pure consciousness than 
before. Moberly affirms that "a sense of guilt is not 
necessarily a morbid state of mind, to be dissipated by 
being shown up. Far from being enervating, it may be 
thoroughly healthy and an indispensable means of self- 
mastery."43 Trueto its scientific methods, psychoanalysis 
tends to study guilt in quantitative terms; thus, any 
individual consciousness approaching a state of psychosis 
or psycho- neurosis is ipso facto bad and dangerous and 
should be submitted to treatment. One would certainly be 
43 Ibid., p. 61. 
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inclined to accept the need for treatment in such cases; 
yet there is another way of approaching the problem of 
guilt which is less expedient and which is perhaps more 
fundamental. By this approach the crux of the problem is 
seen to be one of orientation. what on the one hand appears 
to be a matter of quantitative analysis appears in this case 
to be a question of direction, the problem of orientating 
the consciousness toward the original or ultimate ground 
of guilt: God. As Martin Buber would say: "Guilt is the 
product of not taking the direction toward :1-od. "44 Once 
the sense of guilt is manifest, it is only necessary, 
morally speaking, that this sense should be grounded in an 
inner awareness, a self -consciousness which responds to the 
command of the conscience to master, to recreate, and to 
perfect the self. A sense of guilt is a call to become 
transformed. 
From the standpoint of science the foregoing inter- 
pretation would be regarded as unfortunately mystical. 
Nevertheless, we suggest that it remains firmly based upon 
Freud's central thesis that the original act of guilt was 
the rebellion of the sons against the father.45 Even 
Breasted, who presented evidence for the social basis of 
consciousness, could not overlook the fact that the ideas 
44 Maurice S. Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of 
Dialogue, (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1955), 
p. 104. 
45 Freud, Totem and Taboo, tr. A.A. Brill, (George 
Routledge & Sons, Ltd., London, 1919), p. 235. 
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of right and wrong were first decreed in Egypt by the 
Pharoah.46 Moreover, the Pharoah whom Breasted describes 
as having had the greatest moral influence is Ikhnaton, the 
same Pharoah whom Freud identifies with '.loses. Breasted 
tells us that "the chief force which moved the soul of 
Ikhnaton was emotion. "47 Ikhnaton's religious reforms 
constituted an "assault upon tradition" of such "fanatical 
violence" that it "could not but bring down upon him and 
his movement a retributive vengeance which stopped only 
with complete annihilation.i48 Breasted's archeological 
evidence, therefore, tends to confirm rreud's hypothetical 
ventures into cultural anthropology, for, accordin to 
Breasted, it was only after the downfall of Ikhnaton and 
his religion that the "conscience [was] fully emancipated" 
and the sinner confessed "his ignorance and proneness to 
err. "49 From that time onward "conscience became, as it 
had never been before, the unmistakable voice of °od.i50 
The similarities to the Freudian hypothesis are too obvious 
46 ,Tames Henry Breasted, The Dawn of Conscience, 
(Charles Scribner's Sons, Idew York, 1934), p. 42. 
47 Ibid., p. 297. 
48 Ibid., p. 309. 
49 Ibid., p. 317. 
50 Ibid., p. 320. 
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to be ignored: it was the violent rebellion of the sons 
(or the followers) against the primal father (or the 
Pharoah), that formed (or conformed to) the pattern of 
all human guilt. 
It cannot be too much emphasized that the primitive 
brothers, whose crime Freud surmised, did not turn against 
each other; their crime was not internecine warfare, but 
destruction of the Father -god; their specific guilt was 
only incidentally the guilt of each brother before the 
other. In fact, this guilt of each one individually before 
the other has meaning only in the light of the supreme 
guilt: the guilt against the primal father. If Freud's 
hypothesis of the ultimate guilt pattern has any truth, and 
the history of Christianity would suggest that it has, then 
all guilt is ultimately guilt before God. A God -centred 
reliion51 must invariably disclose the same pattern: all 
sin is sin against God; therefore all guilt is guilt before 
God. In this context, it makes little difference whether 
we say with Freud that the primitive brothers, faced with 
their guilt, forswore the killing of the father and denied 
themselves the women of the group;52 or whether we sajr with 
Moberly that guilt may be a means of self -mastery; the 
51 Or, mutatis mutandis, a secular Father -god religion, 
i.e., Cáesarisms of the modern as well as the Roman type. 
52 Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 238. 
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result of guilt is to effect a self- transformation; it is, 
in other words, a call to become transformed. 
But, if it is true that guilt does not necessarily 
imply a state of morbidity, it is equally true that guilt 
is often the cause of a morbid, thoroughly unhealthy 
condition. This condition may well be the condition of 
modern man and not simply the case of a single individual 
on the couch of an analyst. Something has gone radically 
wrong with man's ability to discover and to know the 
meaning of his guilt; the fundamental guilt which afflicts 
the consciousness of modern man is felt, and not known. 
It is felt with an intensity that drives him by despair from 
collective/ 
inaction to violent action in the hope that he can 
rediscover his conscience. ;ian'-s guilt remains incompre- 
hensible because he has lost contact with that ultimate 
authority which gives meaning to his guilt. When we come 
to investigate the problem of guilt in the modern world, 
we do not find, as we did with the linguistic evidence, 
that guilt is grounded in objective action; on the contrary, 
it is bound up with, and almost indistinguishable from, a 
sense of failure, of futility, o.f doubt, and loss of 
direction; one feels guilty because of the overwhelming 
number of unanswerable questions presented by existence. 
No longer can we agree completely with Hegel that guilt and 
action evolve together; we now find, on the contrary, that 
the profoundest consciousness of guilt arises precisely from 
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inaction, from the inability to grasp the principles upon 
which all rational action must finally rest. Klan in search 
of a soul is man in search of the meaning of his guilt, for 
to be able to discover this is precisely to have a soul. 
But man searches blindly and without ears to hear, so long 
tr 
has it been since the cord; and n_ent has echoed .,the world. A 
vital chord has been severed, as it were, within the psyche. 
In medical terms it is exactly as if a surgical brain 
operation had somehow deprived man of his eternal connection; 
he has been "cut off" from the higher levels as effectively 
as his moral perception can be disorientated by a scalpel.53 
To say that man is searching for the meaning of his 
guilt is to describe but half of his tragedy, for he also 
attempts to flee from an unknown, impalpable, and therefore 
terrifying guilt. Not to know the meaning of guilt is to 
know something of the sensation of metaphysical horror 
which primitive man must have experienced before the unknown 
realm of nature. In a part of his distracted consciousness 
he seeks outward provocation and sensation; unable to 
endure rest, he thirsts for action and actually finds 
relief in the commission of crimes which he justifies on 
the basis of self- preservation, or historical necessity, 
53 An operation by no means impossible, as the following 
statement reveals: "Within rather broad anatomical limits ... 
gross disturbances of social and ethical valuation can be 
brought about by the interruption of nerve tracts within 
the frontal lobes and by lesions in the neighbourhood of 
the hypothalamus and the sub -thalamus." Prof. Alexander 
Kennedy, "Brain Structure and Moral Values ", The Advancement 
of Science, VII No. 25 (1950), p. 54. 
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or even reason itself. The typically modern urge to 
express the self through action, the tendency to identify 
truth and consciousness with action is nothing but the 
rationalization of this rushing wildly down every avenue 
of sensation in order to find release from the incubus of 
unknown guilt in the arms of a real and palpable guilt. 
Is it any wonder that modern man betrays a secret pride 
in the awareness that it is his achievement at last to be 
able to destroy everything, even to the annihilation of all 
distinction between guilt and innocence? He actually 
believes, or is at least capable of believing, that to 
kill with a clear conscience, as if Murder were sanctified 
by the Deity, is to have rediscovered his conscience. 
Only a universal spiritual calamity such as the death of 
God could explain such moral idiocy. 
That part of man's consciousness which turns inward 
upon itselt carries with it a deep suspicion and fear of 
reality, not only of outer, but of inner reality; man's 
suspicion is sometimes directed less at the outer world 
than at his inner self. But fear and suspicion are not 
controlled by us, rather it is they which become masters 
over us; suspicion desires to break away from its futile 
preoccupation with the self and to fasten upon a definite, 
objective enemy. And it can find that enemy with a haste 
and disregard for reason, yet with an utter certainty that 
makes reason appear as some loathsome excrescence on the 
face of Truth herself. Accordingly, we submit that Kafka 
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has given a clearer and more consistent picture of modern 
man in the midst of a hostile world than any other writer. 
Kafka is not an obscurantist, but an artist who describes 
with equal clarity subjective and objective reality. In 
the following example from his story "The Burrow ", Kafka 
shows the agony of fear and suspicion issuing from the 
diffuse and profoundly experienced but unintelligible 
guilt in the modern world. 
And it is not only by external 
enemies that I am threatened. There 
are also enemies in the bowels of the 
earth; not even legend can describe 
them ....54 It need not be any 
particular enemy that is provoked to 
pursue me, it may very well be some 
chance innocent little creature, some 
disgusting little beast which follows 
me out of curiosity, and thus, without 
knowing it, becomes the leader of all 
the world against me ....55 But what 
avails all exhortations to be calm; 
my imagination will not rest, and I 
have actually come to believe - it is 
useless to deny it to myself - that 
the whistling is made by some beast, 
and moreover not by a great many small 
ones, but by a single great one ....56 
I merely assume that the beast - and 
I make no claim whatever that it knows 
of my existence - is encircling me ....57 
Lying on my heap of earth I can 
naturally dream of all sorts of things, 
even of an understanding with the beast, 
though I know well enough that no such 
thing can happen, and that at the 
instant when we see each other, more, 
at the moment when we merely guess at 
54 Franz Kafka, The Great Wall of China and Other Pieces, 
tr. Willa and Edwin Muir, (Seeker and Warburg, London, 1946), 
p. 49. 
55 Ibid., p. 59. 
56 Ibid., p. 75. 
57 Ibid., p. 76. 
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each other's presence, we shall both 
blindly bare our claws and teeth, 
neither of us a second before or 
after the other, both of us filled 
with a new and different hunger, even 
if we should already be gorged to 
bursting.58 
Can it be asserted that Kafka is not describing 
reality, but only some hallucinatory, completely subjective, 
and personal interpretation of reality? We do not believe 
that this can be maintained. The guilty fear and suspicion 
found in modern life is universal in extent; it is not 
confined merely to individuals, to nations, ethnic groups, 
or social classes, although it may take different forms 
and become especially intensified among certain groups of 
peoples. This is obviously the case with some individuals 
whose sense of guilt is dangerously exaggerated. That a 
consciousness of guilt can reach the pitch of madness among 
specific groups of people has been only too tragically 
borne out by modern history. The following evidence is 
taken from a psychological study of a people whose culture, 
literature, and political history shows pre -eminently the 
pervasive influence of a sense of guilt. Similarities 
between these collective reactions and those individual 
ones described by Kafka will be clear. 
... the majority of Great Russians 
have a diffuse feeling of guilt, which 
is largely or entirely unconscious, and 
58 Ibid., p. 80. 
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a diffuse feeling of fear ....59 
The mass of the CRussianä population 
is oppressed by diffuse feelings of 
guilt and hostility but shows very 
little anxiety ....b0 The Russian 
intelligentsia and elites seem to 
share the diffuse guilt and hostility 
and to see potential enemies all 
around them, including the mass of 
the people they control ....61 ("Che 
most common word in Russian for 
indicating an enemy is a word meaning' 
'dark or sinister fort& -s'. This term 
is completely vague; the dark forces 
might be anywhere and anyone, inside 
or outside the individual, the group, 
the country. All that can be 
certainly known about these dark 
forces is their plan (conspiracy, 
intention) to constrain and destroy62.... 
If one's own guilt cannot be 
alleviated, then an enemy who has been 
identified appears to be irremediably 
wicked, and almost without human 
qualities, as though he were an 
incarnation of the scriptural devil 
no longer consciously believed in63.... 
Once an enemy has been 'unmasked' and 
identified ... the proper response ... 
is an attack of destructive rage .... 
For the intelligentsia and the 
Soviet 'elites the proper response 
is hatred ... It would seem as though 
an attack of rage had a somewhat 
cathartic effect ... and that violence - 
especially emotional violence - becomes 
valued as an instrument in liberating 
one temporarily from the diffuse 
unconscious guilt and fear and 
destroying the confusions produced 
by the dark forces.64 
59 Geoffrey Gorer and John Rickman, 22. tit., p. 154. 
60 
Ibid., p. 189. 
61 Ibid., p. 190. 
62 Ibid., p. 156. 
63 Ibid., p. 155. 
64 Ibid., p. 162. 
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Thus it seems clear that collective guilt is 
something more than a bad myth, since it is one of the 
fundamental purposes of a totalitarian regime to utilize 
and to perpetuate whatever feelings of guilt are natural 
to the people. Totalitarian Leaders, however, just because 
they are totalitarian, are not content to allow the natural 
pattern of guilt-innocence to resume its course in freedom. 
Their purpose is rather to impose a radically new structure 
of guilt-innocence, and to enforce the inclusion of every 
person under this system. Marxist philosophy, when it is 
brought down from the clouds in response to its demand to 
change the world, is seen to be at bottom1aot a demand for 
a new economic system, but a demand for new gods and new 
devils, for a new pattern of guilt- innocence. The 
revolution in the private world of Marx, the violent over- 
throwing of the structure of his own conscience is later 
re- enacted in history among those who attempt to enforce 
the new pattern on earth. It could not have been otherwise. 
These points are clearly substantiated in the essay "Truth 
and Guilt" by John Rickman. He asserts that the greatest 
difference between Czarist Russia and Communist Russia is 
"in relation to guilt ".65 The Church under the old regime 
did not deny the possibility of guilt in certain areas of 
life; it acknowledged a "complexity of guilt "; gave the 
65 Ibid., p. 235. 
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people a different scale of values from that of the State, 
and offered absolution for individual guilt. Under the new 
regime, however, there is no "complexity ", there is only 
one sin - sin against the State, and to commit violence 
or destruction on behalf of the State cannot be a sin, 
and, hence, cannot involve guilt.66 However, the problems 
concerned with guilt and totalitarianism will be considered 
in the next chapter. 
We now have to ask, as we did above, whether it can 
be asserted that the foregoing evidence for the existence 
of a diffuse sense of guilt is peculiar to only one form 
of society and is, therefore, not applicable to psycho- 
logical reality in other parts of the world. Again we deny 
that this is the case. Just as the revolution which was 
born in the consciousness of : :iarx was eventually played 
out in objective reality, so this latter revolution became 
the great historical event of the era, heightening the 
consciousness, vivifying the imagination, and, most 
important of all, purging the soul of its vast load of 
guilt. What happened when the tragedy of guilt was played 
out on the Russian stage was that repressed feelings of 
guilt and hatred were purged on a universal scale. The 
profound attraction experienced almost universally for the 
revolutionary, totalitarian events of this century signify 
66 Ibid.,pp. 234-5. 
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the need for an emotional cathartic, a violent (if only 
vicarious) casting away of a diffuse and unintelligible 
feeling of guilt, as well as for a weltanschauung and a 
clearer vision into the future. In other words, these 
events signify precisely the existence of those human 
problems that great religions have always responded to. 
Modern man's loss of the idea of authority, and, hence, 
his loss of inner control, manifested in his craving for 
action; his need to act upon the external world, and his 
desire only for "final solutions" corresponds, we believe, 
to the existence of an abstract, subjective guilt which is 
continually seeking, as it were, to objectify itself, to 
discover its objective source so as to vent itself in 
violent action against this suspected evil. In the modern 
world great revolutions imply activist philosophies, and 
activist thought implies a profound sense of guilt; there- 
fore, the thesis must concern itself with the relations 
between guilt and activist, totalitarian thought. 
To recapitulate the main points made thus far, the 
thesis recognizes the psychological priority of the sense 
of guilt in all problems of morality, and accordingly, it 
asserts the need for moral philosophy to begin with the 
problem of guilt, not with a view to provide universal 
scapegoats upon which man can discharge his burden of 
guilt, but in order to. indicate that moral reality is 
individual, not collective, and that all attempts to solve 
this problem by collective thought and collective action 
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must ultimately reach the point where man's sense of 
guilt is either resolved in freedom_ within himself, or 
shifted by violence into a new pattern of guilt- innocence. 
Consistency in collective thought and action is the 
motivating force behind the latter endeavour, and the name 




Kierkegaard, with his characteristic fondness for 
paradoxical metaphor, explains in the Concluding Scientific 
Postscript how an inward movement of the self, travelling 
backward and downward, touching the whole past in all its 
most sensitive details, right raise the self at the same 
time to a new and higher level of existence. This would 
seep:1 to presuppose an extraordinary strength of will, a 
kind of motive power, a religious energy, perhaps, to urge 
the self backward into the dark shameful corners of the 
past and to assuage the pain involved in reopening old 
wounds. For nothing can be so painful as to relive what 
the mind has so generously buried; the plunge into the 
history of the self opens an almost endless depth of guilt 
and misery. Se should not be surprised to find that great 
heroes, the conquerors, and leaders of men have seldom 
troubled to look backward or downward either into their own 
lives or along the road. whence they came to power. Such 
power over the lives of others.usually grows in proportion 
to one's capacity to forget. It is a question worth asking: 
does it require more strength to forget, or more strength 
to remember? It seems to be characteristic of our age 
that it is- easier to forget, easier to throw passions 
outward than inward; and needless to -add, this is found to 
be much less painful. Yet this -is also an age of inward- 
ness and isolation; not ofactive inwardness such as 
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Kierkegaard understood, but of a blind, groping, darkened 
inwardness. It is painful because it has neither an 
intelligible beginning nor a discernible end; it is darkened 
by an impalpable shadow of guilt. We can illustrate this 
condition by these lines from a poem by Kenneth Fearing: 
'I do not deny my guilt,' 
said John Doe, 'My own, first, and 
after that my guilty knowledge of 
still further guilt. I have 
counterfeited often, and successfully. 
I have been guilty of ignorance, and 
of talking with conviction. Of 
intolerable wisdom_, and keeping 
silent. Through carelessness, or 
cowardice, I have shortened the 
lives of better men. And the name 
for that is murder.' 
'Guilt,' said John, 'is always 
and everywhere nothing less than guilt. 
I have always, at all times, been a 
willing accomplice of the crass and 
the crude. I have overheard, daily, 
the smallest details of conspiracies 
against the human race, vast in their 
ultimate scope, and conspired daily 
to launch my own. You have heard of 
innocent men who died in the chair. 
It was my greed that threw the switch. 
I helped, and do not deny it, to nail 
that guy to the cross, and shall 
continue to help. Look into my eyes. 
you can see the guilt. Look at my 
face 
. Amy hair, my very clothing, you 
will see guilt written plainly everywhere. 
Guilt of the flesh. Of the soul. Of 
laughing when others do not. Of 
breathing and eating and sleeping. 
I am guilty of what? Of guilt. 
Guilty of guilt, that is all, and 
enough.'1 
l Kenneth Fearing, "Confession Overheard in a Subway ", 
Afternoon of a Pawnbroker and Other Poems (Harcourt Brace & 
Co., New York, 1943). 
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Or, it may be illustrated with these words spoken by 
a character in a play by Sartre: 
I feel guilty. For thirty 
years I've felt ollltlty of some- 
thing. Guilty of being alive. 
Just now, houses are burning 
because of me, innocent people 
are dead, and I am going guilty 
to my grave, my whole life has 
been one long mistake.2 
But the self is unable to endure its own shame; it 
finds the shame of others almost as painful, and perhaps 
as hateful. Suspicion of oneself may lead to suspicion of 
others; hatred of oneself to hatred of others. Men recognize 
their individual guilt in each other's eyes; hence, inward- 
ness and isolation. Turning away from each other, they see 
only the painful images of themselves and hardly recognize 
the distorted, ruined image of what they once were. The 
time is now past when man could imagine the existence of a 
divine human being and see the possibility therein of his 
own spiritual nature. To set us up a glass where we might 
see the inmost part of us would be, we feel, an unbearable 
torture. Never have self -reflections caused so much 
uneasiness; never have mirrors revealed such depths; the 
comnnn mirror has become in modern literature the objective 
correlative to the human aversion to looking inward. Innocent 
mirrors may be the breeding places of great suspicions; 
they throw back our guilt and self -distrust. 
2 Jean -Paul Sartre, Three Plays: "Crime Passionel ", 
"Men Nithout Shadows" and "The Respectable Prostitute ", 
tr. Kitty Black (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1949), pp.117 -18. 
37 
I have always had a certain 
suspicion about myself. ... things 
like astonishment at the sight of 
one's own face in the looking - 
glass, or at the reflection of the 
back of one's head, or indeed of 
the whole figure, when, walking 
alon the street one suddenly 
passes a mirror.0 
The symptoms of such unrelieved shame have undoubtedly 
crept into every nerve and fibre of our existence. A 
hundred years ago Dostoevsky recognized the shame of being 
individual men which we try to hide by contriving "to be 
some sort of generalized man",4 a shame of which Albert 
Camus was probably thinking when he noted that modern man 
dreams of "a strange freedom of the species ".5 The 
suspicion that we have been false to the sacred image within 
us grows until we feel self -convicted; taking up our hands 
we point the accusing finger of guilt against our own souls. 
This, to some extent, affords relief, but we insist that 
others should do the same; if the guilt is to be accepted 
at all, it must be accepted universally. All guilt implies a 
wrong, and a wrong implies the need for punishment. The 
suspicion we have concerning ourselves begins to assume a 
3 Franz Kafka, Wedding Preparations in the Country_, 
(Seeker and Warburg, London, 1954), p. 406. An interesting 
reference to mirrors and the sense of guilt is provided by 
Geoffrey Gorer. He recalls that the immense drinking orgies 
common among Russian peasants and workers end in the destruc- 
tion of property, especially the smashing of mirrors, which 
is said to represent aggression turned inward so that by 
"destroying the mirror, which reflects the self, it may 
appear that the evil self is destroyed." (The People of 
Great Russia, p. 140). .
4 Fyodor Dostoevsky, "Notes From Underground ", '.White 
Nights and Other Stories, tr. Constance Garnett, (William 
Heinemann, London, 1918), p. 154. 
5 Albert Camus, The Rebel, tr. Anthony Bower, 
(Hamish Hamilton, London, 1953), p. 272. 
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totally different perspective; perhaps it is not we who 
have been false to the consciousness of the reflection of 
God in man, but rather this image has dealt falsely with us. 
The accusing finger is relaxed; we release ourselves from 
suspicion, and we begin to look again more carefully. We 
already know the real criminal exists; the crime has never 
been committed for which a scapegoat could not be found. 
Suspicion pulses and throbs as if it had a separate life of 
its own; it is a stifled passion awaiting the advent of 
some spark, some impulse to give it complete liberation. 
And the liberation will come; it must come as surely as a 
law of human nature to those who are ready to receive it. 
Human guilt does not seek its own level, it does not desire 
equilibrium; on the contrary it tends to be either implosive 
or explosive, either self- destructive or other- destructive. 
And so suspicion, spawned in the beginning by guilt, waxes 
and wanes, now it secrets itself and now makes ready to 
burst forth. Even when it seems least viable ... 
... it is nevertheless there 
and alive ... it is only gathering 
its strength, waiting for the favourable 
opportunity when, at a single bound, 
it will grow from a minute discomfort 
into a big, wild, malevolent suspicion 
that breaks free of its fetters and 
ruthlessly destroys everything that 
there is in common between him who 
has the suspicion and him who is 
suspect.6 
6 Kafka, Wedding Preparations in the Country, p. 407. 
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Se need not pause here to suggest what forms the will 
to destruction might assume. Man's technical ingenuity 
has amply demonstrated its sufficiency to reproduce the 
wildest and most fantastic details of all his underworld 
dreams. Seeking to destroy the evidence of his own guilt, 
man only succeeds in gaining the knowledge that he can 
destroy the whole world (i.e., all of humanity), that he has 
made everything possible except the destruction of guilt 
itself, and that as a last resort, as a last gesture of 
infinite defiance all human guilt must be flung back at its 
Creator. "God is guilty:" shout the characters in a post- 
war German play.? At the "trial of God ", a character called 
Jonah turns the accusation back on modern man: "You can 
pick out the face of twentieth -century man fro:r all others. 
Hardly ever will you find so much cruelty, self- righteousness, 
and emptiness, all in one physiognomy." One sees in the 
indictment of God, the "final solution" which "raving 
twentieth- century man" has indeed been seeking. It would 
hardly be possible to discover a more ultimate or a more 
universal scapegoat than. God. The search for scapegoats 
seems in fact, to have effected a larger and larger share 
of modern thought, including philosophy and science itself. 
Where shall we look for the beginnings of such confusion? 
7 Although this play, The Sign of Jonah, by Geunter 
Rutenborn, has been produced in The United States, it has 
apparently not been published. The references have, there- 
fore, been taken from an article in the magazine Presby- 
terian Life, (June 22, 1957). 
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THE INSTABILITY OF IDEAS 
The first signs of definite instability were evident 
towards the end of the eighteenth century. Professor 
Barbu refers to Tocqueville's statement that the pre - 
Revolutionary period in France brought forth a tendency 
among the people to believe in absurdities of all sorts.8 
Much in evidence were pseudo -religions, semi- mystical cults 
and secret societies oddly flourishing in an age of "Reason ". 
We are told that the eighteenth century was not more 
rational than any other, and perhaps less so. Actually, it 
secretly craved the irrational and the supernatural.9 
Thus, in an atmosphere of instability where reason was 
commencing to lose its supports, it could actually happen, 
and in fact did happen, that reason "became itself the 
object of faith, it became the omnipotent reason" .10 There 
were at least two men, however, who were uniquely aware by 
the middle of the nineteenth century that all was not well 
with reason. Both Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky understood 
that fundamental principles were slipping away, and that 
8 Zevedei Barbu, Democracy and Dictatorship, 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1956), p. 234. 
9 See E.M. Butler, The Myth of the Magus, (Cambridge Ú.P.,1940 
10 Barbu, óp,. cit., p. 235. The decline of wisdom, 
writes Gabriel Marcel, is "a phenomenon of immeasurable 
gravity ... comparable to some great meteorological trans- 
formation such as now and then takes place ...' (The 
Decline of ';disdom, tr. Manya Harari (The Harvill Press, 
London, 1954), p. 46). 
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men were clutching at dangerous substitutes in the 
conviction that truth was near at hand. Young men in 
Russia were attracted to "certain strange incomplete ideas 
which `[were; floating in the air ";11 one noticed the 
"extraordinary instability of ideas, ideas that prompt 
people to terrible actions ".12 Unable to grasp first 
principles, men were being converted to Philistinism without 
being aware of .it. "But what then is Philistinism ?" asked 
Kierkegaard. "Philistinism always consists in the use of 
the relative as the absolute in connection with the essential. "13 
The situation was such that man's consciousness was being 
subverted; instead of relating himself directly to the 
ideal, man considered that he was "related to the ideal 
through the medium of successive generations, through the 
state, through the centuries ... "14 Essentially, Kierkegaard's 
Philistine is none other than Dostoevsky's "direct man ", the 
man of action who takes "immediate and secondary causes for 
primary ones" and so provides himself with a quick and 
simple excuse for his activity.15 Confusion of the relative 
11 Dostoevsky, New Dostoevsky Letters, tr. S.S. 
Koteliansky (The Mandrake Press, London, n.d.), p. 43. 
12 Ibid., p. 48. 
13 Soren Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard's Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, tr. David F. Swenson and 4alter 
Lowrie (Oxford U.P., London, 1941), p. 486. 
14 Ibid.., p. 483. 
15 Dostoevsky, "Notes From Underground ", White Nihts 
and Other. Stories p. 62. 
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with the absolute, the purblind apotheosis of false 
absolutes and half truths led to the enthronement of 
reason and science which have never been able to unravel 
the obscurities of good and evil and have only succeeded 
in adding fuel to the confusion of all values. Such has 
been the subverting influence of ... 
... the half truths of science, 
the most terrible scourge of humanity, 
unknown till this century, and worse 
than plague, famine or war. A half - 
truth is a despot such as has never 
been in the world before. A despot 
that has its priests and its slaves, 
a despot to whom all do homage with 
love and superstition hitherto 
inconceivable ...16 
Underneath all the appearances of justifiable optimism, 
reason was becoming divorced from the conduct of individual 
life; man no longer sought ways to exist in harmony with 
nature and with sod; he rejected the ancient wisdom of 
striving to justify himself before God and instead proudly 
began to apply reason to the efficient planning of mass 
life and to the subtle transformation of the term "good" 
into a question of utility and efficiency. Thus, in our 
day Martin Buber writes: "False absolutes rule over the 
soul, which is no longer able to put them to flight through 
the image of the true ... "17 All the delprious enthusiasm 
16 Dostoevsky, The Possessed, tr. C. Garnett, 
(Heinemann, London, 1913), p. 233. 
17 Martin Buber, Eclipse of God, (Victor Gollancz, 
London, 1953), p. 155. 
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for creating the "new man" could never have happened 
unless that "new man" had not already in actual fact 
become basically conceived quite independently of the 
conscious will of man. That fond dream of creating the 
"new man" which to all appearances began with the Ecole 
Polytechnique and which has survived into the present 
century had actually taken root in a different world from 
the world of man's conscious life. 
THE COE7i7ÜION OF DR;A::i AND REALITY 
This instability of ideas indicates in its first 
stage a sensation of intellectual giddiness somewhat like 
the intoxicated feeling a released prisoner experiences 
when he breathes the clear air of freedom and believes 
that freedom means unlimited possibilities. His dreams 
have already helped to convince him of this, for the 
strongest and most persistent dreams concern our strongest 
desires, those objects we believe we have been deprived of 
by life. The stability of outer reality over against the 
reality given in our dreams is maintained by the authority 
of consciousness, an authority which is neither unchanging 
nor unmixed with explosive elements from the source of 
dreams, the unconscious. These elements are continually 
at war with the inner authority, and the balance of power 
invested in the latter is more precarious than we like to 
believe. Giddiness and hedonistic hysteria result precisely 
from a weakening of consciousness; the intellect flutters 
like a butterfly from flower to flower, from sensation to 
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sensation, always convinced it is coming closer to the 
truth when in fact it could not be farther from truth. It 
is not a question of the innocence or guilt of man's dreams, 
but a question of their unsuspected power, their capacity 
for depriving consciousness of its true interest in the 
self, so that perfection and imperfection cease to be 
images for the consciousness to apply inwardly and become 
merely pronouncements on what ought to be done actively and 
materially. In this situation the most guiltless dreams 
and the most innocent will may combine to ensorcell the 
consciousness into a state where it is no longer capable 
of clearly distinguishing good from evil, and where, in any 
case, a manifestly evil action, provided it is done with a 
good will, is superior to the innocence of inaction. iiïean- 
while, impatience has done its work; gradually the barriers 
between the conscious and the unconscious are broken down, 
( "For nothing is hid that shall not be made manifest ") and 
the worst fantasies and dreams of man's underworld life 
break out into the real world. 
Much of Kierkegaard's overwhelming sense of fear, which 
he developed into fantasies of his own wickedness, resulted 
from an acute perception of the constant war between the 
higher and lower natures of man. The fear arising from this 
perception is the basis of his conviction that education 
through dread is the only education worthy of the name. 
When it is fully realized that the terrible inner reality 
(the possibility) is never far from the outer, then one 







reality. It would be quite true to say that one of the 
chief ideas which both Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky attempted 
to impart was that possibility could educate more convinc- 
ingly than anything else. One might also add that Kafka's 
whole life consisted of this "education" in its most 
intense form. 
Evidence of the confusion of dream and reality appears 
nowhere so notoriously as in the frequency and fervency with 
which we attempt to deny the existence of any and all threats 
to reality as we wish to have it. Over and over one hears 
the leitmotif of the modern consciousness: "It is icr_possible" 
(i.e., "It can't happen here "). Actually, all that seems 
impossible is that the human imagination should ever be able 
to grasp the tenuousness of this absurd defence and the 
possibilities which it contrives to deny. To a certain 
extent we are all like the condemned man in Kafka's sketch 
who is interrupted at his last meal by the executioner: 
"Are you ready ?" asks the executioner. Receiving no reply, 
he commences to sharpen his knives; the condemned man looks 
at him, shudders and turns away; he "has no desire to see 
more". Again, after a while, the executioner says, "Ready ". 
The condemned man jumps up with a scream, "Ready? You're 
not going to kill me ..." He is reassured as if by the sound 
of his own voice. "It is impossible," he says quietly. 
"This singular judicial procedure was instituted just because 
it is impossible. ... You will take me to another jail; 
I shall probably have to stay there a long time, but they 
will not execute me." Whereupon the executioner draws a 
ti 
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dagger from its sheath. "You are probably thinking," 
says the executioner, "of those fairy tales in which a 
servant is com_randed to expose a child and does not do so 
and instead binds him over as apprentice to a shoemaker. 
Those are fairy tales: this, though, is not a fairy tale. "18 
This type of mental defence against a threatening 
reality may be illustrated by contrasting the effect upon 
the reader of Coleridge's The Ancient Mariner with the 
effect commonly produced by Kafka's story The Trial. Both 
tales present a dream -like, "impossible" view of reality; 
in both there is a judgement and a punishment completely 
inconsistent with ordinary standards of human justice; yet 
the poem alone immediately appears to have an intrinsic, 
retributive logic, a kind of divine necessity which has no 
place on earth, but which is nonetheless acceptable as a 
possible kind of earthly justice. In the same way, the fate 
of Oedipus, improbable though it is by merely human 
standards, has its own inner logic. The ordinary reader of 
Kafka's story, however, will try to convince himself that 
its events are outside the realm of possibility. He will 
be inclined to approve the punishment of the Mariner while 
rejecting as absurd the suffering and death of Joseph K.; 
18 Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka: 1914 -1923 
(Seeker & Warburg, London, 1949), pp. 162 -63. In refusing 
to take seriously the despair common to existentialist art, 
one refuses to accept the ''existential meaninglessness and 
hidden despair" of one's own life. This is the opinion of 
Paul Tillich who writes, "one does not feel spiritually 
threatened by something which is not an element of oneself." 
(The Courage To Be, p. 134). 
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he will be impressed with the "truth" of the poem, while, 
at best, only the bizarre originality of the story will be 
impressive. And yet, it is the story, not the poem, which 
is classical in style; it is only the story in which the 
symbolism is natural and prosaic. The reason for this 
difference seems to be that so long as the dream -like 
consistency and logic of imaginative art remains in its 
accustomed place, that is, as a reflection and not as a 
description of possible events, it is acceptable, but when 
the absurd events normally restricted to dreams break 
through into real life, then the description of these 
events is no less unwelcome than the reality itself. From 
this we draw the conclusion that what is called "the failure 
of nerve" in modern life may be, in fact, the only positive 
reaction to present reality. 
The universal fairy tale of the modern age begins with 
the words: "It is impossible." Thus, having come full 
round fro.r_ the giddy fairy tale life of the eighteenth 
century which was so firmly convinced that possibilities 
were unlimited, we have now reached a stage where the 
human consciousness is haunted by the dreadful suspicion 
that in reality (not only in dreams) everything is possible. 
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THE fdIEANING OF KAFKA'S WORLD 
Looking back upon Kafka's time from the year 1957 we 
can see that it is not so much the reality behind subsequent 
events (everything Kafka wrote can be said to represent 
this reality), but the events themselves that present the 
greatest obstacle to credulity. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that Kafka's conception of reality cannot easily 
be accepted as having any relation to an objectively real 
world. Even the authentic reports of survivors of 
concentration camps fail to provide the links with common 
sense experience which are required for a genuinely rational 
assent to the existence of such camps.19 The very existence 
of such vast horrors is enough to render the mind incapable 
both of communicating and of accepting the fact. One of 
the survivors of those camps, however, noted that he had 
lived among characters "straight out of the world of Kafka".20 
In the account of his experiences in a French concentration 
camp, Arthur Koestler asserts that his inability to find 
anyone who could explain the reason for his arrest was a 
typical Kafkan situation. He compared the whole episode to 
J` 19 Cf. Hannah Arendt, The Burden of our Time 
'.:(Becker & Warburg, London, 1951), p. 414. In a private 
letter to the present writer, Miss Arendt writes: "What 
makes Kafka so modern is that he seems to indicate: Every- 
'thing can happen and nothing is real." The following is 
only one of many examples which might be used in support 
of this opinion: "... it could well happen that in flying 
from one enemy I might run into the jaws of another. Any- 
thing might happen:" ("The Burrow" in The Great Wall of 
China, p. 49). 
20 David Rousset, A World Apart (Seeker & Warburg, 
London, 1951), p. 3. 
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a novel by Kafka.21 With reference to the inability of 
the human mind to gráps contemporary events, Koestler says: 
"Facts and proofs abound; but consciousness lags behind; 
it is easier for the imagination to grasp the past than 
the present. "22 We can see the truth of this statement in 
the cries of righteous anger against capitalist abuses of 
7.: 
generations ago, while the worst terrors in history are 
brushed aside;23 or in the reprobation of the Inquisition, 
when several hundred Inquisitions running simultaneously 
could not equal the mass exterminations of the present age. 
Nearly every historian of events in Germany during the 
last war expressly warns his readers that although he has 
used the most exacting care in documenting his sources - 
9 
which are often eye -witness descriptions - they may expect 
to find many of the details beyond credulity. Rousset says 
that the internees "are separated from other people by an 
experience which it is impossible to communicate ".24 The 
21 Arthur Koestler, Scum of the Earth (Collins with 
,î:Hamish Hamilton, London, 1955), p. 152. Both Freda Utley 
and Margarete Buber have described the arrest of their 
1 husbands under circumstances even more sinister than those 
imaginatively described by Kafka in The Trial. Cf. Margarete 
Buber, Under Two Dictators (Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 
!;;1949), and Freda Utley, Lost Illusion (George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd., London, 1949). 
22 Ibid., p. 225. 
23 See the essay by Bertrand de Jouvenel, "Treatment 
a of Capitalism by Intellectuals" in Capitalism and the 
Historians, edited by F.A. Hayek, (Routledge and Kegan Put 
Ltd., London, 1954). 






authors of the book Russian Purge acknowledge that ... 
No event in recent history 
so tremendous as the great purge 
has remained apparently so incom- 
prehensible. To the Soviet people, 
and to the two authors of this work, 
who were among its victims, the 
purge still seems utterly fantastic. 
What chance, then, has the non - 
Soviet world of forming a true 
picture of those extraordinary 
years ?25 
Again, we may refer to Koestler who tells us that 
prison life usually can be defined as normal life without 
its freedom. But this will not do at all when we attempt 
to understand totalitarian prison life, which bears the 
same relation to ordinary life, as life on the moon bears 
to life on earth. "Incorr_parable magnitudes are involved; 
earthly concepts lose all their meaning. "26 Writing about 
experiences in Russia during the war, another observer 
states: 
The reader can be given facts. 
He cannot share the experience ... 
One can enumerate the horrors ... 
All this can be described. It can 
even, to some degree, be imaginatively 
felt. To what degree, depends on the 
mind and heart of the reader. But 
there will always be the distance of 
a universe between this imagination 
and the experience itself.27 
25 F. Beck and W. Godin, Russian Purge and the Extraction 
f Confession (Hurst and Blackett Ltd., London, 1951 9. 
26 Arthur Koestler, 
ondon, 1937), p. 373. 
27 The Dark Side of 
T.S. Eliot (Faber and 
Spanish Testament (Victor 
the Moon (author unnamed . 





Another observer of totalitarian prison life writes: "We 
know how great is the tendency of the human imagination to 
exaggerate in the effort to picture the torture and 
humiliation of others. About the concentration camps no 
exaggeration is necessary; the most gruesome fantasies are 
reality. "28 A medical doctor who was an internee writes: 
... no one who has not had any personal experience of a 
German concentration camp can possibly have any conception 
of concentration camp life ... " 29 He asserts that "The 
concentration camp as a symbol of reality can only be 
compared to the notion of death as a terrifying oblivion. "30 
In spite of the longer period of time that separates 
us from Dostoevsky we may not expect to find it any easier 
to credit the events in Soviet Russia or to see the 
connection between them and the world of Dostoevsky. 
Theodor Reik says that though The Brothers Karamazov is not 
real, "it is truer to life than life itself ". Yet people 
would object if, as an expert criminologist and psychologist, 
he were to discuss the "invented" novel rather than a "real 
case ". "There are judges," he adds significantly, "who 
28 Curt Bondy, "Problems of Internment Camps ", 
The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XXXVIII 
(1943), p. 454. 
29 Elie A. Cohen, Human Behaviour in the Concentration 
Camp, tr. .H. Braaksma (Jonathan Cape, London, 19547:75:i17. 




maintain that judicial errors belong exclusively to the 
realms of fiction ".31 How much more potent then will be 
the mental effort where one's survival is at stake. áo 
strong sometimes is this "fairy tale" mentality, this 
fictive, self -preserving reaction, that even in the face 
of death itself one does not abandon the illusion that "it 
is impossible ". Dostoevsky himself understood this profoundly. 
More than once he recalls the time when he faced the firing 
squad with the other members of the revolutionary Petrashevsky 
group. He understood that a condemned man can make the last 
few hundred yards to the gallows appear as if death were a 
thousand miles away. 
If we were to choose from all of Dostoevsky's works 
the lines most pertinent to the utter confusion of dream 
and reality we should choose these words of Zossima: 
And we may ask the scornful 
themselves: if our hope is a dream, 
when will you build up your edifice 
and order things justly by your 
intellect alone, without Christ? 
... Of a truth, they have more 
fantastic dreams than we. They aim 
at justice, but, denying Christ, 
they will end by flooding the earth 
with blood, for blood cries out for 
blood, and he that taketh up the 
sword shall perish by the sword.32 
31 Theodor Reik, The Unknown Murderer, tr. Dr. Katherine 
ones (Hogarth Press, London, 1936), p. 238. 
32 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov tr. C. Garnett, 
(:William_ Heinemann, London,., 1912), p. 338. 
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Anyone who has read The House of the Dead will 
remember that one of the most astoundingly vivid scenes in 
that book takes place in the prisoner's bath house. Some- 
one has aptly described it as the most convincing portrait 
of hell on earth ever written. Another memorable scene in 
this book is the description of the prisoner's Christmas 
drama, a somewhat chaotic, but extremely amusing, human and 
touching scene. But what could any serious novelist, even 
a philosophical novelist of Dostoevsky's genius, do with a 
scene such as this? ... 
To the horrors of Solovetsk 
Soviet prison had been added a 
figment of delerium: in the midst 
of a typhoid epidemic, the prison 
theatre was filled with camp beds 
on which the sufferers lay moaning, 
but on the stage, surrounded by the 
dying, those convicts who had been 
promoted to the role of actors were 
with great fervour rehearsing a 
play celebrating the success of the 
Five Year Plan and of socialist 
Enthusiasm.33 
... Or with the case of the prison where "in the same 
cell you could find prisoners suffering severely from the 
effects of interrogation, about which nobody bothered, while 
every conceivable medicine for the prevention and cure of 
coughs, colds and headaches was regularly distributed. "34 
The same authors describe the fantastic legends that were 
33 Anton Ciliga, The Russian Enigma, tr. Fernand G. 
Renier and Anne Cliff. (George Routledge and Sons Ltd., 
London, 1940), p. 183. 
34 F. Beck and V. Godin, óp. cit., p. 59. 
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ingeniously created by accused people in response to the 
`NKVD's theory that the accused had to build up the case 
for his persecution by his own free -will. 
A Kiev workman, for instance, 
described in detail how he had tried 
to blow up a kilometre -long bridge 
over the Dnieper with several 
kilograms of arsenic, but, because 
of rainy weather, had had to abandon 
the attempt. A worker in an 
educational supplies factory ... 
maintained that he belonged to an 
organization whose object was the 
construction of artificial volcanoes 
to blow the entire Soviet Union 
sky- high.35 
Similarly, the complete confusion of the concepts of 
guilt and innocence resulting from the mass arrests in 
Russia between 1936 and 1938 has been reported by Alex 
Weissberg. He states that of approximately eight million 
people arrested between 1936 and 1938 not one was guilty 
as charged. As a result of this, the few spies and guilty 
ones who might have been arrested could not be detected from 
35 Ibid., p. 46. This type of exaggerated confession 
corresponds to the confession extracted from Robert Vogeler 
in Hungary: "Finally, after sixty days, he was at the end 
of his tether and wrote a 'confession' which he consciously 
phrased as extravagantly as possible, hoping that its very 
ridiculousness might transmit a message indicating his 
desparate position." (See James Clark Moloney, "Psychic 
Self- Abandon and Extortion of Confession ". The International 
Journal of Psycho -Ana_ ysis, XXXVI (1955), p. 57. However, 
it cannot be said that the Communists exaggerated for the 
same reason; their confessions were made in excess of zeal 
to confess, in a state bordering on intoxication. Perhaps 
Vogeler was nearer to such a state than he later realized. 
After sixty days of "mental or psychological torture" 
combined with the use of drugs (p. 56.) his confession 
could hardly have been phrased with complete consciousness. 
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the innocent, who had already been forced to confess.36 
In China (so it is reported) large public meetings 
are held at night in order to induce mass -hysteria, that 
is, the right psychological background for mass- brainwashing. 
In the servi- darkness, in 
strained silence, each member 
of the actor audience comes in 
turn to the middle of the circle 
and weeps at the recollection of 
his former existence and the 
misery and oppression of which 
he was the victim ... ;Thej cries 
for vengeance against those 
responsible for all the many 
evils of life rise in intensity ... 
In the course of such a public 
confession one can see the guilty 
man sob and even roll himself on 
the ground in despair ... The 
atmosphere of these assemblies 
cannot be described; one must 
have experienced it for oneself.37 
Perhaps enough examples have been given here to 
support our contention that it is neither Dostoevsky nor 
Kafka who have written "fairy tales ", but it is we ourselves 
who indulge in "fairy tales" and self- delusion when we 
prefer to believe "it is impossible ". When faced with the 
coincidence between Kafka's fantastic, unreal world and the 
totalitarian reality of today, one understands how difficult 
is the task of assimilating into a common -sense perspective 
36 Alex Weissberg, Conspiracy of Silence (Hamish 
Hamilton, London, 1952) pp. 1 - 3. 
37 Francis Dufay and Douglas Hyde, Red Star Versus 
the Cross (Paternoster Publications, London, 1954), p. 112. 
Cf. also Sargant, Battle for the Mind. "Mao's terror gets 
the utmost publicity ... Hundreds of mass trials, often 
involving thousands of blood -yelling participants, (are) 
carried out in the big cities, usually at a popular sports 
ground, in which the victims are publicly denigrated, then 
publicly shot." (quoted from Time magazine, Aarch 5, 1956). 
1 
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the reality of a world in which the worst fantasies of 
the unconscious break through and overwhelm the whole of 
human existence. But it is not simply in the concentration 
camps that the individual battle to preserve one's identity 
goes on, for this happens everywhere. All thinking men 
must be engaged in the one essential truggle to distinguish 
the real from the unreal, the nightmare from the waking 
reality, and the mere scapegoat from the real criminal. 
If we mean by "real" whatever is existent, then we must 
admit that the real as a concept is not capable of distin- 
guishing between the grotesque and the normal or between 
the irrational and the rational. Oddly enough, some people 
insist upon speaking of a "cult of unreason" as if this 
were something practised by secret societies or something 
found only in queer novels. 
What must be made clear with regard to the relation 
between guilt and the historical events of the twentieth 
century is that in the world of the unconscious, that is to 
say, in the existing world, it is not the punishment which 
fits the crime, but the crime which equals and even 
surpasses the punishment. Once the demon of projected 
guilt has been loosed on the world there is an end to good 
and evil; actual crimes go beyond the range of the most 
perverted imaginations as well as beyond the imagined crimes 
they are intended to redress. Does anyone seriously believe 
that either Sade or Dostoevsky possessed imaginations equal 
to the actual crises of our day? Here we see the enormous 
difficulty in understanding the causal relations between 
!-Jo 
57 
the historical crime and its provocation; in trying to 
seek these relations in observed historical events, we 
completely overlook the evidence froir_ the underworld life 
of man where forces unmeasured on earth are continually 
transforming the world. We see this difficulty especially 
in the incredibly feeble attempts to explain the manifold 
crimes of our age in the language of economics and 
sociology. We have been trained to observe, and, in fact, 
we desire to observe, only the visible relations on the 
surface of events, and many of these we disregard if they 
are too painful, or if we cannot fit them into any common- 
sense pattern of reality. Just as we may relegate to the 
unconscious whatever is evil in ourselves, so we disregard 
evil in others because self -preservation demands it, or 
because such evil in others reminds us too strongly of our 
own. 
The reason why the totalitarian 
regimes can get so far toward realizing 
a fictitious, topsy -turvy world is that 
the outside non -totalitarian world, 
which always comprises a great part 
of the population of the totalitarian 
country itself, indulges ... in 
wishful thinking and shirks reality 
in the face of real insanity ...38 
If, in the totalitarian reality, "earthly concepts 
lose all their meaning" and "the most gruesome fantasies 
are reality ", we can understand why Albert Camus has raised 
the problem of murder to the level of the most urgent 
philosophical problem of our day. But in actual fact, 
38 Arent, 22. cit., p. 413. 
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while it may be possible for us to debate the justifiability 
of killing human beings, the words and concepts we use are 
at the same time in process of becoming meaningless. "What 
meaning has the concept of murder when we are confronted 
with the mass production of corpses ... ¡when, murder is as 
impersonal as the squashing of a gnat, a merely managerial 
technique2 "39 A11 of the brief evidence included here, 
which presumably would be confirmed by the untold millions 
of dead, means that the human psyche possesses no absolute 
defence against a reality which goes beyond good and evil 
and therefore beyond guilt and innocence. The testimony of 
history since the war only bears out with painful clarity 
that both the juridical and the moral aspect of totalitarianism 
which is called "war guilt" remains unsolved. Little good 
it does to deny the concept of "war guilt" when the guilt 
is there whether we deny it or not. This guilt is a chapter 
not written in official histories, but surviving only in 
personal memories and recollections of incocr.prehensible 
crimes. The greatest crimes in the history of man go 
unpunished and unforgiven, and it is in. the nature of things 
that this should be so, because, being incomprehensible, 
they are beyond guilt and beyond innocence and therefore 
beyond man's capacity to judge. Where unforgivable and 
unpunishable crimes exist, it is sheer folly to deny the 
existence of a collective guilt consciousness. It is but 
39 Ibid., pp. 415-16. 
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another example of the "fairy tale" mentality, the 
temperament which finds it difficult, if not impossible, 
to regard Kafka with deep seriousness. For us, on the 
contrary, Kafka's world and the totalitarian world con_ple- 
ent each other; they are to be studied together and under- 
stood together as violent eruptions of the underworld life 
f man into the conscious life; accordinly, the reality of 
.odern totalitarianism in general and of the concentration 
camp in particular become at once the point of departure 
for understanding Kafka, while the world of Kafka helps to 
end historical perspective to the former. b 
rt 
TOTALITARIANISM AND "THE NEW MAN" 
The first step toward the understanding of totalitarianism 
s to view this revolutionary method of control as the 
ttempt by man, on a universal scale for the first time in 
istory, to reforge his own conscience. The evidence for 
his is in the structure of the totalitarian society - a 
tructure which is intentionally designed to force human 
eings under a revolutionary pattern of guilt and innocence. 
hus, not only does collective guilt exist, but it positively 
st exist wherever guilt is deliberately organized to 
evolve upon all the people individually and collectively. 
t is useless to condemn the "barbarous doctrines of 
ollective responsibility ",40 when collective responsibility 
40 H.D. Lewis, "Morality and Religion ", Philosophy, 
IV (1949), p. 52. 
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and organized guilt are the very essence of the totalitarian 
structure. It is not the doctrine that is barbarous, but 
the system which makes it possible for there to be such a 
collective responsibility.41 By claiming to accept all 
responsibility for everything done by his subordinates the 
totalitarian Leader gradually spreads among the people the 
idea of their guilty complicity. The real mystery of the 
totalitarian Leader resides in an organization which makes 
it possible for him to assume the total responsibility for 
all crimes ...1142 By this arrangement it becomes possible 
for him to enmesh the whole people within an organized 
collectivity of guilt. The "mystery" is simply the fully 
developed expression of a plain psychological fact: shared 
guilt is easier to bear than individual guilt. It is shared 
guilt which makes it possible for individual men to commit 
unheard of crimes as if they were sacred duties. Jaspers 
has noted the peculiar phenomenon of Nazism by which every 
German was forced to accept his complicity in the crimes 
41 "Collective guilt; is simply a psychic phenomenon, 
and therefore, when one asserts the collective nìilt of the 
German people, one is not passing sentence, but merely 
stating an existing fact." (Essays on Contemporary Events, 
p. 49). Cf. also Jaspers: "Dass wir Deutschen, dass jeder 
Deutsche, in irgendeiner Weise schuldig ist, daran kann, 
wenn unsere ausführungen nicht völlig grundlos waren, kein 
Zweifel sein." (Die Schuldfrage, p. 50.) Paul Tillich has 
said that although "Not many individuals in Germany are 
directly guilty of Nazi atrocities ... all of them are 
responsible for the acceptance of a government which was 
willing and able to do such things." (Love, Power and 
Justice, p. 94). 
42 Arendt, 22. cit., p. 363. 
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of the regim_e.43 
It is extremely important to fix this distinction in 
mind: modern totalitarian regimes differ from the autocracies 
and tyrannies of the past in no way so much as in their 
development of a completely revolutionary system of control. 
Absolute monarchies and various forms of autocracies have 
been traditionally distinguished by a leader who claimed 
autonomy for himself. By not surrendering in the least his 
right to wage war or to use his subjects in any way he pleased, 
i. this type of leader refused to allow his subjects the sense 
o_ of whole- hearted participation and personal involvement in 
his schemes.44 No modern totalitarian Leader, however, 
would ever make this mistake. On the contrary, his purpose 
I ; will be to create a complete system of mental and physical 
y' control which will have as a fundamental characteristic a 
revolutionary pattern of good and evil and of guilt and 
innocence; in other words, his purpose is the creation of 
men with radically different values, new men in every 
respect, but men who can never be emotionally detached from 
the Leader's ideals. The importance of this transformation 
1 
43 Karl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage, (Artemis - Verlag, 
Zurich, 1947), p. 61. 
44 Cf. Arendt, óp. cit., p. 362. "A tyrant would 
never identify himself with his subordinates, let alone 
with everyone of their acts ... he would always maintain 
an absolute distance from all his subordinates and all 
his subjects." It is significant that Stalin presented 
a double aspect to his followers - that of supreme and 
'exalted Leader as well as Comrade. 
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for the Leader and his group, and the evidence of its 
-;.essentially "religious" character is given in the means 
for assuring its continuing effect. Lenin regarded as the 
r most important duty of the Soviet law courts that of 
w; securing the strictest carrying out of the discipline and 
i ".self- discipline of the toilers ... Without compulsion such 
a task Lhe stated, is completely unrealizable.45 Thus, it 
is easy to understand why, in a country where the "withering 
1 away" of the state and the "withering away" of the law were 
t formerly confidently expected, there is now "the coexistence 
side by side of a system of force and a system of law .... "46 
To say merely that this system is one of force is to 
omit the presence of terror as its prime element. The 
presence of a condition of universal terror is far from 
being a haphazard or incidental part of the totalitarian 
structure; it is directly connected with the intentional 
dif .ision of guilt among all the people, a guilt moreover, 
$ which is not without a certain resemblance to that feeling 
of guilt experienced by people who have no means of 
rationally determining its source. One of the peculiar 
features of the totalitarian system of organized guilt is 
the deliberate obscuration of responsibility, with the result 
45 Harold J. Berman, Justice in Russia, (Harvard U.P., 
Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p. 306. 
46 See the preface by H.J. Berman to Boris A. 
Konstantinovsky, Soviet Law in Action, (Harvard U.P., 
Cambridge, .:lass., 1953). 
a: 
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that, on the one hand, certain individuals may commit the 
most revolting crimes without any sense of responsibility 
for them, while on the other hand, all people without 
exception always know that their responsibility can be 
arbitrarily fixed at any time. Thus, the total situation 
is such that guilt is everywhere and yet nowhere; it is at 
once general and subjective and particular and objective. 
The extreme example of the absence of any sense of guilt 
or responsibility is the concentration camp system. 
Everywhere one came up against 
the mechanism of divided and therefore 
elusive responsibility. This system 
which made it impossible to ascertain 
the final responsibility for any act, 
the most insignificant as well as the 
most horrible, contains the key to a 
psychological understanding of most of 
the happenings in the police prisons 
and in the concentration camps. The 
system was designed to make it possible 
for many members of the S.S. to take 
part in actions of which ... they 
would otherwise not have been capable.47 
The terror, however, resides precisely in the 
overwhelming awareness that victims are chosen arbitrarily 
from among any class or group and without any regard for 
objective guilt. In fact it may well be said that the very 
essence of the terror and the possibility of its perpetuation 
consists in its being arbitrary and without regard for 
objective guilt or innocence. 
47 Ella Lingens- Reiner, Prisoners of Fear, 
Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1948), p. 6. 
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A fundamental difference between 
modern dictatorship and all other 
tyrannies of the past is that terror 
is no longer used as a means to 
exterminate and frighten opponents, 
but as an instrument to rule masses 
of people who are perfectly obedient. 
Terror as we know it today strikes 
without any preliminary provocation, 
its victims are innocent even from 
the point of view of the persecutor.48 
Thus, it is possible that anyone may be a victim for 
any reason whatever since the totalitarian Leader extracts 
complete responsibility from everyone while simultaneously 
assuming total responsibility for himself. "The burden of 
the evidence now available indicates that the threat of 
arrest occurs as a very real possibility to a substantial 
portion of Soviet men, possibly as many as one in five, at 
some point in their lives ".49 Lenin's astute observation 
that compulsion must be an adjunct of the law has thus 
found its realization in ... 
A; system of terroristic police 
control, supporting but also super- 
vising the party for its leaders, and 
characteristically directed not only 
against demonstrable 'enemies' of the 
regime, but against arbitrarily 
selected classes of the population ,,.50 
Though the terror is maintained by the arbitrary 
selection of its victims, it should not be assumed that 
48 Arendt, on. cit., p. 6. 
49 Barrington Moore Jr., Terror and Progress U.S.S.R. 
(Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p. 155. 
50 Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, 
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Harvard U.P.,_ 
Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p. 10. 
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the Leader has no purpose in choosing one victim or set 
of victims rather than another. This is to view the system 
from the standpoint of the potential victim for whom the 
capriciousness of the terror is only too obvious. From 
the rulers' standpoint, on the other hand, terror is a 
means to an end, a rational device, to be used 'scientifically'. "51 
The Leader's victims are chosen for a reason that only he 
needs to know; indeed, the terror would largely cease to 
exist if the Leader explained beforehand who was guilty and 
why. Consistently, totalitarian practice is to descend 
suddenly on the chosen victim, dispose of him by exter- 
mination or imprisonment and only later to make a public 
explanation. Within this framework of terror and organized 
guilt, it is easy to see why the responsibility for control 
in modern totalitarian regimes has passed from the army to 
the secret police.52 
If such is the artificially created aura of terror 
within the totalitarian regime then how much greater must 
be the terror within the laboratories of the regime - the 
prisons and the concentration camps. We have been speaking 
of a world in which dream and reality exist side by side, 
a world in which objective fact may have no relation 
51 Moore, óp. cit., p. 157. See also Weissberg, 
22. cit., p. 2. 
52 See Hannah Arendt's contribution to Totalitarianism: 
Proceedings of a Conference held at the American Academy 
of Arts and Sciences, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (Harvard U.P., 
Cambridge, Mass., 1954), p. 76. 
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whatever to a natural order of objective existence because 
modern consciousness is no longer founded upon authority. 
The most extreme form of this breakdown between dream and 
reality takes place in the prisons and camps of the 
totalitarian world where guilt and innocence, good and 
evil are utterly without any significance, except for that 
which is given by brute chance. Just as in the normal 
world men are not held guilty because of what they dream, 
no one is guilty in the concentration camp because what 
happens there is outside and beyond ordinary guilt or 
innocence. The ultimate battle is neither to live nor to 
die but simply to retain for as long as possible the 
semblance of some identity with a self which the surrounding 
world is purposely designed to destroy. Whether the final 
purpose within this environment is destruction and death, 
or whether it is the planned destruction of one self and 
the creation of another, the point is invariably reached 
where the dividing line between fact and fiction is broken 
down. That even the strongest willed individual must have 
a breaking point was demonstrated by Pavlov in his experi- 
ments on dogs.53 Among the "scientific" demonstrations 
developed in the laboratories of the totalitarian world is 
that of the systematic effort to produce this breaking 
point as quickly as possible and to achieve thereby a world 
53 See Chapter II, "Animal and Human Behaviour 
Compared" in William Sargant, Battle for the Mind, 
(Heinemann, London, 1957). 
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outside of guilt and innocence and even outside life and 
death. Thus it is, that, without exception, those who 
return from this world understand that they can no longer 
communicate their experience to others. They have come 
from a world where the "anarchic power of accident "54 and 
sheer arbitrary terror have ruled over life and death, 
where merely to be alive is to feel guilty, where terror 
creates a pervasive and abstract guilt to isolate every 
victim from every other victim while creating a bond 
between the victim and his persecutors. "One of the more 
horrible consequences of these ruthless interrogations, as 
described by victims, is that they suddenly begin to feel 
54 Elie A. Cohen, 2.2. cit., p. 155. Cf. the following 
lines of Kafka: "... the mere reflection is enough that 
during or after my descent one of the countless accidents 
of existence might prevent my confidant from fulfilling 
his duty, and what incalculable results might not the 
smallest accident of that kind have for me? ... I can 
only trust myself and my burrow." (The Burrow" in The 
Great Wall of China, p. 61). It is precisely "the count- 
less accidents of existence" which meant for Kafka that 
the reasonableness of personal events upon which normal 
life has always depended no longer exists. The Platonic 
doctrine that no evil can happen to a good man should now 
be changed to: evil can happen only to the good man. 
"Schmar, the murderer, took up his post about nine o'clock 
one night in clear moonlight by the corner where Wese, his 
victim, had to turn from the street where his office was 
into the street he lived in .... At the very corner 
dividing the two streets Wese paused; only his walking 
stick came round into the other street to support him. A 
sudden whim. The night sky invited him, with its dark blue 
and its gold. Unknowing, he gazed up at it, unknowing he 
lifted his hat and stroked his hair; nothing up there drew 
together in a pattern to interpret the immediate future for 
him; everything stayed in its senseless, inscrutable place. 
In itself it was a highly reasonable action that Wese 
should walk on, but he walked on to Schmar's knife." 
( "A Fratricide ") 
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affection for the examiner who has been treating them so 
harshly ... they are near to breaking point and will soon 
confess. "55 
Hannah Arendt has spoken the truth about our age, and, 
at the same time, caught the essence of fear in the world 
of Kafka with these words: "The basic experiences and the 
basic sufferings of our time take place in an atmosphere 
where innocence is beyond virtue and guilt is beyond crime. "56 
The atmosphere, for example, of "The Penal Settlement" or 
The Trial demonstrates the madness of an age in which guilt 
cannot be reckoned because good and evil have no meaning. 
The experiments carried out in the prisons and camps 
of the totalitarian world can be understood only as logical 
developments of that world itself. The frenzied desire to 
act upon the world, to change the world at all costs even 
if it means destroying the world, to change the human psyche 
even if it means destroying the psyche, finds its logical 
conclusion in those laboratories where good and evil are 
merely fictions of the imagination, and where guilt and 
innocence are completely artificial stages to be manufactured 
at will by the "experts ". The totalitarian world is the 
initial expression of supreme contempt for everything that 
is merely given in the world; it is the first fruit of 
55 Sargant, 2n. cit., p. 209. 
56 Arendt, 22. cit., p. 430. 
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the dawning suspicion that ends and means have no other 
relation than what men choose to give them; in short, that 
nothing is impossible. In its ultimate expression this 
outlook emerges in the creation of experimental camps where 
the "scientific" transformation of human nature, the creation 
of "new men ", and the equally "scientific" destruction of 
life, have combined to demonstrate the horrible truth of 
the suspicion that no limits exist for the possible. The 
very haste with which ordinary men rush to convince them- 
selves and others that "it is impossible" only tends to 
suggest that everything is indeed possible. As we cannot 
hope to understand the concentration camp without under- 
standing the totalitarian world which gave birth to it, so 
we cannot hope to understand the latter without an 
examination of the problems which have made it possible. 
For ... "the fact is that the true problems of our time 
cannot be understood, let alone solved, without acknowledg- 
ment that totalitarianism became this century's curse only 
because it so terrifyingly took care of its problems 




THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE CONCENTRATION CAMP 
To state, in effect, that the concentration camp is 
the ultimate objective expression of the absurd does not 
seem to be consistent with the suggestion that there is an 
intentional theory behind it. Yet, just as the terror is 
a "rational" device for achieving a desired end, the camps 
must be considered as having their own rationale in the 
midst of the sense of unreality which they produce. The 
concentration camps in theory can only be compared to the 
monomaniacal insistence, seen everywhere in varying degrees, 
that the outside world should conform to our demands upon 
it. Just as the individual monomaniac cannot tolerate any 
difference of opinion nor any departure from his notion of 
reality, the camps exist to destroy every last vestage of 
opposition either by transforming whatever is "hostile" 
into a state of acquiescence, or by wiping out everything 
that is considered useless or incorrigible. Only a collective 
state of mind dominated and possessed completely by a 
singular ideology could account for this monumental act of 
aggression against the world and everything in it; for 
nothing can be excluded from the monomaniac's desire to 
bring all of reality into conformity with his idea of it; 
the mere existence of anything which denies his idea must 
be destroyed; anything that is not absorbed and physically 
altered exists as an enemy, there can be no limits, no 
bounds to what can be assimilated or destroyed. Thus, the 
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tremendous, insatiable lust for action against the world, 
which is one of the chief marks of totalitarianism, reaches 
its pitch of insane genius in the concentration camp. The 
concentration camp is the inevitable development of modern 
totalitarianism; neither could exist as we know them without 
the other. 
With reference to the German concentration camps it 
has been said that "Their main purpose was the elimination 
of every trace of actual or potential opposition ix) Nazi 
rule ".1 Precisely the same intention to destroy every 
evidence of "the other" could be ascribed to all concentra- 
tion camps in the world today. In these camps the battle 
is truly "for the mind "; if the mind cannot be changed it 
can be easily destroyed; indeed, we may say, that to some 
extent the mind is destroyed in any case. An internee wrote 
of the corrective labour camps that "Nobody leaves lagier 
behind. Lagier is forever.i2 A British government study 
reports that "It was the prison camps set up by the Chinese 
and North Koreans that became the battleground for the 
war of minds. "3 Another study of the camps reports that 
1 Eugen Kogan, The Theory and Practice of Hell, 
tr. Heinz Norden (Seeker and 'Warburg, London, 1959), p. 30. 
(Quotation italicized in original). 
2 The Dark Side of the Moon (author unnamed; preface 
by T. S. Eliot. Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1946), p. 107. 
3 Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea, 
(Ministry of Defence, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 
London, 1955), p. 1. 
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their main goal is "to break the prisoners as individuals 
and to change them into docile masses from which no 
individual or group act of resistance could arise .... "4 
The insane desire to change or destroy everything opposing 
the philosophy behind the regime results in "the concentra- 
tion camp as a means of producing changes in the prisoners 
which will crake them more useful subjects of the Nazi 
state. "5 Methods employed in the camps may vary, but, due; 
to the almost absolute control of the few over the many, 
the achievement of their ,goal is relatively simple. 
The urge of self -preservation, 
bestial fear, hunger, and thirst led 
to a complete transformation of the 
majority of the prisoners. Never 
before ... had I witnessed such a 
loss of self -control. The ruthless 
struggle of 'each against all' began. 
No one spoke in ordinary tones, 
everyone screamed ... When food was 
brought in, an excitement ensued 
which one can otherwise observe 
only among animals ... Every trace 
of reason disappeared.5 
Sargant has been quoted as authority for the strange 
and "horrible" feeling of affection which the tortured 
prisoner begins to feel for his persecutor. Another aspect 
of this phenomenon is that of identification by the 
prisoner himself with the values of his torturers. "A 
prisoner had reached the final stage of adjustment to the 
4 Bruno Bettelheim, "Individual and Mass Behaviour in 
Extreme Situation ", The Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, XXXVIII (l943Y, p. 418. 
5 Ibid., p. 419. (Quotation italicized in original). 
6 Curt Bondy, "Problems of Internment Camps ", The Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XXXVIII (1943), p. 455. 
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camp situation when he had changed his personality so as 
to accept as his own the values of the Gestapo."7 This 
identification became so complete that old prisoners lost 
even the sense of injustice done to them; they fully 
complied to the very letter with absurd rules that had 
originated in the whim of some guard. Such prisoners 
believed they lived according to values they themselves 
had created, when in fact they had no values of their own, 
but only those of the Gestapo. It is reported that the 
main goal of this effort was to reduce the prisoners to a 
"childlike dependency on the will of the leaders. "8 
The impossibility of recreating the full terror of 
the concentration camp, and the refusal of the rational 
temperament to digest even that which can be recreated, 
have at their basis a world so utterly unbelievable that 
men within it begin to regard themselves as objects. Among 
the prisoners and in himself Bettelheim noticed a split 
between his objective and subjective self which was 
"strangely mixed with a conviction that 'this cannot be 
true, such things just do not happen ".9 Thus the 
prisoners were so affected that they "had to convince them - 
selves that this was real, was really happening, and not 
just a nightmare. They were never wholly successful. "10 
7 Bettelheia_, 2n. cit., p. 447. 
8 Ibid., p. 452. 
9 Ibid., p. 431. 
10 Ibid., p. 432. 
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Our study has now brought us to the point where the 
results of concentration camp existence for the prisoner, 
for his guards, and for the totalitarian society as a whole, 
may be formulated. The conclusion which presents itself 
is that totalitarianism, as the conscious expression of 
man's wish to transform his own nature, uses the concen- 
tration camp as a laboratory to push forward its experi- 
ments on human nature to the farthest possible extreme, 
thereby destroying all opposition either. by "converting" 
it, or by destroying it completely in accordance with a 
"final solution." Yet the camps, plus all the horrors 
which they create, are not completely alien to that belief 
which a large part of mankind hopefully and quite innocently 
anticipated as the dawn of a new age, namely, the belief 
that human nature had not been cast for eternity into one 
unalterable mould. 
The success of the camps is quite simply accounted 
for: every camp presents the greatest possibility for 
controlled behaviour (such was the original purpose of the 
concentration camp); the internees are brought into the 
same relation to their masters as rats in a maze to the 
scientist who conducts an experiment. Some camps are more 
tightly and scientifically controlled than others. The 
Chinese, for example, are said to be experts at what is 
called "milieu control ". By this system of control "The 
Chinese Communist prison is probably the most thoroughly 
controlled and manipulated group environment that has ever 
76 
existed. ".11 
In his medical study of the concentration camp, Cohen, 
who was an internee, states his conclusion thus: "The 
super -ego, which is, as we know, among other things the 
introjection of the voices of parents, teachers, and 
society, is no unchangeable quantity. 1112 Hannah Arendt 
expresses her conviction that "the very thing that must be 
realized is that the psyche can be destroyed even without 
the destruction of the physical man ... "13 The frailty of 
man's moral being has never been so clearly understood as 
by the internees. 
I have looked in vain for 
marks of fellowship or mutual 
kindness among prisoners. Such 
things do not exist and they 
cannot exist. Only after such 
study is it possible to see how 
impulses of our own that we are 
accustomed to think of as part 
of our natures, impulses toward 
kindness and good fellowship ... 
our sympathy ... are, in effect, 
11 Robert J. Lifton, "Thought Reform of Western 
Civilians in Chinese Communist Prisons ", Psychiatry , 19 
(1956), p. 191. (Quotation italicized in original). 
Cf. also this statement: "The political education of 
prisoners in the North Korean camps was not, however, 
confined to oral indoctrination. The Chinese imposed a 
rigid censorship, not only on news from the outside world, 
but also on every form of literature." (Treatment of 
British Prisoners of War in Korea, p. 8.) 
12 Cohen, Human Behaviour in the Concentration Camp., 
p. 278. 
13 Arendt, The Burden of Our Time, p. 415. 
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so many spiritual luxuries which 
the conditions of our life allow 
us, and by no means ineradicable 
aspects of our own character, or 
any evidence of what we may be 
like at rock- bottom.14 
Moreover, the destruction of the psyche and the 
transformation of the structure of the super -ego are not 
limited to the prisoners but extend to everyone within the 
totalitarian society. This would seem to follow from the 
point made several times before that the camp is a logical 
extension of the totalitarian system; what happens even at 
the remotest boundaries of the system will be found to 
happen with a maximum of intensity and speed to the 
individuals in the camps. As for the camp guards, Cohen 
found that in the S.S. many intelligent people from cultured 
and religious backgrounds underwent a complete change in 
their moral consciousness during their adult years. This 
astounding psychological fact is not to be confused with a 
mere change of one set of moral values for another; that it 
was a change of consciousness is to be emphasized. 
Concerning this, Cohen states his belief that the original 
super -ego was changed into a "criminal super -ego" which hence- 
forth permitted the commission of incredible crimes without 
incurring a sense of guilt.15 He also says that the guards 
14 The Dark Side of the Moon, p. 107. 
15 Cohen, 22. cit., pp. 232 -3. Similarly, Bychowski 
asserts that German doctors and scientists who worked for 
the Nazis succeeded in creating new super -egos for themselves. 
(Dictators and Disciples, p. 191). 
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"really believed in a Jewish- capitalistic world conspiracy 
against the German people, and whoever opposed the Nazis 
participated in it and was therefore to be destroyed ..."16 
With regard to the effects of totalitarian control out- 
side the camps, Bettelheim_, who also writes from personal 
experience, has this to say: "It seems that what happens in 
an extreme fashion to the prisoners who spend several years 
in the concentration camp happens in less exaggerated form 
to the inhabitants of the big concentration camp called greater 
Germany. "17 In other words, it is possible to exert a rigid 
control over vast spaces and over multitudes of people who 
cooperate willingly in the transformation of their own 
personalities. By surrendering their freedom, the masses 
lend themselves to an experiment which ends in the creation 
of a "new collective ego ", a revolutionary ego structure after 
the pattern of reality created by the leader.18 Such 
acquiescence on the part of the masses, mobs and groups 
suggests a condition of hypnosis in which the individual may 
easily assume what would normally be called a criminal super- 
ego. Flugel states that it is no less possible for whole 
nations to become transformed in this manner. -9 Bychowski 
states that the leaders in Russia "have been successful in 
16 Ibid., p. 447. 
17 Bettelheim_, ,off. cit. , p. 452. 
18 Professor Alexander Kennedy, in a conversation with 
the present writer, affirmed the possibility of a totally 
amoral community. On the other hand, a community of idol 
worshippers would also be possible. 
19 Flugel, Man, Morals and Society, pp. 210 -11. 
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in promoting Communist ideals to the point where they have 
formed the core of a new collective ego ideal which superseded 
the old one. "20 It may be said that practically no limits exist 
to the possible directions and the extent to which reality can 
be transformed under conditions of mass hypnosis. Under such 
conditions, men not only cheerfully surrender their freedom., but 
they calmly accept death in the full knowledge of their innocence, 
as if their deaths were a necessary expiatory sacrifice.22 In 
the prisons, men who had been condemned to death accepted their 
sentence without a word of protest. In the prison where Ciliga 
was kept, "men taken out to be shot left the ward without a 
word, without a cry of revolt against the government that put 
them to death. "23 Merely the misfortune of being brought 
20 Bychowski, Dictators and Disciples, p. 241. 
21 Ibid., p. 244. 
22 Ciliga, The Russian Enigma, p. 96. 
23 Ibid., p. 183. The authors of Russian P r e,d ht 
Extraction of Confession concur with Alex Weissberg in the opinion 
that, almost without exception, the prisoners were innocent of the 
accusations against them, and that their confessions were purely 
legendary. (p. 182.) Yet they insist that these condemned 
individuals could not escape a sense of guilt, for they had been 
loyal to a system which they now had to experience in its exercise 
of arbitrary terror. This feeling of guilt, the interrogation 
methods, and their desperate need to believe in the system and its 
leaders were the strongest influences in their lack of will to 
resist. (p. 180.) The most successful converts from the stand- 
point of the system are obviously those who condemn themselves. 
There is, for example, the recent case of the American woman who 
left a Chinese prison camp convinced that having been manacled and 
chained to a wall was far less than she deserved. Her case, 
perhaps, had not advanced as far as that of one Isobel Gowdie, who, 
according to Scott, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the 
consequences accused herself thus: "I do not deserve to be seated 
here at ease and unharmed, but rather to be stretched on an iron 
rack; nor can my crimes be atoned for, were I to be drawn asunder 
by wild horses." Scott adds "It only remains to suppose, that 
this wretched creature was under the dominion of some peculiar 
species of lunacy ..." (Sir 'Walter Scott, Letters on Demplicanv 
and Witchcraft, D. 282.) 
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under the control of a nation ruled by a powerful idée fixe 
is enough to cause people to change their values. Such was 
the case among thousands of people in France after the 
German invasion. It is reported of the Dutch people that ... 
... in the first three months 
of the occupation they' passed 
through what I might call a collective 
neuresthenic phase ... a kind of 
paralysis took possession of the 
people. Men were exhausted physically 
and mentally. They could find nothing 
upon which to base any hopes ... It 
was small wonder, therefore, that many 
were inclined to listen to the 
soothing words and the many promises 
of Seyss -Inquart. People tried to 
mitigate their lot by finding 
justifications for the German 
invasion.24 
Hitler once said that his great mission was to free 
humanity from the chimera called conscience or morality. 
We wonder if this is possible. What the world seems to be 
witnessing may indeed be the birth of a new creature, but 
it is a birth attended by monumental hatred and the sub- 
stitution of one guilt pattern for another. Man seems to 
be determined that the world will not end with either a 
bang or a whimper, but only with a mighty groan of anguish 
and suffering. One begins to wonder if the human race is 
now entering upon another stage of super -ego formation. 
Does the violent projection of guilt in the form of wars 
and revolutions, which characterizes our age, correspond to 
the killing of the primal father by the sons? What does 
it suggest for the future of man that the basic structure 
24 A.M. Meerloo, Total War and the Human Mind, 
(George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1944), p. 119. 
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of his super -ego was formed over a period lasting many 
generations, perhaps tens of thousands of years? We are 
reminded of Ivan Karamazov's comparison of man's destruction 
of the idea of God with the beginning of a new geological 
age. In the meanwhile the concentrated effort to purge 
gran of his old conscience and to graft on the new continues 
in the concentration camps and the totalitarian societies 
of the world. 
Among the theorists and psychologists of the totalitarian 
world there is at present an intransigent emphasis upon 
consciousness, upon conscious behaviour for every individual, 
which indicates the effort to bring about by every possible 
means the identification of conscience with consciousness. 
The absolute goals that must be strictly formulated in the 
individual mind are simply the reflection of the gigantic 
process of acting upon the world at large so as to bring it 
into conformity with the totalitarian notion of reality. 
Thus, the "impossible" may become reality by the mere whim 
of the Party line. Everything is objective which coincides 
with one's expectations of reality; whatever does not fit 
can either be made to fit or be destroyed. "For instance, 
if the working class, organized in a political party, 
decide that five million bourgeois should die, thôir decision 
corresponds to an objective order of history. "25 Obviously, 
25 Zevedei Barbu, Democracy and DictatorshLE, 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1956), p. 250. 
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an objective order of history cannot be a crime to those 
who have made it objective. However, leaders come and go, 
and totalitarian conceptions of objective reality have been 
known to change overnight. What then happens to the concepts 
of guilt and innocence? They too become no less subject to 
the creation of objective history than any other concept or 
event. A doctrine is formally erinunciated; a goal is 
prescribed toward which all reality must invariably move; 
history is scientifically forecast. But what if reality 
and the preconceived goals do not coincide? Then the 
history of the past must be rewritten and the future re- 
told; and not forgotten are the "criminals" who misdirected 
history and led everybody astray. We can see that there is 
here "a 'paranoid' concept of reality, that is, a reality 
which should at any cost identify itself with one's ideas 
of and expectations from it. "26 Thus, a situation exists 
where millions of people declared to be criminals and locked 
in concentration camps might suddenly be declared innocent, 
and then declared guilty again before they could be released. 
The concepts of guilt and innocence have no meaning whatever 
within such a system; they are constantly in use, everybody 
in the last analysis must be distinguished by his guilt or 
his innocence, but if guilt and innocence are applied with 
utter disregard for anything but making history correspond 
to our "expectations" then these concepts must cease to 
26 Loc. cit. 
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have any meaning at all. " Their only criterion is the 
scientifically forecast course of history itself, according 
to which certain crimes are necessary and for which there- 
fore 'criminals' must be found. "27 
An example of the arbitrary treatment of such 
concepts as guilt and punishment can be found in the 
development of Soviet legal theory.28 In the early period 
of Soviet law, theorists generally agreed that law and 
religion were the two chief enemies of a classless society; 
both would have to "wither away" with the state. In the 
first Soviet criminal code the concepts of guilt and punish - 
ment were given an extremely idealistic treatment. The very 
word crime was made taboo, and the phrase "socially dangerous 
act" was ¿iven its place. But in 1929 the "withering away" 
theory began to undergo drastic revision.29 Eventually 
the leading Soviet legal critic of those bourgeois concepts 
was himself attacked on all sides and declared guilty of 
27 Hannah Arendt in Totalitarianism. p. 79. In the 
sarr_e work cf. Bertram D. Wolfe's essay on the totalitarian 
treatment of history where he writes: "What the totalitarian 
is sure of is what the rest of us are most unsure of ... It 
is the totalitarian's certainty about the future which makes 
him so ruthless in manipulating the present. To make the 
present conform to the inevitable future, he finds it 
justifiable to use force and fraud, persuasion and violence, 
to wage total and unending war on 'all existing conditions' 
..." (Totalitarianism, p. 264). 
28 See Chapter III in Raymond A. Bauer, The New Man in 
Soviet Psychology, (Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1952). 
29 Ibid., p. 36. 
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"opportunistic nonsense. "30 Since 1937 all the former 
idealism has so far gone by the board that "Soviet criminal 
law has stressed condemnation and disapproval of the crime 
and the criminal. "31 
The Chinese have apparently learned much from the 
mistakes of the Russians. They have founded their prison 
code solidly on a foundation of punishment for the criminal 
and simultaneous reform of his whole moral outlook. What 
might be called the philosophy of thought reform is described 
in the Chinese prison code: 
In dealing with the criminals 
there shall be regularly adopted 
measures of collective study classes, 
individual interviews, study of 
assigned documents, and organized 
discussions to educate them in the 
admission of guilt and obedience 
to the law, political and current 
events, labour production, and 
culture, so as to expose the nature 
of the crime committed, thoroughly 
wipe out criminal thoughts, 
w 
nd 
establish a new moral code.32 
An editorial in Jen Min Jih Pao (The People's Daily) explains 
30 Ibid., p. 37. 
31 Ibid., p. 40. See also the essay by Jerzy G. 
Gliksman in Totalitarianism. The new legal imperative is 
that no offence should remain unpunished. (p. 63.) The 
study made by Gorer and Rickman states that "The communists 
have also greatly extended the pre -revolutionary use of the 
emotion of shame, stid, and appear to consider this emotion 
of great social value." (The People of Great Russia, p. 150). 
32 Lifton, 2n. cit., p. 175. 
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the theory behind this method of thought reform. 
All crimes have definite 
social ideological roots ... if 
we are to wipe out all crimes from 
their root, in addition to inflicting 
on the criminals the punishment due, 
we must also carry out various 
effective measures to transform the 
various ideological conceptions in 
the minds of the people, so that 
they may be educated and reformed 
into new people.33 
It now becomes apparent that the creators of the "new 
man" cannot do without the concept of guilt in the thought 
reform movement. The modern makers of the "new man" cannot 
begin to fashion their creature without moulding him in the 
image of one who is either guilty or innocent, either black 
or white. 
According to the study made by Lifton, thought reform 
for the individual begins with his arrest at midnight or in 
the early morning.34 Then follow long periods of interro- 
gation in which torture, self- abasement and constant demands 
for confession alternate with periods of leniency and complete 
silence. The technique is also one of "intellectually 
pulverizing the prisoner. Through a process of intellectual 
attrition the prisoner is gradually induced to question his 
own judgement, his own memory, even his own motives. "35 
33 Loc. cit. 
34 If there is one thing which appears absolutely 
invariable among totalitarian regimes it is the arrest at 
night. 
35 Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship 
and Autocracy, p. 158. 
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This treatment continues for several months until the 
prisoner is physically worn out, undernourished and "highly 
confused ". He "may no longer be able to clearly demarcate 
the boundaries of truth and fiction. He is guilt- ridden, 
demoralized, and depressed, frequently to the point of 
being suicidal or experiencing transient psychotic symptoms. "36 
An effort is made to give the prisoner "insicnt" into any 
particular guilty act of the past, followin;; which his guilt 
sense is broadened to include his entire life. At this 
point he "feels in need of thorough personal 'reform ".3? 
36 Lifton, off. cit., p. 179. Cf. the following state- 
ment of Sir George Mackenzie cited by Scott: "These poor 
creatures, when they are defamed, become so confounded 
with fear and the close prison in which they are kept, and 
so starved for want of meat and drink, either of which wants 
is enough to disarm the strongest reason ... and when men 
are confounded with fear and apprehension, they will imagine 
things the most rediculous and absurd ...." (Scott, Letters 
on Demonology and Witchcraft, p. 284). 
37 Ibid., p. 190. Cf. Sargant: "Brainwashers use a 
technique of conversion which does not depend only on the 
heightening of group suggestibility, but also on the fomenting 
in an individual of anxiety, of a sense of real or imaginary 
guilt, and of a conflict of loyalties, strong and prolonged 
enough to bring about the desired collapse." (p. 135). In 
modern political brainwashing the interrogators cleverly 
discover the victim's most vulnerable point, a latent feeling 
of remorse or a sensitive doubt, and on this point they work 
until the victim makes the required confession. (p. 146). 
Cf. Scott again with reference to Mackenzie: "This learned 
author gives us an instance, how these unfortunate creatures 
might be reduced to confession, by the very infamy which the 
accusation cast upon them, and which was sure to follow, 
condemning them for life to a state of necessity, misery, 
and suspicion, such as any person of reputation would 
willingly exchange for a short death, however painful." (p. 284). 
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A Bishop describes the process in this manner: "What they 
try to impress on you is a complex of guilt. The complex 
I had was that I was guilty ... I was a criminal - that 
was my feeling day and niht. "38 On all sides the prisoner 
encounters the demand for confession. 
As the confession develops, 
the prisoner finds it looming 
before him as the basic reality 
of his immediate world, no matter 
how much it is at variance with 
the truth as he previously under- 
stood it. What he admits and 
what he wishes become standing 
truths, and a lever for additional 
confession pressures, creating a 
vicious circle of accusation and 
guilt.39 
At last the final stage is reached - "The recoding of 
reality ... the acquisition of a new view of the world, and 
of a new personal relationship to the world ... He identifies 
himself fully with his captors. He is happy in his faith. 
He has been reborn ".40 Oddly enough, the symbolism of this 
process in Chinese thought reform is actually that of a 
"religious" movement from death to rebirth.41 The progressive 
steps are plainly marked out: (1) "The annihilation of 
identity" in which the victim is systematically reduced to 
38 Ibid., p. 178. 
39 Ibid., p. 183. 
40 Ibid.., p. 191. 
41 Ibid., p. 188. 
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a sub -human level; (2) "The establishment of guilt" in 
which the victim is forced into a mental atmosphere of 
guilt. The victiïc is surrounded by cell - mates who urge his 
guilt upon him with increasing insistence; the atmosphere 
is such that everything he hears merges into the command: 
"You must learn to feel guilty.i42 Eventually the stage 
is reached where he actually desires punishment for himself,43 
a punishment moreover which he feels he deserves. "His 
Pervasive inner pain is experienced as guilt anxiety. 1144 
In attempting to review the reasons for a system of 
thought reform which follows mechanistic lines and which 
disdains any demonstration of patience or human kindness, 
we are left to pursue a number of possible explanations. 
Setting aside those which deal with strictly national or 
racial characteristics we arrive at the following practical 
and ideological considerations. Lifton refers to a private 
communication from Raymond Bauer in which the latter gives 
his opinion that the confession extraction methods are 
more likely derived from Marxist- Leninist and Stalinist 
doctrine than from Pavlovian techniques.45 Sargant, on the 
other hand, has carefully studied the relation between Pavlov's 
techniques and the confession extraction methods. He writes: 
42 Ibid., p. 189. 
43 Sargant, 2n. cit., p. 177. 
44 Lifton, óp. cit., p. 189. 
45 Ibid., p. 194. 
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"Pavlov's work seems to have influenced the techniques 
used in Russia and China for the eliciting of confessions, 
for brain -washing and for inducing sudden political 
conversion. "46 Another writer notes an age -old method 
with Pavlovian features: "No matter which technique the 
Chinese were using, they always structured the situation 
in such a way that the correct response was immediately 
followed, by some sort of reward, while an incorrect response 
was immediately followed by threats or punishment. "47 
Still another view is that the Chinese theory of "`re- 
education was based on certain assumptions, namely: that 
the Communists had a monopoly of the truth; that the 
prisoners accepted that they had been dupes of their 
capitalist rulers; that they were willing to learn the 
'truth' and that they welcomed their 'liberation' by the 
Chinese" .48 
46 Sargant, off,. eito, p. 3. Karl Stern writes: "I 
strongly suspect an inner connection between the Pavlovian 
reflex machine and the technique of obtaining confessions 
in the Soviet Union. If the connection is not one of method, 
it is certainly one of philosophy." (The Third Revolution, 
p. 250). Cf. also Mrs. Haldane's statement: "For a materialist, 
the analogy between dogs and men was obvious, as were the 
practical and political implications of Pavlov's researches 
for human beings. Men, like dogs, could be conditioned to 
react to any given situation in the desired manner, for they 
too, were animals. Subsequent application of this theory 
certainly appeared to justify it, not only in the Soviet 
Union, but also in Italy and Germany." (Charlotte Haldane, 
Truth Will Out, p. 39). 
47 Edgar H. Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program 
for Prisoners of War ", Psychiatry, 19 (1956), p. 163. 
48 Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea, p. 2. 
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Along with the foregoing considerations we must 
distinguish between those methods which are used because 
they are convenient and effective and methods which are 
determined by a fanatical world outlook. There is reason 
to believe that even had Pavlov never lived, many of his 
techniques would nevertheless have been developed independ- 
ently of any truly scientific attitude toward behaviour 
problems. Instead, they should have grown naturally out 
of a system intentionally designed to exert the greatest 
possible control over every individual member. In a fanatical, 
paranoid view of reality demanding the coincidence of every 
aspect of reality with that same view, the mind of every 
man must be of the greatest importance. Simply to allow the 
independence (to say nothing of the revolt) of a single 
human mind would be to threaten the strength of the whole 
system; it would be tantamount to denying the correctness 
of the system's ideology. Even the smallest particles of 
matter cannot escape; indeed, they are the very first to 
be incorporated within the system; they form the foundation. 
How then can the human mind, which always tends to show 
most clearly its independence, be permitted to remain out- 
side the pale? Here we see clearly the reason for individual 
confessions, for the months devoted to breaking down a 
single individual, after which he may as well be shot as 
allowed to live. Here is a system "that recognizes no 
spatial limits ... no temporal limits ... and no limits to 
its power over the individual: its will to power claims 
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total possession over every man it wins ... "49 In view 
of this, it seems probable that even without the knowledge 
of Pavlovian techniques a system of controls and methods 
would have been developed within the totalitarian system 
to effect results similar to those of Pavlov. 
Totalitarian solutions by their very nature present 
themselves as universal solutions; they may, for this 
reason, survive among good tren who are as sincerely eager 
to condemn them as they are to put them into practice. 
Totalitarian solutions live on in the world in the form of 
strong temptations which develop most readily in an 
atmosphere of suspicion and hatred where guilt and innocence 
become so tenuous as to be almost indistinguishable. 
Wherever suspicion begins to influence thought we may 
expect to find the most insignificant details counting in 
courts of law as primary evidence; guilt by association 
and guilt by intention rather than by overt action will be 
given precedence. Suspicion of guilt is, under these 
circumstances, far worse than the evidence of objective 
guilt. It is probable that where suspicion and mutual 
distruVt are present, objective guilt can never be deter- 
mined according to rules of law and justice. And there 
49 Jules Monnerot, Sociology of Communism, tr. Jane 
Degras and Richard Rees George Allan and Unwin Ltd., 
London, 1948), p. 18. Cf. also Bertram Wolfe: "Even the 
mighty dead must be made °usable', that is, made to conform, 
or they must be mocked, diminished, debunked and retro- 
actively purged." (Totalitarianism, p. 267). 
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will be a pervasive suspicion that even the denial of guilt 
conceals greater guilt; thus, in non -totalitarian countries 
it can easily come about that men have to defend themselves 
against the most vague yet the most serious imputations of 
guilt. The McCarthy enquiries in the United States were 
notorious for the high- handed way in which the most serious 
charges were used to suggest guilt and to create ever 
deeper suspicion. McCarthy himself urged witnesses suspected 
of Communist sympathies to "purge" themselves of their "bad" 
thoughts. The emphasis in these inquiries tended to make 
guilty associations and guilty sympathies of equal weight 
with guilty actions.50 Further dangers of the arbitrary 
manipulation of the concept of wilt can be seen in the 
totalitarian tendency to objectify guilt before any crime 
has been committed on the grounds that to name the person 
who might be capable of a given crime in the future is 
manifestly to forestall the "crime" and therefore to ensure 
public safety. Again, we can see that even in the non - 
totalitarian countries there is always the possibility that 
50 Edward A. Shils, The Torment of Secrecy, (William 
Heinemann Ltd., London, 1956), p. 207. Fear and mutual 
suspicion have a notable partiality for seeking revenge on 
their own terms; their victims are never guilty of acting 
but merely guilty of being; it is enough that they are said 
to be guilty. In so far as this applies to present -day 
heresy hunting the "rules" for detecting guilt have not 
advanced much in the last three hundred years, as witness 
these witch -hunting rules used in 1646: (1) "Strong and 
long suspicion; (2) Suspected ancestors; (3) Bare confession ... 
unconstant and contrary Answers ..." See Christina Hole, 
A Mirror of Witchcraft (Chatto and Windus, London, 1957), 
p. 164. 
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the concept of guilt may lose its objective and juridical 
meaning and be used instead as a merely arbitrary method 
of creating criminals where there has been no crime. It 
has been said that the reason why no great change of heart 
has occurred among the German people, in spite of their 
full knowledge of the concentration camps, is that "the 
spirit of Hitler lives on in others as well, not merely in 
Germans; ... susceptibility to totalitarian methods has 
become apparent throughout the world. "51 
The very presence in the world of fear and suspicion, 
which are only the inevitable issue of a sense of guilt, 
provides the materials with which tyrants and demagogues 
rise to power. The tyrannical character may be defined as 
one who, through his fanaticism and his insane desire to 
act or to bring about action, has completely submerged his 
sense of guilt in the belief in his infallibility. It 
becomes his divine mission, as it was Hitler's, Lenin's 
and Robespierre's mission, to rid the world of its accumu- 
lated load of guilt. Never before has such fanaticism been 
capable of moving and controlling such great numbers of 
people; never before has the search for universal scapegoats 
inspired so many to such crimes as are now committed in the 
name of justice and of humanity. Those who are least 
capable of understanding their own guilt are the first to 
look for scapegoats; nothing seems to satisfy their need 
51 Kogan, ói?. cit., p. 290. 
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for revenge; their demand for action is always total; 
nothing is to be left free and inviolate. It is this 
fanatical effort to bring everything and everyone in the 
world under sub -mission and control that exactly describes 
the effort to destroy once and for all the evidence of man's 
guilt. 
Finally, there is one consideration not easily formu- 
lated, but not less easily avoided, because the evidence in 
favour of it is clearly brought out in all that has been 
said here. It has been noted that a remarkable phenomenon 
occurs among prisoners by which they tend to identify them- 
selves with their persecutors, in some cases even to the 
extent of completely adopting their moral values and 
slavishly imitating their absurd whims. In another way, an 
extreme case of identification occurs when the prisoner 
actually feels affection for his persecutor. If we apply 
this phenomenon on a larger scale to totalitarian solutions, 
we shall have to admit, whether we like it or not, that 
these solutions have come into being because men have found 
them necessary for survival, and that, just as the prisoners 
also find their survival depending on their ability to adapt 
their lives to their surroundings, no one can escape the 
influence of totalitarian solutions. If we welcome these 
solutions, we immediately succumb to their power; if we 
vigorously show contempt or hatred for them, there too we 
become their victims. We identify through hate as well as 
through love. In one sense it is wrong to speak of 
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totalitarian solutions, for totalitarianism presents itself 
to the world as the solution, and therefore it possesses 
universal power; it cannot exist in the world without 
evoking either passionate devotion or equally passionate 
hatred. It is a solution that attacks the brain as well 
as the heart and from which there is no absolute immunity. 
We can think of no more appropriately ironic words 
with which to end this chapter than those which Scott wrote 
to conclude his Letters on Demonology and Witchcraft. 
Even the present fashion of 
the world seems to be ill suited 
for studies of this fantastic 
nature; and the most ordinary 
mechanic has learned sufficient 
to laugh at the figments which 
in former times were believed by 
persons far advanced in the deepest 
knowledge of the age .... There 
remains hope ... that the grosser 
faults of our ancestors are now 
out of date; and that whatever 
follies the present race may be 
guilty of, the sense of humanity 
is too universally spread to 
permit them to think of tormenting 
wretches till they confess what is 
impossible, and then burning them 
for their pains.52 
52 Sir Walter Scott, Letters on Demonol_gy and 
Witchcraft (John Murray, London, 1831), pp. 389 -90. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ALL IS POSSIBLE. 
Of the innumerable cases of tragic irony in recent 
history the case of Freud would seem to symbolize the 
innocent victim of the corrupt union of knowledge and power, 
for he who was so confident that knowledge gives power was 
obliged to flee for his life from a regime whose secret 
knowledge of everything and everybody in Germany, and whose 
fanatical search for final solutions, brought about the 
actual birth of the "i;r_possible ". Although Freud under- 
stood, perhaps better than any living man, the latent, rest- 
less forces of the unconscious, he was riot, like Kierkegaard, 
"educated by possibility ". 
Kierkegaard recalls the tale of the Indian hermit who 
had lived on nothing but dew for years; when the hermit at 
last tasted a drop of wine he promptly became addicted to 
drink.' Now, in whatever way one chooses to regard this 
tale, either as tragic or as comic, Kierkegaard assures us 
that a man educated by possibility can understand it only 
in this way: by absolutely identifying himself with the 
unfortunate hermit. The effect of such an identification 
must be, and can only be, that of dread, dread of possibility. 
One wonders how the enormous store of psychoanalytical 
literature now available to everyone would have effected 
' Kierkegaard, The Concept of. Dread (Oxford U.P., 
London, 1944), p. 141. 
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Kierkegaard's "education ". One wonders even more how it 
effects the education of anyone today. Has it helped to 
put anyone through "the school of possibility "; has it 
helped to teach anyone "that terror, perdition, annihilation 
dwell next door to every Iran ";2 or is this seemingly end- 
less list of unhappy case histories only "finite" and 
"comu.onplace ", and therefore unable to educate? The gist 
of our study thus far suggests that it is; we have seen that 
even reality cannot educate because the sufferings and the 
crimes of our time are beyond comprehension; they stand 
outside guilt and innocence, and we are given only the 
incredible tales of horror by survivors who write as if they 
too could not believe what had happened to them. How then 
can we expect psychoanalytical case studies to provide a 
source of education such as Kierkegaard speaks of? The 
extent to which possibility, in Kierkegaard's sense, has 
broken through to confound reality and our understanding of 
reality can be illustrated by Kierkegaard's comparison of 
reality, which is light, with possibility, which is heavy. 
It is this heaviness of possibility which will lead anyone 
who'has learned the profitable lesson, that every dread 
which alarms may the next instant become a fact" to "extol 
reality" and to reflect that it is possibility that alarms 
far more than its counterpart.3 Now this might be true, 
but it can be true only in the case of someone whose interior 
2 Ibid., p. 140. 
3 Loc. cit. 
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world is a conscious dualism of "higher" and "lower ", of 
authority and freedom; in other words, it can be experienced 
only by someone who knows the authority of conscience as 
Kierkegaard did. It is precisely the strength of the inner 
authority which creates the tension between the "higher" or 
the "lower" possibilities and which in turn gives rise to 
dread. We are reminded here that Kierkegaard considered 
three things to be practically synonymous: consciousness, 
conscience, and personality. For him, the underworld life 
is illumined by the strength of these three, hence, the 
dread. How far the world has travelled from such an 
experience of inner authority is best indicated by the fact 
that dread in the Kierkegaardian sense means that unforgivable 
crimes are potential, whereas dread as man knows it today 
means that unforgivable crimes are actual. And being actual, 
they are incomprehensible, and because they are incompre- 
hensible, it is too much to ask of dread, as Kierkegaard 
did, that dread should discover guilt. We repeat: "The 
basic experiences and the basic sufferings of our time take 
place in an atmosphere where innocence is beyond virtue and 
guilt is beyond crim_e.i4 Only the authority of an actual 
totalitarian Leader and the pseudo- conscience inspired by 
him can answer for the fact that unforgivable and unpunish- 
able crimes have come into being in our time. 
4 Arendt, The Burden of Our Time, p. 430. 
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Evidence of an inner authority such as Kierkegaard 
understood has all but disappeared from our world. Kierke- 
gaard saw this fact only too clearly in his own time. We 
now find reason to believe that the super -ego structure 
is perhaps the weakest element of Aran's personality; it 
requires constant strengthening by direct corroboration 
that its impressions of moral reality at any given time are 
in accord with those earliest impressions which gave form 
to it.5 We have seen what incredible effects can be 
produced on the super -ego by totalitarian experiments. 
Totalitarianism, by filling the gap made by the absence of 
authority, has made the "impossible" possible; guilt or 
innocence can be suddenly reduced to strictly arbitrary 
formulations; the human psyche can be made the object of 
"scientific" experiments to transform or destroy it, and 
crimes which the world has never dared to imagine can 
become reduced to laws of history or to laws of state. 
Rousset has remarked that "Ordinary human beings do not 
know that everything is possible. Even when the weight of 
evidence forces their mind to admit this, they do not really 
believe it in their bones. The internees know. "6 They have 
passed through the fire alive - physically; they have had 
engraved on their flesh the knowledge that everything can 
be made lawful and therefore possible; unlike those heroes 
of Dostoevsky - Kirilov and Raskolnikov - who merely 
5 See Cohen, Human Behaviour in the Concentration Camp, 
p. 234. 
6 Rousset, A World Apart, p. 109. 
100 
conceived the idea that he who dares to do the "impossible" 
will himself become a god, the internees have lived through 
the reality of the idea. "The concentration and exter- 
mination carps of totalitarian regimes serve as the 
laboratories in which the fundamental belief of totalitarian- 
ism that everything is possible is bein_; verified. "7 
The use of the term "laboratory" seems particularly 
correct from the standpoint of the problems of pain and fear. 
In the sterile atmosphere of the laboratory, pain and fear 
often have little personal significance; pain is a problem 
for the anaesthetist. This is not to suggest that science 
is unconcerned with pain, but that pain has always been a 
definite obstacle to scientific, and particularly to 
medical, research; it has always been something to defeat 
absolutely. There seems to be a close connection between 
the limits of human pain and the frontiers of the possible. 
This is true not merely of physical pain but also of spirit- 
ual pain and suffering, for suffering in this sense is just 
as much a barrier as pain in the physical sense; both are 
limits to what lies beyond, and whatever lies beyond 
7 Arendt, 22. cit., p. 414. One can hardly imagine 
M. André Breton standing amid the corpses of Buchenwald and 
saying, as he did in the Surrealist Manifesto, "The 
admirable thing about the fantastic is that it is no longer 
fantastic: there is only the real." This is but the artistic 
expression of the "aesthetic joy" liberated by the vision 
that all things are possible. "The freedom surrealism 
possesses is a perfect freedom in the sense that it recognizes 
no limitations exterior to itself." It was no mere chance 
that surrealists allied themselves with a materialist and 
activist philosophy. (See André Breton, What is Surrealism? 
tr. David Gascoyne (Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1936 , 
p. 64 ff. 
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suffering has always been for man a great attraction. 
There are positive benefits to be gained by advancing the 
limits of pain and suffering, but the nature of these 
benefits depends upon what is desired. It was Kirilov, 
for instance, who said, "God is the pain of the fear of 
death;" to achieve complete freedom man must conquer his 
fear; he who will overcome his fear of death will become 
a god.8 As with Raskolnikov it is a question of having 
the daring; to him who has the daring, either to kill 
himself or to kill others, everything is lawful. To have 
such daring means to conquer at once the ultimate obstacle 
to complete moral fearlessness, that is, to freedom based 
upon the destruction of guilt. In effect, to annihilate 
God is to annihilate pain and the suffering of guilt, and 
to live without these is to achieve perfect life, not 
eternal life, which does not exist, but perfect life on 
earth. "Men will unite to take from life all it can give, 
but only for joy and happiness in the present world. "9 
Such is the pattern of metaphysical revolt against pain. 
There is also a form of hedonistic revolt which attempts to 
wring pleasure itself out of pain and which in doing so 
extends the limits of pain and therefore brings the 
"impossible" closer to reality. The Marquis de Sade, by 
demonstrating how the line between pleasure and pain could 
8 Dostoevsky, The Possessed, p. 105. 
9 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, p. 701. 
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be extended according to the individual's capacity for 
suffering, also suggested by these experiments that pain 
can be transcended by private methods. It may even be the 
case that modern man's algolagnie genius, particularly his 
genius for developing refinements of all kinds of torture, 
is, more than any other factor, responsible for his over- 
coming limits to the impossible. It might be argued that 
man's capacity for enjoying pain and cruelty, not only the 
pain he inflicts upon others.but that to which he willingly 
subjects himself, has grown proportionately with his 
ability to reduce pain through science. The argument heard 
from some theologians that God requires pain on earth would 
be more sensible if it simply asserted that man himself 
demands the continued existence of pain. From the viewpoint 
of Sade we can see behind Sorel's apology for violence a 
pleasurable anticipation not so much of the post -revolutionary 
society as of the blood- spilling that is to precede it. The 
same can be said of many other revolutionists and activists. 
The history of modern revolutionary thought would 
provide an excellent perspective from which to study the 
history of the attempt to liberate the ''impossible "; in 
fact, the two histories may be said to be virtually equiv- 
alent. From about the time of the French Revolution, the 
limitlessness of possibility began to be identified with 
the abolition of the concepts of crime and guilt. It was 
Robespierre who, in the name of the people, abolished all 
crime and guilt from France and thereby established the 
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foundation for the Reign of Terror. Everything done by 
the sovereign people is virtuous, maintained Robespierre, 
and no excess, error, or crime is possible. "10 This is 
what Robespierre understood by the limitlessness of 
possibility - in effect, nothing less than the violent 
overthrow of all inner values, the annihilation of God first 
in order to proceed with the annihilation of all objective 
enemies. It is noteworthy that revolutionary tyrants are 
invariably imbued with the idea that no limits exist to 
the possible. Hitler referred to the original members of 
his party as "energetic and disciplined young men who, 
through their years of military service, had been imbued 
with the principle that nothing is impossible ... "11 We 
can therefore understand why Sartre's philosophy, which 
matured under the Nazi terror, echoed Kirilov's new, terrible 
freedom, this time for all men. The terror that gripped 
Europe had killed and buried God forever. 
But it must be emphasized that by the limitlessness of 
10 Gustave Le Bon, The Psychology of Revolution, 
tr. Bernard. Miall, (T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1913), p. 241. 
Wordsworth undoubtedly is describing the psychology of a 
French revolutionist in the following sentences from his 
preface to "The Borderers ": "Accordingly, his reason is 
almost exclusively employed in justifying his past enormities 
and in enabling him to commit new ones .... His imagination 
is powerful, being strengthened by the habit of picturing 
possible forms of society where his crimes would be no 
longer crimes ...." (The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth, 
Vol. I, p. 346). 
11 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, tr. James Murphy, 
(Hurst and Blackett Ltd., London, 1942), p. 202. 
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possibility as expressed in the French Revolution and as 
generally conceived among revolutionists during the nine- 
teenth century is implied something less than the actual 
knowledge that all is possible; it is rather the revolution- 
ary affirmation that all is permissible, an affirmation 
which seems to be necessary before man can progress to the 
stage of creating the "impossible ". At this stage of 
revolutionary theory the "new man" does not exist yet; he 
is only the "future man" who has accepted the doctrine that 
all is possible. The new man is not yet, but he will be; 
he first appears as it were out of the clouds like a 
divine revelation to spur on the revolutionists. This 
vision incites the revolutionist to greater deeds of glory 
and also increases his fury when the "new man" resists all 
attempts at his creation; the revolutionary leaders dis- 
cover that their plans to wipe out the past and change human 
nature are being thwarted by human nature itself, that the 
past keeps reasserting itself. Consequently, their 
revolutionary fury reaches heights of insane glory; the 
ineluctable past gradually triumphs in a war of attrition, 
and eventually, complete reaction smothers the revolutionary 
passion.12 
It is perfectly obvious that Dostoevsky was haunted 
by this problem of possibility, and that he saw the philo- 
12 Le Bon, 2. cit., p. 84. 
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sophical implications more clearly even than Kierkegaard.. 
However, Dostoevsky could not completely believe that 
absolutely nothing stood between man and his desire to 
change the world and to transform human nature. Human 
omnipotence was conceivable, but it was not believable. 
Faith at last conquered fear and refused to allow reason to 
translate fear into terms of a possible objective reality; 
he dared to go only as far as the certain understanding 
that without God all is permissible. He glimpsed the 
possibilities open to men without God; he saw them only 
too well, but he could not express them with complete con- 
viction in literary form. A writer like H. G. Wells might 
be able to project his imagination from things as they are 
now to things as they will be, but it is another matter to 
infer future objective reality from present subjective 
reality. An example of this difficulty is shown in The 
Possessed where the anbience of evil, so powerful and 
credible in Dostoevsky's other novels, is never quite equal 
to its effects; it is greater and more overpowering than 
the objective reality given in the novel, and hence, the 
revolutionary society fails to be completely convincing. 
But, as prophecy, The Possessed has been amply confirmed 
by history; it has even had its sequel written by Arthur 
Koestler. Darkness at Noon is not the literary equal of 
The Possessed, but it documents the truth of it. 
In order to make the "impossible" possible it is first 
necessary to kill the idea of God in man; to kill the idea 
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of God is to kill fear, and to kill fear is to declare 
that all is permissible and to open the gates to the 
"impossible ". That unpunishable and unforgivable crimes 
have appeared on earth in our time can only be explained 
by the eruption of the "impossible" into the realm of the 
possible, so that, in effect, we witness the paradox that 
a "non- existent" God demonstrates by His very absence that 
He is more terribly present than ever before. For this 
paradox, Jung gives the following explanation: 
It is an immutable psychological 
law that a projection which has come 
to an end always returns to its 
origin. So when somebody hits upon 
the singular idea that God is dead, 
or does not exist at all, the psychic 
image of God, which represents a 
definite dynamic and psychic structure, 
finds its way back to the subject, and 
produces a condition in which the 
thinker believes himself to be 'like 
unto God'; in other words, it brings 
out qualities which are only character- 
istic of fools and madmen and therefore 
lead to a catastrophe.13 
This statement perfectly describes the situation of 
Kirilov who "could not compromise with an idea" and so 
became "great -souled because he had lost his reason ".14 
Would that all such "great -souled" people killed only them- 
selves. He who dares to kill himself for an idea is a rare 
man indeed; nowadays the activist ideologists and mono- 
maniacs are content with nothing less than acting against 
13 Jung, Essays on Contemporary Events, pp. 69 -70. 
14 Dostoevsky, The Possessed, p. 635. 
107 
the whole world. Even in his madness Kirilov posséssed 
the understanding that man and the world will be transformed 
only when each man as an individual transforms himself. All 
his life Kirilov had been tormented by God, and it is to his 
credit that he knew what it was that tormented him. In our 
day it is a fortunate man who knows the exact nature of his 
secret torment and does not mistake his personal grievance 
for a universal one. The Kirilovs of the world blame them- 
selves and attempt various forms of self -transcendence, 
including suicide; the Verhovensky's blame the world and 
seek universal scapegoats. But in either case God, it 
seems, exacts punishment ( "punishment belongs to me "). 
Man cannot get rid of God, believed Kierkegaard, and for 
this reason he cannot destroy his guilt. Man may shift 
the burden of his guilt for a time, but he can never wholly 
displace it or destroy it. 
ACTIVISM 
It has been truly said that "An unduly guilt- weighted 
civilization will of necessity be an unduly active one. "15 
The cult of activism and the frenzied demand for change 
began to grow rapidly in the nineteenth century and have 
continued to grow up to the present time. The spokesmen for 
this new activism were apologists for revolution and 
15 Grace Stuart, Conscience and Reason, p. 175. 
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violence: Trotsky's Defence of Terrorism and Sorel's 
Reflections on Violence revealed the direction of histor- 
ical events. Never before in political history has violence 
been so openly admired for its own sake as in this period; 
never before has it found so many eloquent apologists. 
Frustration and guilt- anxiety seem bound up together in 
this type of consciousness. Suspicion, hostility, and fear 
are only too obviously present in the world as powerful 
motivating forces. Ample reason exists for believing that 
modern man has reached a stage where he is unable to act 
in what he considers an effective way without the existence 
of an enemy; hostility and suspicion have become as 
necessary to thought as to action; in fact, effective 
action is only possible when suspicion and hatred have, to 
some extent, become rationalized and universalized; action 
is deemed worthless if it cannot be applied against the 
whole world. Modern man insists upon having not merely 
enemies; he wants universal enemies who must be exposed not 
as individuals but as a class, a nation, or a race of 
people. Above all, there must be an idealized system, a 
complete ethic of possible, by which the enemy is exposed 
and prepared for extermination; everything must be "justified" 
beforehand. Our modern vendettists are not satisfied with 
anything less than total revenge or total destruction. The 
truth about modern man is that he can no longer act until 
he has found a universal enemy. Action in this age means 
precisely to act against an enemy conceived to be universal 
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in extent for the purpose of destroying it entirely or 
transforming it in accordance with a totalitarian system. 
In order to act, modern man must first find an enemy; in 
other words, action and aggression have become virtually 
identical in the modern world. 
But, we may ask, is it inevitably true that an 
historical period or a civilization strongly conscious of 
its guilt will become frenzidly active in the sense described 
above? Apparently not, for guilt consciousness was 
considered a central moral and religious problem by the 
greatest dramatists of ancient Greece. The Greeks too lived 
with wars, revolutions, and a strong consciousness of guilt, 
and revolutions are destructive wherever and whenever they 
occur. Nevertheless, it must be noted that Aristotle did 
not consider the destruction accompanying revolutions as 
worthy of any special attention.16 In the present age, on 
the contrary, revolution has become the science of destruc- 
tion. It might be said that, whereas for Aristotle revo- 
lution essentially signified the attempt to replace one 
form of state with another, our age has confounded the idea 
of revolution with that of annihilation and destruction. 
16 Aristotle, The Works of Aristotle: Politica, tr. 
Benjamin Jowett (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1921T; Bk. V. 
One notes with a kind of bitter humour the many anthropological 
and moral judgements of Aristotle which have been strangely 
inverted in the course of history, particularly modern history. 
For example, in calling a man utterly bad Aristotle refers to 
him as a beast; bestiality is beyond all finite definitions; 
a bestial nature is one without rational principles. Yet, we 
note in this present age numerous references to the effect 
that man does thus and so, engages in this or that crime, this 
or that internecine evil which even the beasts are above. 
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Even in his discussion of the causes of revolutions 
Aristotle fails to provide us with the sense of a nexus 
between the underlying forces of discontent among the Greek 
states and those forces of discontent in the modern age. 
Under the category of "trifling causes" Aristotle places 
feelings and emotions which at the present time assure 
monumental and universal proportions. This is true, for 
instance, of the motive of revenge. 
Although Hobbes puts forward very credible reasons 
for the act of sedition it will be seen that he has not 
conceived a complete picture of the modern activist and 
revolutionist. We might, for instance, take exception to 
his statement that no revolutionist would dare to act 
wherever his eventual success was in doubt.17 We might 
add, on the contrary, that this very improbability of 
ultimate success may be a spur to action which would be 
deemed all the more heroic for its lack of objective value. 
In this case, its purely activist, senseless nature would 
comprise the value. 
Perhaps this is the place to observe a fundamental 
distinction between the Greek and the modern attitude toward 
action directed against the external world, an attitude 
which in our day may be accompanied by a kind of metaphysical 
rage, a burning desire to act upon existence itself as if 
17 Hobbes, The Elements of Law (Cambridge U.P., 
Cambridge, 1928), Part II, Chapter 8. 
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to destroy the forms and essences behind everything. But 
this was in no sense true of the Greek attitude. From the 
standpoint of art this distinction is clearly manifest. 
Greek drama does not possess the sense of broadness, the 
feeling of vast action, of wide and contradictory emotions 
and unlimited possibilities which have come to be common- 
place in literature since the time of Shakespeare and which 
were developed to an extreme in nineteenth century Russia 
by Tolstoi and Dostoevsky.18 Dostoevsky continually refers 
to this tragic broadness in the Russian character. Dmitri 
says to Alyosha, "yes, man is broad, too broad, indeed. 
I'd have him narrower ".19 Although Dostoevsky does present 
us with a certain sense of fatality behind human action, 
and although he successfully constructs an inner reality 
operating through the diverse actions of his characters, 
we feel how uncertain and capricious are the laws of this 
inner reality compared to the laws of the narrower Greek 
world. Professor Kitto informs us that Sophocles and 
Aeschylus were able to go straight to the heart of these 
18 In Greek tragedy the worst horrors and crimes are 
never impossible or improbable. "The drama's whole effort 
is to show the logical system which, from deduction to 
deduction, will crown the hero's misfortune ... In that 
revolt that shakes man and makes him say: 'That is not 
possible', there is an element of desperate certainty that 
'that' can be so ". (Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, 
tr. Justin O'Brien (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1955), p. 103). 
19 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, p. 110. 
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inner laws with the "clarity and force of a single state- 
ment, the firmness and the cohesion which we find in a 
mathematical demonstration ... "20 
By Elizabethan times the breakup of this concise and 
tidy conception of the moral world had already begun. Man 
is less and less face to face with his gods and more alone; 
the artist seems scarcely able to "write humanity large "; 
his characters have, as it were, a tendency to run away 
from his original conception of them; their very broadness 
makes them perverse and unwieldy. The Greek temple does not 
strive; it is the Gothic cathedral that is filled with unrest 
and yearning. The Greek temple was bold but not aggressive; 
so was the -}reek himself; he had the temerity to demand 
redress from his gods; he demanded new things of the uni- 
verse, but he neither hated nor distrusted consciousness. 
What the Greek wrested from the universe was always in the 
form of a creative re- interpretation within his conscious- 
ness. As Malraux has said, "the crucial discovery made by 
Greece was that of man's right to stand up to his gods and 
to arraign the universe. "21 Consciousness was not a problem 
to the Greek as it is to modern man. In the words of Yeats 
we vividly perceive the old world of spiritual laws expanding 
into the outer nothingness of the physical universe: "Things 
fall apart; the centre cannot hold." Thus, the modern 
20 H.D.F. Kitto, Form and Meaning, in Drama (Methuen and 
Co., Ltd., London, 195 , p. 210. 
21 André Malraux, The Psychology of Art: The Creative Act, 
tr. Stuart Gilbert (A. Zwemmer, London, 1949), p. 15. 
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consciousness, like the modern conception of the physical 
universe, is centrifugal in contrast to the Greek conscious- 
ness. The Greek did not know the experience of being torn 
asunder by infinitely lofty desires on the one hand and 
devilish fancies on the other, and consequently he felt no 
hatred toward a nameless, hostile "system ". The Greak idea 
was to find harmonious relations with the laws of nature, 
not to throw oneself against them. 
This distinction between the Greek and the modern world 
has enormous significance for understanding what has 
happened to the human psyche. Psychologists generally 
agree that frustration is one of the basic causes of hatred 
and aggression. This is clearly borne out in child psycho- 
logy where it is shown that the child who is deprived of 
some joy or possession, and, hence, feels itself alone in 
unfriendly circumstances, turns with violent aggression 
against the outside world.22 The fear of the loss of love, 
the fear of aloneness and the rebellion against the frustra- 
tion inherent in these conditions is alike in the child and 
in the adult.23 But this is simply to say what has been 
said and acted out by men everywhere in all times: the fear 
of aloneness is one of the most terrible tortures of 
22 F.F.M. Durbin and John Bowlby, Personal Aggressive- 
ness and War (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 
London, 1939), p. 16. 
23 Loc. cit. 
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existence. What wonder then that modern man turns against 
an entire world from which he feels isolated? His sense of 
alienation is terrifyingly diffuse, as broad as his concep- 
tion of the universe against which he strives. From the 
uncertainty of existence arises frustration, and eventually 
aggression and destruction complete the catharsis demanded 
by the inward conflict.24 
It has been suggested that a close relation exists 
between the desire for action and that willingness to fight 
which is a part of hu,an nature.25 Destruction awakens 
destructive impulses; blood begets blood. Yet, this must 
be qualified, since a catastrophe of nature does not incite 
cruelty but rather the opposite; in the face of natural 
disaster men are united in a desire to prevent suffering. 
Therefore, it is not destruction itself that excites the 
baser passions, but it is the possibility of releasing those 
passions in a cause; the sight of blood spilled for a cause 
can really convince men that they are committing "great 
deeds" and thus spur them on to even greater destruction.26 
In action, fear and reason are swallowed up. Mrs. 
Haldane writes frankly of the excitement and aesthetic pleasure 
24 Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and 
Society (Yale U. P., New Haven, Conn., 1950), p. 243. 
25 Durbin and Bowlby, 22. cit., p. 30. 
26 Loc. cit. 
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bordering on rapture which she experienced during the 
bombing of London. Only once during this period of her 
life did she experience emotional fear. This happened at 
a time when she was forcibly inactive; otherwise fear was 
kept in check by action.27 
Like doomed Ippolits, the modern activists sense that 
time is running out; they feel cheated by life, and the 
delusions of the past fill their hearts with hatred and 
shame; the temptation to wreak vengeance on all and on 
everything breaks out because action is their last resource, 
nothing else remains for their. to satisfy their sense of 
frustration. There cones a time when man's frustration is 
joined to a cause, his rage becomes "metaphysical "; it is 
"purified" and elevated to a state of ecstacy. In such an 
intoxicated state is Ivanov in Darkness at Noon. Ivanov, 
with a masochistic frenzy raised to the level of a new 
spiritual crusade, is happy to be among those who are 
tearing off mankind's old skin. "Why should mankind not 
have the right to experiment on itself? "28 His words echo 
Carrier's: "We will make a cemetery of France rather than 
fail to regenerate it in our own way." 
Can there be any doubt that man's fundamental guilt 
outdistances his earthly conception of guilt when the 
violent revolutions of our time are conceived and launched 
27 Charlotte Haldane, Truth Will Out (George Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson Ltd., London, 1949), pp. 185 -89. 
28 Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon, tr. Daphne Hardy, 
(Jonathan Cape, London, 1940, p. 157. 
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precisely against the Infinite? To annihilate God by 
obliterating from men's minds any trace of metaphysical 
longing and to enforce a vision that is earthbound - this 
is the task assumed by our modern activists. But the past 
does not die so easily, it returns with a vengeance. Man 
can only destroy the past totally by destroying himself 
totally, and, indeed, he seems to be in a hurry to destroy 
himself for this reason. It is as if the guilt that all 
men carry through life leaves after them a wreckage more 
terrible in proportion to their vain attempts to destroy 
it. 
There is a sense, however, in which this frustration 
theory is an inadequate description of a state of conscious- 
ness that could justly be described as victimized. God's 
absence means that He has tragically lost prestige; He has 
been discredited because He no longer guarantees anything. 
God is not even, like man, a part of history. Indeed, He 
must be anti -history, since He has no final goal for man- 
kind and never did have one. The disillusionment of the 
modern ideologist with his shattered utopia is like a 
baby's whimper compared to the universal groan of anguish 
which continues (and will continue) to rise in mortified 
protest against the "Great Hoax" of history. In reality, 
the superfluous man of the nineteenth century was only a 
reflection of God's own ineffectualness. Not man, but God 
was superfluous. Apathy, boredom, and self -pity was the 
result in those who did not protest ( "everything is good "); 
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rage and a passionate desire for action in those who did 
( "eve.rythin,g is permissible"). 
Of what lasting good are man's utopian dreams if his 
love for humanity is inseparable from his thirst for action? 
"Love in dreams is greedy for immediate action, rapidly 
performed and in the sight of all. Men will give their 
lives if only the ordeal does not last long but is soon over, 
with all looking on and applauding as though on the stage. "29 
Active love is the form of action men must strive for, though 
active love is difficult and painful in reality. That is 
why the fond dream is so attractive and so simple compared 
to the reality. "The imagination always wants to shorten 
and slip in a different picture, the picture in which the 
noble sufferer is admired by all; but in reality things do 
not move so quickly .... "30 
29 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, p. 55. 
30 Kierkegaard, The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, 
tr. Alexander Dru (Oxford U.P., London, 1938), p. 341. 
Cf. also this statement by Bertrand de Jouvenel with which 
Kierkegaard would surely have agreed: "Disillusioned with 
the weapon proper to itself, persuasion, the intelligence 
admires those instruments of Power which are swifter in 
action ...." (Bertrand de Jouvenel, Power: The Natural 
History of its Growth, p. 119). And cf. also the, following 
statement by Wordsworth: "Perhaps there is no cause which 
has greater weight in preventing the return of bad men to 
virtue than that good actions being for the most part in 
their nature silent and regularly progressive, they do not 
present those sudden results which can afford a sufficient 
stimulus to a troubled mind. In processes of vice the effects 
are more frequently immediate, palpable and extensive. Power 
is much more easily manifested in destroying than in 
creating." (The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth, 
Vol. I, p. 3477 
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Arthur Koestler compares the awareness of guilt to 
the eternal pounding of the surf; it may be still in moments 
of self -forgetfulness, but the eternal beating must even- 
tually break through the consciousness.31 Such is exis- 
tential guilt, a guilt shared by all men, and independent 
of time and place, of whether the individual is active or 
passive.32 But action in our age has the quality of 
desperation and frenzy as if man aspired to cause sufficient 
din to drown the intolerable evidence of his guilt. Even 
philosophy joins in the charivari, for "Europe no longer 
philosophizes by striking a hammer but by shooting a cannon. "33 
In order to silence and drown forever everything suspected 
of being merely given, all solutions must be final and 
universal. Every thought and every action must be total, 
all- embracing; only final solutions, only revolutionary, 
planetary methods are considered. It is as if the death - 
wish had been liberated from the unconscious, rising up to 
possess mankind with a fanatical hatred against everything 
merely given, against life itself, with a desire to obliterate 
in toto human history and thus all evidence of a meaningless 
and guilty past. For this exactly describes the death -wish: 
the illusion that we can restore innocence to ourselves, wipe 
31 Arthur Koestler, Arrow in the Blue (Collins with 
Hanish Hamilton Ltd., London, 1952), p. 78. 
32 Karl Jaspers, Tragedy is not Enough, tr. Harold A.T. 
Reiche et. Victor Gollancz, London, 1953) p. 52 ff. 
33 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 149. 
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clean our guilt by punishing or destroying that person or 
thing through which we believe we have become guilty.34 
Man has always yearned to recreate the world, and no one 
can doubt that this legitimate passion had led to great 
achievements; but only the present age has had the origin- 
ality to introduce alongside the urge to recreate the world 
the urge to punish it. Our modern idealized actions must 
be joined to a great cause, and the cause must possess the 
masses who in turn are justified, and controlled by a Leader. 
The crass action of modern movements has been described 
as a "powerful car with no brakes" ready to hurl us into 
another world but certainly not the imagined utopia.35 
And it seems to be necessary that the "car" should be with- 
out brakes, for otherwise we would despair of getting any- 
where, and that is the important thing, not to arrive but 
to go. 
The specific genius of the great activist personality 
is to blend the whole of reality into a Manichean system 
of good -bad and black- white, allowing for no gradations 
of guilt or innocence. The lack of direction experienced 
by the modern intellect is clearly attested by the extreme 
caution with which it treats any intellectual system not 
thoroughly imbued with all the requirements for action - 
final solutions, final goals and absolute methods. Once 
34 Koestler, who carefully analyzed his guilt conscious- 
ness, remarks on what he calls a "bridgeburning pattern" in 
his past. He thrived on catastrophes for the very reasons 
mentioned above. (See Arrow in the Blue, p. 117). 
35 F.L. Lucas, The Delights of Dictatorship 
(W. Heffer and Sons Ltd., Cambridge, 1938), p. 47. 
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this difficulty has been overcome the sluice -gates are 
opened for complete emotional attachment. We have already 
noted the paranoid aspect of this treatment of reality. 
Money -Kyrle calls attention to the hypo -paranoid who sees 
the world in black and white, the latter division always 
being an attribute of his own consciousness. Never can 
this individual experience a sense of guilt except within 
the outlines of his world- view.36 But, having succeeded in 
divesting himself of all traces of a vague and unknown 
guilt, he is ready to commit any action deemed necessary 
by the system's rigidly prescribed goals. 
That such systems are precisely designed for 
liberating individual frustrations and feelings of guilt 
must presuppose an activist personality who has success- 
fully liberated his own guilty conscience and his frustra- 
tions by discovering the final solution. The amazing 
mental agility by which the system makers of our age are 
able to wield the most diverse problems of existence into 
closed, absolute ideologies with intellectual and emotional 
appeal for everyone is to be explained by the dynamic 
influence of a personality who has dealt "successfully" 
with his own problems of guilt and conscience. He may be 
a great thinker or simply a demagogue, but the system 
itself and the method by which it is originally achieved 
is basically the same - that of releasing frustration and 
guilt feelings so that action can be directed within the 
36 R.F. Money - Kyrle, Psychoanalysis and Politics 
(Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., London, 1951), pp. 76 -7. 
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new pattern of guilt- innocence toward the preconceived 
goals of the system.37 Bychowski states that "Hitler offers 
a perfect illustration of what the Swiss neurologist 
Monakow termed 'agglutinated, emotional causality', which 
unifies the most varied, unrelated subjects and reduces 
them to a common denominator on the basis of strong emotions 
of love, jealousy, and hate. "38 Hitler himself described 
in Mein Kampf the operation of this peculiar talent: 
It is part of a great leader's 
genius to make even widely separated 
adversaries appear as if they 
belonged to but one category because 
among weakly and undecided characters 
the recognition of various enemies 
all too easily marks the beginning 
of doubt of one's own rightness.39 
Thus, the Jew as Hitler's personal scapegoat was transformed 
by him into a universal scapegoat capable of assuming 
culpability for anything and everything that might happen. 
It requires no special insight to perceive that Hitler's 
conception of "weakly and undecided characters" applies 
specifically to people with overburdened consciences and 
feelings of guilt, i.e., to practically everybody. The 
37 In a private letter to the present writer, 
Professor Barbu of Glasgow states: "I agree that there is 
a strong element of 'projected guilt' in Marx, Hitler and 
Stalin, and that their activities (and conceptions) are 
modes of playing out a feeling of guilt." 
38 Bychowski, Dictators and Disciples, p. 147. 
39 Quoted from the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1957), 
Vol. 16, p. 160. 
122 
one basic characteristic of modern ideological systems is 
that they offer everybody freedom_ from guilt in order to 
release the inwardly felt obstructions to action. It is 
not to be wondered therefore that ideological systems are 
dedicated to the masses, and accepted by the intellectual 
élite as well, with the result that totally new and 
revolutionary structures of guilt consciousness may be 
found extending throughout what have hitherto been the 
basic ideological structures, namely, religions, racial 
groups, and states. 
We notice in this totalitarian age the increasing 
need of the masses to bow down before a great man, a Leader 
who can offer something for which to live and, more 
especially, to die. The modern totalitarian Leader wields 
a power which can only be compared to that of a hypnotist 
who projects into millions of subjects his own paranoia, 
his own hatreds and fantastic desires. 
It has long been understood by psychologists that a 
close resemblance exists between the hypnotic state of 
mind and the individual consciousness within the group. 
If this group is a large mass held together by strong 
racial or patriotic ties the sócializing process tends to 
be more subtle, more difficult to define, because it is 
diffused among large numbers of individuals who are subject 
to many lesser socializing influences. Exactly this broad- 
ness of conditioning factors, however, enables the 
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individual to transcend their direct influence and to 
retain a personal character, a will of his own. It is when 
all these socializing forces are concentrated within a 
small orbit that the phenomenal power of the group mind 
appears. Under these conditions the individual qualities 
preserved until then become ruthlessly submerged, and the 
essential identity of the individual is lost.40 Such is 
the picture of the group mind which Freud, following the 
example of Le Bon, has drawn in relation to the ego. He 
refers to "these noisy ephemeral groups" investigated by 
Le Bon which offer to the psychologist so many examples of 
the disappearance of the individual within the group. These 
very groups of which Freud speaks have in our day attained 
unprecedented power; they are not simply "superimposed" 
Freud's term upon the major divisions of society, but 
they are actually created apart from them, usually in oppo- 
sition to them, so that by their very presence in our midst 
they threaten the meaning and even the existence of that 
larger world they spring from. Their amazing virulence 
sweeps aside lesser factions within the social body, destroy- 
ing all opposition, until the "noisy ephemeral group" is a 
mass of obedient humanity under the direct control of the 
Leader. Freud maintains that man's passion to be hypno- 
tized and led by a dynamic Leader "is solidly founded upon 
40 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis 
of the Ego, tr. James Strachey (Hogarth Press, London, 
1949), pp. 101 -2. 
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a predisposition which has survived in the unconscious 
from the early history of the human family. "41 That this 
instinct lives on in ever more strange and virulent forms 
is attested by the passion with which modern man seeks 
for the means to vent his frustration and hatred in action, 
particularly action in support of an ideology. If what 
Freud has said about religions is true, that they must be 
cruel and intolerant to those outside their beliefs, then 
how much more cruel must be the secular religions of our 
age and of the future.42 What Freud could hardly have 
imagined is that man's need to act upon the world, to 
destroy the past in order (as he thinks) to create the 
future, has brought into being groups which extend across 
all boundaries of state, race, and religion. The ideo- 
logical systems of today grasp converts on a universal 
scale simply because they point out universal enemies to 
hate. Groups and societies of men in ancient times kept 
the foreigner at bay because he was different and therefore 
dangerous. But an activist society knows that it cannot 
exist without a constant attack upon all opposition; the 
final solution must be reached at all costs; therefore a 
perpetual effort to change the world must be made; the 
existence of an enemy, and even of potential enemies, is 
essential proof that action must never be diminished. 
41 Ibid., p. 100. 
42 Ibid., p. 51. 
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Modern man everywhere is looking for a condition of 
hypnosis in which his conscience and his will can be 
submerged into a mass will and a mass conscience. It has 
come to be true that "all is possible" because man has lost 
his individuality; man himself desires nothing more than to 
lose it completely; by throwing off the intolerable burden 
of freedom and guilt he merges his consciousness into the 
hypnotic medium of the activist group. We are reminded 
again that Flugel has pointed out that under such hypnotic 
influences, groups, and even nations may allow the individ- 
ual to assume a criminal super- ego.43 Glover has also said 
that ... 
... the more deeply we investigate 
the problem, the more irresistible 
becomes the conclusion that group life 
is governed by mechanisms which are 
identical with those observed in the 
individual. But whereas the irration- 
alities of the individual are usually 
limited as to consequences, the effects 
of group irrationality are therefore 
infinitely more dangerous.44 
Not only do we find a fanatical hunt for universal 
scapegoats, but we see today the total absorption of the 
individual in this hypnotic process. Hence, the impossibility 
43 Flugel, oó. cit., p. 210. 
44 Edward (lover, The Dangers of Bein:? Human, 
(George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1936), p. 67. 
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of locating any consciously guilty Nazis after the war. 
Once the totalitarian machine which had supported the 
ideology collapsed, the spell of hypnosis broke. Precisely 
because the individual psyche had been totally absorbed by 
the ideology and its objectification, the totalitarian 
machine, there could be no awareness of it even after the 
event.45 
Such is the individual human condition with which the 
totalitarian systematizers and Leaders count upon to 
produce conformity among the masses, to create their 
artificial structures of guilt- innocence and to bring 
every individual under their influence. 
In his deep, overpowering need to find release from 
the burden of his guilt, modern man is willing to accept 
the slavery of mass hypnosis; more than this, he demands 
it. The totalitarian system gives him an enemy, it enables 
him to hate and to act aggressively with a "good" conscience 
and a sense of duty; it provides him with goals to work for; 
and the over -all stimulus of action plus the accompanying 
sensation of release from guilt offer all the illusions of 
a militant religion. But all this is necessarily built on 
a Godless, and therefore, a friendless world. To say that 
the world is friendless is to describe in a word its 
hostility. Because he feels that it is hostile, man is 
forced to act aggressively against the world; he unloads 
45 Arendt, 22. cit., p. 353. 
127 
his feeling of guilt upon a scapegoat which must accept the 
punishment for the hostility the world directs against him. 
Because he has no God, man can no longer blame himself 
consciously; he looks inward but sees only emptiness; he 
cannot understand the meaning behind his angst, and although 
he has psychology and religion, he has no insight. In the 
end there is only one thing he finds to do: he turns with 
all his long- denied need for worship and for aggression to 
that "system" which offers him the possibility of finding 
his gods again and punishing his enemies. In modern 
activist philosophies there is always a definite paranoia, 
a dreadful suspicion that enemies may be everywhere, and 
that the outside world is hostile, existing as an enemy to 
be punished and subdued. We are in truth a haunted people 
such as never have been on earth before. Individually we 
sense the terrible loneliness and fear of existence; each 
in himself is precisely no -one; hence the fanatical urge to 
group, to find identity of feeling, thought and action, to 
seek revenge against the world. 
Guilt in our age has become so profound a problem of 
existence, it has so far exceeded our individual capacities 
either to control or to understand, that mass hypnosis may 
well become the gravest of all human problems. It is 
precisely because man has lost his sense of inner authority 
that he can no longer contain his guilt- anxiety and that 
his guilt must take the foray_ of outward aggression. To 
this need for aggression the activist Leader and systematizer 
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responds with goals for action, an enemy to hate and to 
punish; he provides a complete system, a way of life, a 
way to think, a way to express emotions, a way to act. It 
may even be the case that history is entering a period in 
which "greatness" and "genius" will belong exclusively to 
those activist leaders and thinkers who can persuade large 
numbers of mankind that certain other large numbers of 
mankind are guilty. The key to such solutions is already 
clear: an enemy to hate, a future to build, and a utopia 
to achieve. Within a system requiring absolute obedience 
to such ideals it is equally clear that a revolutionary 
and artificial pattern of guilt- innocence is being drafted 
upon what is thought to be the "new man ". This, as we have 
said, is precisely the task of the totalitarian Leader, to 
define absolutely the meaning of guilt and innocence in 
relation to the prescribed goals for action and to bring 
everyone within this orbit. The essential thing is to make 
everyone feel guilty for certain actions and for the 
omission of others. Therefore, collective guilt not only 
certainly exists, but it is the chief formula upon which 
the Leader reckons to construct his new society. If 
collective guilt is denied altogether then the theory and 
practice of totalitarianism is completely misunderstood. 
That should be condemned by everyone is the collective 
guilt theory by which the totalitarian system is born, 
the theory that a certain section of humanity is the 





Totalitarianism_, in its attempt to impose a 
revolutionary pattern of guilt- innocence upon everyone 
within its system., erects what is basically a new theodicy 
in order to universalize its enemy and to justify its new 
order of crimes. Not only are scapegoats necessary in 
order to raze the existing structure of society, but their 
utility becomes just as important in maintaining the 
tyranny that follows. As the ultimate authority, the 
Leader and his Party cannot tolerate any imputation of 
error or guilt to themselves. Before any new line of 
thought or action can be instituted a suitable scapegoat 
must be found to ease the transition and to punish the 
"guilty ".1 
Totalitarian thought is the expression of moral revenge 
trying to take in the whole world. Since the devil cannot 
exist for the totalitarian moralist, his devil -surrogate 
must be a universal enemy, namely, a social class, a race 
or a political system; in other words, a universal vehicle 
for carrying away the sins and troubles of the "Chosen" 
class or race. The strength of totalitarianism therefore 
consists in the fact that aggression and hostility are 
given almost unlimited scope; the forces of good are 
encircled by the forces of evil; the "other" is either a 
1 Cf. Barbu, Democracy and Dictatorship, p. 249. 
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declared enemy or a suspected enemy. Evil is not in 
ourselves, but in the "other ", and the "other" exists as 
an objective fact against which all action and thought are 
aggressively directed. This is why, for the totalitarian 
moralist, there can be no justification for thought unless 
it results in action, primarily in aggressive action. For 
the totalitarian religionist, immortality is in destruction 
and the achievement of vengeance; his profound grievance 
against the world is mollified only when the object of his 
hatred has been totally destroyed or totally transformed. 
It is not enough that mere punishment or mere suffering 
should be the lot of his enemies, but the punishment must 
result in confession of guilt; the accused must accuse 
himself. Shestov correctly divined the totalitarian trend 
among moralists who ... 
... are not satisfied with 
simply despising and condemning 
their neighbour themselves, they 
want the condemnation to be universal 
and supreme: that is, that all men 
should rise as one against the 
condemned and that even the offender's 
own conscience shall be against him. 
Then only are they fully satisfied 
and reassured.2 
Although projection of guilt is apparently a universally 
human method of unburdening the self of guilt, it is the 
2 Leo Shestov, All Thin s Are Possible, tr. S. S. 
Koteliansky (Martin Seeker, London, 1920), p. 55. 
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present age which has added to the ancient symbolic rite 
the act of aggressive revenge on an unlimited, almost meta- 
physical, scale. The ancient scapegoat rite of the Jews, 
for instance, seems like a charming fairy tale when 
compared to the monumental acts of revenge by which modern 
man attempts to transfer his guilt. This diffuse and 
uncontrollable anxiety -guilt was at the bottom of that 
urge for aggression which Dostoevsky discovered in a 
certain type of Russian liberal. His hatred, Myshkin 
observed, was not simply directed at the order of things, 
not at the objective structure of existence, but at the 
fact of existence itself.3 
According to a study by Grygier, the sense of 
oppression, whether real or imaginary, causes the individual 
to seek an outlet for his need for revenge by throwing the 
blame onto others. The oppressed personality is deeply 
prejudiced, he is ... 
... moralistic and professes a 
philosophy according to which somebody 
is always responsible for misfortunes; 
but he tends to deny any weakness or 
fault in himself. Instead he projects 
the blame on to other people: minorities, 
authority, police, etc. He feels 
frustrated, and considers himself a 
victim of persecution ... He dicho- 
tomizes people into good and bad, and 
attributes blame and responsibility 
accordingly; the underlying assumption 
being that he himself is good and so 
are all those who are like him and 
who agree with hin :.4 
3 Dostoevsky, The Idiot, tr. C. Garnett (Heinemann, 
London, 1913), pp. 335 -6. 
4 Tadeusz Grygier, Oppression: A Study in Social and 
Criminal Psychology, (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 
London, 1954), p. 270. 
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We may reasonably assume that the so- called oppressed 
personalities become more numerous in proportion to the 
spread of oppressive forces in the world. Wars, revolutions, 
and totalitarian methods release the feelings of oppression 
and guilt, but these feelings are not thereby consumed in 
the process. They not only continue to exist, but they 
increase in the world by feeding on themselves. Grygier 
finds a "positive correlation between crime and the tendency 
to direct aggression outwards and, on the other hand, between 
neurosis and the tendency to direct aggression inwards ".5 
Thus, in the present world man is eager, as never before, 
to find the Leader who can deliver him from the awful ordeal 
of blaming himself. We said before that activist thinkers 
and leaders have this one point of "genius" in common, that 
they have "successfully" dealt with their own problems of 
guilt and conscience. Ernest Jones considers that activism 
as an attempt to unburden oneself of guilt betrays a much 
greater than normal sense of guiltiness. The revolutionary, 
for instance, is a person in whom something has happened so 
as to enable him ... 
... to pursue his murderous aim 
with the callousness, ruthlessness and 
apparent freedom from guiltiness that 
are the attributes of the typical 
destructive revolutionary. The Jacobin 
has been able to do something about his 
sense of guilt which the Girondin could 
not ... In my experience what has 
5 Ibid., p. x. 
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happened is that the sense of 
guilt in such people has been 
disposed of, or successfully 
kept at bay, by their developing 
in a specially high degree the 
paranoid mechanism of projection. 
They have persuaded themselves 
that their opponents are so 
unspeakably evil that they deserve 
no better fate than torture and 
death and that to inflict this, 
so far from being a guilty act, 
is a laudable one ... In their 
exalted conviction they find it 
easy, in certain circumstances, to 
infuse a followin.; with both dread 
of the wicked enemy and loathing 
for him, and at the same time to 
inspire him with confidence that 
if they follow their noble leader 
the good cause must triumph. We 
reach thus the conclusion that a 
successful revolutionary must be 
more than a little mad ...6 
A considerable part of the madness of the activist 
consists in his unalterable conviction that it is by action 
and action alone that the world can be changed. And indeed, 
it is changed, but hardly in accordance with the avowed 
purpose of the activist. On the contrary, the hatred which 
breaks out in aggression is never dissipated by the act of 
ag;ression. If such were the case, the world would long ago 
have achieved utopia. However, let us, for the moment, accuse 
ourselves of being unwarrantably pessimistic; let us suppose 
that all or most of the hatred now accumulated through wars, 
revolutions, and the general conflicts of this century can 
6 Ernest Jones, "Evolution and Revolution ", The 
International Journal of Psycho -Analysis, XXII (1941), p. 200. 
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somehow remain repressed in the human psyche until it 
dissipates itself. Is this possible? The judgement of at 
least two investigators does not allow us this hope. "The 
overwhelming fact established by the psychological evidence 
is that aggression, however deeply hidden or disguised, does 
not disappear. It appears later and in other forms. It is 
not destroyed. It is safe to conclude from the evidence 
that it cannot be destroyed.i7 One psychologist goes so 
far as to speak of new and different egos which are formed 
not only by extreme physical and psychological torture such 
as we described in a previous chapter, but by the traumata 
of war and oppression which strike nearly everyone. The 
effects of such traumata cannot be undone; the ego once 
changed is changed forever.8 These statements do not appear 
to mean that hatred culminating in aggression offers a final 
catharsis for that hatred. Nor are we given any reason to 
suppose that aggression motivated by some utopian cause 
(as, indeed, all modern aggression seems to be) is any more 
likely to prove beneficial. So far from being the end of 
hatred, aggression is simply the perpetuation of it. We 
might not be far from wrong in comparing aggression to a 
kind of psycho -physical energy controlled by its own Law 
of Conservation. If this were indeed so, it would help 
7 Durbin and Bowlby, Personal Aggressiveness and 
",Var, p. 17. 
8 Stephen Schänberer, "Disorders of the Ego in 
Wartime ", The British Journal of Yiedical Psychology, 
XXI (1947 -8), p. 253. 
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to explain why so- called idealistic aggression can never 
achieve its avowed purpose. It should also explain why 
power when it is addressed outwardly and aggressively must 
inevitably prove a corrupting influence, and why this power 
never diminishes as the revolutionists claim, but in fact 
grows increasingly stronger. We must agree with Bertrand 
de Jouvenel that revolutions are not the death of power but 
the substitution of a greater for a lesser power.9 Accord- 
ingly, we need not stop to inquire concerning the perversion 
of activist philosophies or the betrayal of revolutions, as 
if these violent creations are accustomed to spring immacu- 
lately from the heads of their systematizers like Athena 
from the head of Zeus. The reason for the inevitable 
perversion of such activist philosophies is that they are 
never conceived in innocence; but, being spawned in hatred 
and worship of power, and, being acts of aggression in their 
very conception, they naturally seek for objective scape- 
goats; the enemies of the original fantasy must be 
perpetuated in reality. 
It has become in the nature of a cliché to speak of the 
unprecedented amount of hatred in the world today. The fact 
that large numbers of intellectuals and respected thinkers 
have allied their sympathies with totalitarian ideologies 
may be taken as evidence that human thought, which used to 
have powers of ennoblement and which used to be replete with 
9 Bertrand de Jouvenel, Power: The Natural History of 
Its Growth, tr. J.F. Huntington (Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 
London, 1948), p. 185 ff. 
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images of the beautiful, is now more slave than master, 
more dead than alive. Philosophers, as Bertrand de Jouvenel 
reminds us, have from the time of Plato, associated them- 
selves with power and authority.10 But has philosophy ever, 
we may ask, been so openly in alliance with aggression and 
activism? Philosophy may have been poverty stricken before 
Marx's time, but at least its pages were comparatively free 
of blood. We may assume the omnipresence of hatred if only 
because hatred, along with fear, has become the most power- 
ful impulse in the will to group. We shall have to question 
seriously the future moral significance of any system based 
upon the premise that the world must be acted upon to make 
it conform to reason. As if reason can ever be the result 
of fantasy and scapegoat philosophy. Such a philosophy 
might be rationalized to the most sublime degree, but in 
the last analysis, the aggression and the guilt would still 
remain. Man expects to recover reason by attacking the 
world; he hopes to bring peace with a sword and freedom 
10 Ibid., p. 119. Cf. also Hannah Arendt: "What is 
more disturbing to our peace of mind than the unconditional 
loyalty of members of totalitarian regimes ... is the 
unquestionable attraction these movements exert on the 
_intellectual elite, and not only on the mob elements in 
society." (Arendt, The Burden of Our Time, p. 318). In 
the present age philosophers are no longer alone in the 
intellectual vanguard of totalitarian movements. Totalitar- 
ianism has the unique power of transforming anyone into a 
god and a philosopher at once. 
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with tyranny .11 One of the chief lessons that should have 
been learned from the French Revolution is that a vast 
difference lies between reason and reasoning. To reason 
is one thing; to be guided by reason is quite another. 
Modern man reasons in a state of hypnosis; he is hypnotized 
by goals he cannot reach; in his blindness to everything 
except his ends, he cannot see the corrupting influence of 
his means, which mount in fury and destruction until his 
own conscience whispers "all is permitted ", and his deeds 
announce that "all is possible ". The ideologies of our day 
may be permeated with emotional and fantastic ideas, and yet 
they attract millions of followers who can never admit that 
what they do and say is anything but the command of reason; 
to admit this, they know, would mean to lose their hold on 
life. 
It must be seen that there is a world of difference 
between rationally locating the sources of evil and simply 
nominating a convenient scapegoat on which to unload the 
world's sense of guilt and frustration. A rational notion 
of what is good is possible, and it is possible and even 
necessary to be convinced that its opposite is an evil which 
must be hated and destroyed wherever it appears. But it is 
just at this point, this point of destruction, that we must 
stop to ask what we expect to achieve by destruction. 
11 Cf. Grace Stuart's statement that "until we understand 
that these mechanisms of the mind which protect us from guilt 
are universal - we shall continue to go about the world as 
powers of darkness and to see ourselves as angels of light." 
(Conscience and Reason, p. 101). 
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Modern man and only modern man has earned the distinction 
of making a religion of destruction. Destruction exerts a 
tremendous fascination upon everyone everywhere; it may even 
be the case that modern man's only claim to reason is 
precisely that in rare moments of insight he understands 
what it is that needs to be destroyed. Then violent emotion 
takes over, and the true vision is lost. Those who proclaim 
most loudly their adherence to reason are often marvellous 
destroyers (as they may also be marvellous reasoners), but 
after their fit of destruction is over they have no energy 
for creating, which proves how deeply emotional their 
reasoning was in the first place. These emotional systems 
of thought have all the characteristics of fanatical 
religions; they completely dispense with the notion that 
fallibility touches all human nature and that all individuals, 
separately, and without reference to environment, are subject 
to evil. 
So powerful have certain emotionally charged ideas 
become, and so prone is man to accept all the conclusions 
of those incomplete and unstable ideas which took root in 
the eighteenth century, that these fantastic conclusions 
now become the basis of our secular religions. The truth of 
this matter is not simply that incomplete and unstable ideas 
provide the chief motivating force of great movements, but 
that this force actually depends upon the instability of the 
ideas. Essentially, Hitler's discovery that the most violent 
distortions of the truth are the most firmly believed in is 
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not different from that other triumphant discovery that 
history can be rewritten; both are significant additions to 
that larger discovery of our age that "all is possible ". 
One of the chief sources of strength for totalitarianism is 
its understanding that never before in human history has man 
been so eager to believe anything;. But the one factor which 
seems, more than any other, to be embodied directly in the 
centre of the dominant secular religions and philosophies 
of our age, the Ubermensch, racial, and proletarian move- 
ments, is the violent projection of guilt. 
We reach therefore the conclusion that it is not the 
guilt which people of our time passively experience, but 
the guilt they actively project that determines the course 
of action pursued by the dominant philosophies. The 
powerful totalitarian movements of this century are powerful 
and are a;:;ressive in direct proportion to the guilt which 
they manage to project onto universal enemies having no more 
true relation to the ideals these movements profess than their 
means have to their professed ends. At the present time an 
activist system probably could not be conceived, and certainly 
it could not long exist, apart from an enemy, that is, apart 
from a scapegoat. We conclude that it is highly probable 
that any activist philosophy will be a scapegoat philosophy, 
and that its course of action and its final solutions will 
largely, if not completely, be determined by the violent 
projection of guilt. 
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CHAPTER VI 
GUILT, FREEDOM AND POSSIBILITY 
The great tragedy of our age is that man's guilt has 
been become far too oppressive a burden for his conscious- 
ness to bear, and that much of his anxiety and aggression is 
shown in his desperate attempts to deny the real existence 
of that guilt. In a very true sense the central problem is 
not man's guilt, but his rejection of guilt as an illusory 
burden imposed by mythology. One frequently meets the 
objection that, after two thousand years of Christianity 
and a sense of guilt, man is farther than ever from achieving 
self-mastery. The answer is surely not more .guiltiness, but, 
if it is possible, more conscious acceptance of guilt. 
However, it :night be equally correct to say that mankind has 
never carried and does not now carry a burden of guilt; 
rather it is ir_an hi.r_self who seems to be thrust into exis- 
tence by ;;Milt. In answer to the fundamental question 
"what is man ?" we might reply: "man is his guilt ". Man is 
what he does, and what he does has come to be more and more 
determined by what he does with his sense of guilt. More- 
over, there would seem to be psychological evidence even 
for the apparently mystical assertion that man is thrust 
into existence, or at least into conscious existence, by 
his guilt. For this would seem to be implied in Freud's 
contention that a sense of guilt is the expression of an 
ambivalent feeling and therefore of a conflict which begins 
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with the very earliest awareness of other people's existence.1 
Heinrich Zimmer describes the celebrated Buddhist myths 
which pronounce all creation as guilty in its particularity 
and exclusiveness.2 This guiltiness has been called by 
Jaspers existential guilt. To Richard Hertz it appears that 
"all mankind without exception is deeply engaged in the 
collective guilt of its pursuits ...i3 There is, consequently, 
the guilt of character, of individuation, and of the unaided 
human will because all who are involved in creation are 
what they are by virtue of their peculiar guiltiness. Guilt, 
it seems, is the very stuff of existence, and very little in 
man's recent history would seem to deny this assumption. 
... character as such, by its very 
existence, is guilty. The lion is lion 
by eating the lamb, and the lamb is lamb 
by displaying its particular brand of 
covetousness; the Moslem is Moslem by 
marking the burning deserts with his 
fanatical footprints; the Christian is 
Christian by wading knee -deep in the 
blood of the infidels when 'liberating' 
Jerusalem.4 
The meaning of the Promythean myth, according to 
Nietzsche, is that existence necessarily imposes crime and 
therefore guilt upon the individual; at the heart of all 
things lies a mystery, an antagonism which must be 
1 See Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, D. 121. 
2 Heinrich Zimmer, Myths and S rbols in Indian Art 
and Civilization, ed. Joseph Campbell The Bollingen Series VI, 
Pantheon Books, Washington, D.C., 1946). 
3 Richard Hertz, Chance and Symbol (The U. of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1948), p. 156. 
4 Ibid., p. 32. 
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experienced by each individual as he strives to transcend 
and universalize the self. Both sides of the polarity are 
equally right, Apollo is balanced by Dionyqus and both are 
equally justified; both are necessary aspects of a world 
which is divine and human and in which every individual is 
"in the right individually, but as a separate existence 
alongside of another has to suffer for its individuation ".5 
In this identity of individuation and guiltiness the 
great religions of East and West bear close agreement. 
Coomeraswamy was convinced that mystical theology is 
identical. the world over and that the great Christian 
mystics reveal a remarkable similarity to Sanscrit writings.6 
Anaximander's assertion that all existence must expiate the 
fact of its particular existence is suggested by Hertz to 
be in line with Christian doctrine, since for man to become 
a man a "fall" was necessary.? Indian mythology traces the 
original act of individuation back to the gods themselves; 
thus, the first sin originated with them, and the wheel of 
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, tr. 
'Wm. A. Haussmann (T.N. Foulis, Edinburgh, 1909, p. 79. 
6 See the foreword by Walter Eugene Clark to Ananda 
K. Coomeraswamy, Elements of Buddhist Iconöaraph4 (Harvard 
U.P., 1935). 
7 Hertz, 22. cit., p. 33. As Hertz points out, this 
is not Werner Jaeger's interpretation of this famous saying. 
That all "things must pay one another the penalty and 
compensation for their injustice according to the ordinance 
of time" is due to the rule of law within the cosmos, not 
to the sinfulness of existence. "Existence in itself is not 
a sin - that is a non -Greek idea." (Werner Jaegar, Paideia: 
The Ideals of Greek Culture, tr. Gilbert Highet (Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1939. 157). 
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guilty existence began to turn under that perpetual life - 
energy by which each of us comes to have a personal identity 
and a personal history. Guilt and individuation were 
simultaneously introduced into existence. Indra became 
"guilty of the most heinous of all possible cruces, namely 
the slaying of a brahmin".8 With the slaying and dismember- 
ment of Vritra the first act of creation and the first sin 
were accomplished; the one became the many. Thus, the gods 
themselves need a stepping -stone to individuation. Even 
the Lord, says Peer Gynt, "needed the earth to make himself 
God of the Earth ..." and Peer's life -energy, his shakti is 
that which "makes me 'me' and no one else. No more than 
God could be the Devil. "9 
Indian philosophy, however, is not content merely to 
explain how the one became the many, it seeks to teach the 
many how to become the one again, how to transcend the 
self. Guilty as he is by the very fact of individuation, 
man is yet free to atone for his guilt and to transmute his 
all -too human nature. Our understanding of freedom is to 
be found grounded in the spheres of philosophy, literature, 
and art. With N. O. Lossky, we take freedom to mean that 
inward experience of "an open way upwards or downwards ... 
the possibility of the highest good and the worst evil. "10 
8 Zimmer, 22. cit., p. 189. 
9 Henrik Ibsen, Peer Gynt, Act IV, Sc. 1. 
10 N.O. Lossky, Freedom of Will, tr. Natalie Duddington, 
(Williams and Norgate Ltd., London, 1932), p. 108. 
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Likewise, Berdyaev believes in a freedom interiorly lived, 
an understanding of freedom closely resembling Dostoevsky's 
as well as Kierkegaard's in the sense of freedom in truth, 
the higher, divine freedom. The broadness of the human 
soul, which Dostoevsky so clearly perceived and described 
in such characters as Dimitri Karamazov and Versilov, reveals 
the possibility of the purest and highest sentiments existing 
side by side with the basest desires in the same soul. As if 
in confirmation of events to take place a hundred years hence 
Dostoevsky wrote: "Believe me, the most complete aberration 
both in the minds and hearts of men is always possible. "11 
The possibility of an upward and a downward way as the 
essence of freedom is exactly the understanding of freedom 
which comes from a study of the heroic figures of world 
literature, the archetypal heroes "poised between height 
11 Dostoevsky, Diary of a 'Writer, Vol. II, tr. Boris 
Brasol (Scribner's, New York, 1949), p. 604. Ooethe is 
said to have asserted in regard to himself that there was 
no crime he would not deem himself capable of committing. 
Also, Kierkegaard's love for Socrates was founded in part, 
at least, on his discovery that Socrates looked upon himself 
with a mixture of horror and hope. (See the Phaedrus where 
he wonders whether his nature is more like Typhó s or more 
simple and gentle. See also Lowrie, Kierkegaard, p. 307). 
Wordsworth's experiences in revolutionary France gave vent 
to the following lines which he wrote in the preface to 
"The Borderers ": "The study of human nature suggests this 
awful truth, that, as in the trials to which life subjects 
us, sin and crime are apt to start from their very opposite 
qualities, so are there no limits to the hardening of the 
heart, and the perversion of the understanding to which they 
may carry their slaves. During my long residence in France, 
while the revolution was rapidly advancing to its extreme of 
wickedness, I had frequent opportunities of being an eye- 
witness of this process ..." (See E. do Selincourt's edition 
of Wordsworth's works (1940) Vol. I., p. 342.) 
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and depth, between the Divine and the Devilish ... *12 
Arthur Koestler is convinced that this possibility of an 
open way upwards and downwards has had an illimitable effect 
upon art and literature. He recognizes as a part of the 
basic pattern of the archetype the "Night Journey" of the 
hero, an expression as old as mankind. "The journey always 
represents a plunge downward and backwards to the origins 
and tragic foundations of existence ..." after which the 
tragic hero emerges "regenerated on a higher level of 
integration. "13 
The evidence for such figurative movements of the soul 
in mythology and literature is far too voluminous to be 
dealt with here. We may, however, succeed in clarifying 
our purpose in identifying freedom and possibility in this 
way. Fror_ Jung we obtain the interpretation that the night 
journies are symbolic representations of profound descents 
into the self, psychologically speaking, of introversions, 
after which the self is reborn. Jung refers to the night 
journey of the hero as an "almost worldwide myth ".14 He 
cites the example of the Egyptian God Osiris who, after a 
night sea journey in a cedar coffin, is dismembered before 
12 laud Bodkin, Archetypal Patterns in Poet, 
(Oxford U. P., London, 1934), p. 245. 
13 Arthur Koestler, Insight and Outlook, (Macmillan 
and Co., London, 1949), pp. 371 -2. 
14 C.G. Jung, Sx bols of Transformation, being Vol. V 
of The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, tr. R. F. C. Hull, 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1945), p. 347. 
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being reborn.15 Christ, it is noted, spent three days in 
the underworld,16 an event not without resemblance to the 
"dark descent" of the Eleusinean Mysteries.17 There is 
also the mythological motif of dying and rising again in 
which the cave and the grave are prominent symbols. Christ 
was born in a cave and rose after death from a cave.18 
Parallel to this motif is that of being lost and found again 
which occurs in Christ's being lost from his parents.19 Jung 
informs us that these journies or regressions show the 
"inherent possibilities of 'spiritual' or 'symbolic' life 
and of progress which form the ultimate, though unconscious, 
goal of regression. "20 
Koestler enumerates several instances of the hero's 
night journey: Orpheus and Odysseus to the underworld; 
Joseph to the bottom of the well, and Jonah into the belly 
of a fish.21 These heroes, in contrast to the vast majority 
of mankind, act on a tragic level of existence. The guilt 
of Jonah, his complacency and love of the trivial, combine 
to thrust him onto the tragic level where he eventually 
15 Ibid., p. 236. 
16 Ibid., p. 331. 
17 Ibid., p. 341. 
18 Ibid., p. 338. 
19 Ibid., p. 343. 
20 Ibid., p. 331. 
21 Koestler, Insight and Outlook, p. 371. 
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finds God.22 Koestler suggests that the crisis- conversion 
theme in Tolstoi and Dostoevsky is an example of this 
universal theme of the night journey and the regeneration.23 
Furthermore, the task of the artist is to reveal the 
connection between these two movements.24 When the artist 
creates a great hero,something fundamental to the spiritual 
effort of all men is preserved forever. The hero is a hero 
because he brings something human from the common to the 
uncommon plane where it is preserved for all men to admire. 
In the words given to Daedalus by Gide, there is a ... 
... truer plane on which time does 
not exist; on this plane the representative 
gestures of our race are inscribed, each 
according to its particular significance. 
Icarus was, before his birth, and remains 
after his death, the image of man's 
disquiet, of the impulse to discovery, 
the soaring flight of poetry ... What 
happens, in the case of a hero, is this: 
his mark endures. Poetry and the arts 
reanimate it and it becomes an enduring 
symbol.25 
In blindness there is also light, also a night journey 
culminating in the achievement of inner light. "Nobody 
understood me," says Oedipus, "when I suddenly cried out 
'0 darkness, my light': ... People heard it as a cry of 
grief; it was a statement of fact. It meant that in my 
22 Ibid., p. 374. 
23 Ibid., p. 375. 
24 Ibid., p. 380. 
25 Andre Gide, Oedipus and Theseus, tr. John Russell, 
(Seeker and Warburg, London, 1950), p. 92. 
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darkness I had found a source of supernatural light, 
illumining the world of the spirit. "26 Kierkegaard had 
found it "very notable ... that the great geniuses of poetry 
(like Ossian and Homer) are represented as blind ", and, 
whether they actually were blind or not, the representation 
of this "seems to show that when they sang the beauties of 
nature they did not see what they saw with the outward eye 
but that it revealed itself to an inner intuition. "27 
Tiresius, blinded for divulging Jupiter's secrets to mortals, 
was able, in the opinion of Milton, to see things denied to 
mortal sight. Milton, like Kierkegaard, remembers "those 
old poets, ancientest and wisest, whose calamity the gods 
are said to have recompensed with far more excelling gifts, 
and men to have honoured with that high honour, as to choose 
rather to blame the gods themselves, than to impute their 
blindness to them as a crime. "28 
Toynbee considers the motif of "Withdrawal- and -Return" 
to be of great spiritual significance in history. The lives 
of some thirty historians, philosophers, statesmen, saints, 
mystics and poets are studied from the aspect of their 
withdrawal to the underworld or into the wilderness and their 
26 Ibid., p. 113. 
27 Kierkegaard, The Journals, pp. 1 - 2. 
28 
John Milton, A Second Defence in The Works of John 
Milton (Columbia U.P., New York, 1933), Vol. VIII, p. 63. 
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ascent to a higher plane of existence.29 
The fact that the mythological emanations of Man's 
sense of an open way upward and downward have recently been 
criticised as being incompatible with a modern scientific 
weltanschauung., in no way denies the psychological truth of 
this sense.30 In the foreground are the religious myths, 
inconsistent perhaps with a naturalistic conception of the 
universe, but nevertheless consistent with the psychological 
background of the sense of spiritual freedom. In terms of 
this background the doctrinal words "ascended into heaven" 
are not different, except in degree, from the basic human 
identification of. "stepping up" with every inner, spiritual 
event. The author of Symbolism and Belief inquires "how it 
is that all over the world to follow the good impulses has 
seemed like going uphill, and to follow the evil ones like 
going downhill. "31 Christopher Dawson states that "The 
religious attitude towards transcendence ... appears to be ... 
deeply rooted in human nature ..." so much so that even 
naturalistic world -views are described with religious feeling.32 
29 Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, (Oxford U.P., 
London, 1935), Vol. III, p. 248 ff. 
30 See Rudolf. Bultmann's essay "New Testament and 
Mythology" in Kerygma and Myth, tr. Reginald H. Fuller; 
ed. Hans Werner Bartsch (S.P.C.K., London, 1953). 
31 Edwyn Bevan, Symbolism and Belief (Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1938), p. 63. 
32 Christopher Dawson, Religion and Culture, (Sheed and 
,'dard, London, 1949), p. 38. Cf. William James's assertion 
that in all the autobiographical evidence in The Varieties of 
Religious Experience there probably is not one instance where 
the experience of "rising" to one's "higher part" would not 
apply. (p. 499). 
150 
Notwithstanding Hume's arguments that mankind has progressed 
from a groveling attitude to familiar spirits to a notion of 
Deity, myth and symbol have always shown that the divine 
descends from above and that evil arises from below. Andrew 
Lang's special contribution to the study of mythology was 
the idea that even the most primitive peoples worshipped a 
"high god", and that this type of worship was intir_ately 
bound up with the moral traditions of the same peoples. 
Turning away from Hume's theories, Lang came to see that the 
"high god" embodied moral ideas and consequently had nothing 
in corr_°r_on with Hume's familiar spirits.33 In any discussion 
of symbolism the special symbols of certain poets should not 
be overlooked: the use by Blake of the sun to suggest God, 
or of the moon by Keats to represent perfection and beauty 
are examples. 
An identification of spiritual effort among all men 
would seem to be possible only if there is a common structure 
of religious and moral experience behind it; a structure, 
moreover, in which the place of man in relation to God is 
essentially that of creature to creator. Given such a 
relationship, the first fruits to emerge are those of love, 
hatred, and therefore, guilt. Something of a basic common 
tradition in literature, as seen in the Ulysses theme as 
well as in the universality of certain symbols and images, 
33 Richard Chase, Quest for Myth, (Lousiana State U.P., 
Baton Rouge, La., 1949), pp. 61 -63. 
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presupposes this co:rm_on spiritual effort. An example of 
this yearning, as we may call it, is the Grail Quest. 
The quest of the holy grail has been conclusively 
established by scholarship in all the major European 
languages "as the record of a determined effort to attain, 
on the lower plane, to a definite and personal knowledge of 
the Secret of Life, on the higher, to 'any intimate and 
personal contact with the Divine Source of Life." Thus the 
Grail Quest belongs in literature "with the deepest, and 
most keenly felt, of all human needs ".34 The Ulysses 
tradition is also one of spiritual quest. In the post- 
Homeric era, Stoics and Christians "made use of Ulysses as 
an emblem for nostalgia or for spiritual aspiration. "35 
Impatience and nostalgia have the two -fold aspect of love 
and hatred; the opposing aspect of self- assertion and self - 
transcendence. If the yearning for self -transcendence is 
accompanied by neuroticism or mental illness, it is also a 
sign of spiritual health. Kierkegaard refers to Hamann's 
belief. that "diese heilige Hypochondrie" is a kind of 
spiritual homesickness without which man would forget God 
and sink back into paganism.36 With the same thought in 
34 Jessie L. Weston, The Quest of the Holy Grail, 
(G. Bell & Sons, London, 1913), p. 139. 
35 W.B. Stanford, The Ulysses Theme (Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1954), p. 175. 
36 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 145. 
Similarly, Gide remarks on the "vast sickly unrest of ancient 
heroes" and concludes that it is fortunate that man is 
"forced to feel more than to think " (Andre Gide, The Journals 
of Andre Gide, Vol. I, pp. 80 - 1.) 
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mind, Cattell reminds us that emotional adjustment is not 
always to be found through the method of acquiescence in 
the group consciousness. "Some other form of emotional 
adjustment was evidently at work in Columbus, in Newton, in 
Darwin, in Mohammed, and in Christ. "37 Similarly, Gide 
says that "At the origin of a reform there is always a 
discomfort; the discomfort from which the reformer suffers 
is that of an inner lack of balance ... he aspires to a new 
equilibrium_ ".38 From Unamuno comes the question: "But 
what is disease precisely? And what is health? May not 
disease itself possibly be the essential condition of that 
which we call progress and progress itself a disease ? "39 
Again we may refer to Kierkegaard whose opinion was that 
"To lead a really spiritual life while physically and 
psychically healthy is altogether impossible.i40 
Among writers besides Homer who have used the Ulysses 
theme are: Sophocles, Seneca, Racine, Tennyson, Lander, 
Giradoux, Shakespeare, Dante, Euripides, Joyce; and among 
painters, Rubens, Claude, Ingres, Fuseli, Turner and others.41 
The literary perpetuators of the Ulysses theme often tend 
37 Raymond B. Cattell, Psychology and the Religious 
Quest, (Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd., London, 1938), p. 114. 
38 Andre Gide, The Journals of Andre Gide, tr. Justin 
O'Brien (Seeker and Warburg, London, 1948777o-1. Vol II, p. 242. 
39 Miguel De Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life, tr. 
J.E. Crawford Flitch (Macmillan and Co., London, 1921), p. 19. 
40 Kierkegaard, The Journals, p. 326. 
41 See Stanford, 22. cit., p. 279. 
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to identify their personal yearnings with those of Ulysses, 
a fact which prompts Stanford to suggest that Jung's arche- 
typal theory may be a valid explanation for the maintenance 
of this tradition.42 In line with Miss Bodkin's studies of 
the archetypal hero poised between good and evil, Stanford 
points out that Homer's Ulysses comprises two opposing 
elements which he calls the "Autolycus -Athene antithesis ".43 
Yet Joyce's Ulysses conveys an even greater sense of 
separation within the self, an almost cosmic yearning. By 
combining Greek and Hebrew traits in Ulysses, Joyce carried 
this symbolism of the divided self deeper than it had ever 
appeared before.44 Homer's Odysseus is not driven by an 
interior dichatomy or by a nameless yearning, but rather by 
divine wrath; he is not a wanderer like Byron's guilt- haunted 
Manfred. And to this extent the Homeric wanderer should 
rather be compared to the Wandering Jew and the Ancient 
,4ariner.45 
These considerations bring us to the significant 
observations of Kierkegaard on the philosophical importance 
of three legendary characters: Don Juan, Faust, and the 
Wandering Jew, who are respectively the err_bodi:nent of three 
ideas: desire, doubt, and despair. These ideas according 
42 Ibid., p. 246. 
43 Ibid., p. 279. 
44 Ibid., p. 221. 
45 Ibid., p. 87. 
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to Kierkegaard are the beginning of religion and morality 
when they are united in the individual.46 Don Juan is the 
sensual demoniac; Faust, the intellectual.47 Although every 
age has its Faust and its Don Juan, there is only one 
universal Faust and only one Don Juan. Each age simply 
interprets the given symbol.48 Dante's Ulysses is merged 
with a Faustian conception of the "sinful desire for for- 
bidden knowledge ",49 while Marlowe, who was fascinated by 
the human phenomenon of greed for power, made Faust the 
persónification of this lust.50 The problem of the pride 
of intellect, le tragique de l'intellect, is just as large 
a theme in modern literature as it ever was. Herbert Read 
has said that "Faust is still our representative myth ".51 
Read has also shown that Coleridge, before the creation of 
The Ancient Mariner, "had come to realize from his investiga- 
tions into the nature of dramatic poetry, that all dramatic 
effect was dependent on a tragic sense of life ".52 
46 Kierkegaard, The Journals, p. 26. 
47 Kierkegaard, Either /Or, tr. David F. and Lillian 
M. Swenson (Oxford U.P., London, 1944), Vol. I, p: 73. 
48 Kierkegaard, The Journals, p. 31. 
49 Stanford, óg. cit., p. 181. 
50 See Rex Warner, The Cult of Power, (John Lane, 
the Bodley Head, London, 1946), p. 7. 
51 Herbert Read, A Coat of Many Colours, (Routledge 
and Sons, London, 1945), p. 176. 
52 Read Coleridge as Critic, (Faber and Faber, 
London, 1949, p. 32. 
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It is not surprising that the Mariner's tragic guilt 
begins with an act of aggression. "The violent self - 
assertion of the individual is one of the roots of tragedy ... 
a kind of revolutionary urge, a desire to defy the powers 
that be ... "53 The entire history of tragic art is, after 
all, the story of man's guilt; one of the basic character- 
istics of tragedy, according to Jaspers, is guilt, guilt in 
the aspect of action and guilt in the aspect of all exis- 
tence.54 In tragedy is expressed pre -eminently the meaning 
of spiritual freedom, and in tragedy we find the basic 
questions of philosophy in dramatic terr_s.55 The examples 
of the open way upward and downward in myth and in tragic 
art illustrate convincingly, without attempting to prove, 
the experience of freedom. 
"In every man," said Baudelaire, "and at all times, 
there are tNo simultaneous yearnings - the one toward God, 
the other toward Satan. The invocation of God, or spirit- 
uality, is a desire to ascend a step, the invocation of 
Satan, or animality, is a delight in descending. "56 
53 Warner, 2n. cit., p. 7. 
54 Jaspers, Tragedy is Not Enou:4h, p. 52 ff. 
55 Ibid., p. 103. Cf. the following statement: 
"... Hebbel considers the fundamental characteristics of 
tragedy as related to a metaphysical conception of original 
or cumulative guilt." (T.R. Henn, Harvest of Trage d, p. 67.) 
56 Charles Baudelaire, M Heart _Laid Bare, tr. Norman 
Cameron; ed. Peter Quennell George Weidenfeld and Nicolson 
Ltd., London, 1950), D. 131. 
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Dostoevsky, in his notes for the projected novel, The Life 
of a Great Sinner, the dominating idea of which was to be 
religious, depicts his hero with an extremely ambiguous 
temperament given to "Fallings and risings ".57 Already in 
his second novel, The Double, Dostoevsky had made the 
psychological discovery of the duality between the higher 
and the lower impulses of character. In Conrad's Lord Jim 
there is the significant remark made by Stein that rr_an wants 
to be a saint and also a devil; he lives in a kind of dream, 
and at last comes to grief because he hasn't the strength 
to live a consistently perfect life. 
Freedom seems at times to be an illusion, the background 
of the dream which man lives in presuming himself to be 
capable of existing consistently in the rare atmosphere of 
perfection. Yet, in so far as man acknowledges his spiritual 
nature he will not give up the notion of his freedom to move 
upward or downward, nor will he deny his guilt in failing to 
do the one or to indulge the other. Kafka has described 
this insistence upon freedom in the following parable: 
He is a free and secure citizen 
of the world, for he is fettered to 
a chain which is long enough to give 
him the freedom of all earthly space ... 
But simultaneously he is a free and 
secure citizen of Heaven as well, for 
he is also fettered by a similarly 
57 Dostoevsky, Stavroin's Confession and the Plan of 
The Life of a Great Sinner, tr. S.S. Koteliansky and Virginia 
Woolf TThe Hogarth Press, Richmond, 1822), p. 114. Cf. the 
following speech by a tragic character envisioned by Wordsworth: 
"I am undone /No living power can save me - sinking, sinking, 
And feel that I am sinking - ." (The Poetical Works of 
William Wordsworth, Vol. I, p. 350 . 
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designed heavenly chain. So that 
if he heads, say, for the earth, 
his heavenly collar throttles him, 
and if he heads for Heaven, his 
earthly one does the sane. And yet 
all the possibilities are his, and 
he feels it; more, he actually 
refused to account for the deadlock 
by an error in the original fettering.58 
These chains, which we may understand as fettering 
Kafka himself, syrholize the stifling of freedom by a sense 
of guilt. Yet, as we have declared before, a sense of ¿-wilt 
does not necessarily deprive one of freedom, it does not 
degrade life nor induce mental illness. Kierkegaard, on the 
contrary, eventually broke loose from his earthly chains. 
In confirmation of the equivalence of freedom and the 
possibility of moving upward or downward, he speaks of 
si n:,ing and then of floating "up from the depth of the abyss, 
lighter now than all that is oppressive and dreadful in 
life. "59 Kierkegaard also uses the illustration of going 
backward and downward, not in the enjoyment of evil, but in 
the recollection of guilt. "The religious experience is 
essentially an expression of the confidence that man by 
God's assistance is lighter than the whole world, the same 
sort of faith which makes it possible for a man to swim. "60 
58 Kafka, The Great Wall of China and Other Pieces, 
tr. Willa and Edwin Muir (decker and -,Varburg, London, 
1946), p. 151. 
59 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 142. 
60 Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard (Oxford U.P., London, 
1938), p. 262. 
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Man, says Buber, is a dual creature "both brought 
forth from 'below' and sent from 'above ", a situation 
resulting in the relation I -Thou and its contrary relation 
I -It.61 Not to be capable of moving both ways, to be 
deprived of the "possibility ", would be to lose the 
possibility of any victory over the duality inherent in 
one's nature. To be co[rpletely denied one's freedom in 
this sense is a situation we can hardly imagine, for it is 
this freedom which is fundamental to human existence and 
which, for this reason, is a terrible freedom. There is no 
question of accepting this freedom; it is given. Yet 
Kierkegaard does not speak of his despair in terms of 
necessity; rather he insists that he chooses despair, and, 
therefore, it is not by necessity but by freedom that he 
despairs.62 Can this be literally true? Both Kafka and 
Kierkegaard were born into despair; they were, to so speak,' 
born guilty. In what sense then can Kierkegaard speak of 
choosing himself as guilty in order to choose himself abso- 
lutely.63 What is meant by choosing himself and at the 
same time choosing freedom? To choose oneself is to turn 
inward upon oneself; this is the first step toward freedom. 
I know (says Kierkegaard) that only guilt can deprive me of 
61 Martin Buber, The Eclipse of God, various translators, 
(Victor Gollancz, London, 1953), p. 165. 
62 Kierkegaard, Either /Or, tr. Walter Lowrie, 
(Oxford U.P., London, 1944), Vol. II, p. 179. 
63 Ibid., p. 182. 
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freedom;64 therefore I must defeat guilt where it originates: 
within myself. To assume otherwise, to assume, for instance, 
that I am not guilty, that the cause of the guilt I feel is 
outside me, would call for activity directed outwardly. By 
this assumption, inward activity, or self- activity, would be 
meaningless. My activity crust be inward activity. How else 
can one expect to know oneself? The very act of turning 
away from the self, that is, of directing activity outward, 
is a refusal to understand oneself. But it is precisely the 
self that must be understood, for it is the self that is 
guilty. By turning inward I come face to face with my 
guilt; by turning outward I flee from my own guilt and at 
the same time increase the possibility of further guilt. 
To become free is to beco_r_e conscious of one's guilt. That 
ran is truly free who is conscious of having descended a 
step; he refuses to believe that a step down can be the 
same as a step up; he refuses to persuade himself that he 
has "risen" when he has, in fact, "fallen "; and he knows 
(or at least attempts to know) why he despairs. In other 
words, this man has begun to know himself. To be as fully 
conscious of one's despair as one is conscious of one's 
victory over despair - this is to be as free as it is given 
any man to be free. In despair, a man's eye is on himself; 
whereas enthusiasm and optimism, usually associated with 
collective cures, are often incurably blind. There is reason 
to believe now that true insight is only possible through 
despair, and if this is so then a certain despair is the 
64 Cf. The Qoncept of Dread, p. 97. 
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pre -condition of wisdom just as insight is ordinarily the 
pre- condition of intelligent outlook.65 
In conclusion then, the possibility of the open way 
upward and the open way downward is the essence of man's 
spiritual freedom; this freedom is given in the nature of 
existence, and to this extent man is subject to it, he is a 
slave of freedom. But man may steal a march on freedom by 
turning inward and becoming fully conscious of his relation 
to freedom and of the possibilities which inhere in him as 
the agent of. freedom. 
65 IJloney Kyrle has asserted that moral changes in 
character resulting from insight are equivalent to the 
possession of wisdom. Insight is the name he gives to the 
process by which the individual is revealed to hiself 
through psychoanalysis. (Money-Kyrle, Psychoansis and 
Politics, p. 68). 
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CHAPTER VII. 
IMPATIENCE AS THE ORIGIN OF GUILT. 
The suggestion was put forward above that man may be 
defined in terms of his guilt: man is his guilt. In this 
chapter we shall discuss the reasons for impatience as an 
explanation of existential guilt or the guilt of. individua- 
tion. 
It would seem that mankind must invariably account for 
the distinction between good and evil, as well as for the 
eventual triumph of good over evil, by the belief in a state 
of primal innocence and in an event through which innocence 
was sacrificed. In mythology this. belief is clearly 
manifest; it is, of course, the basis of the greatest 
religious myths and it has been used in such modern works 
of fiction as Ulysses and Finnegan's Wake; in philosophy it 
was used by Plato, and it may safely be said that even the 
modern activist philosophies cannot do without this belief. 
Cornford has said that ''All ancient thought is haunted by 
regret for a golden age in the remote past ....'`1 We are 
informed by E. H. Carr that Karl Marx believed in a golden 
age of prehistoric communism which existed before private 
property and class divisions were known on earth.2 He was 
1 F. M. Cornford, The Unwritten Philosophy and Other 
Essays (Cambridge U.P., 1950), p. 45. 
2 Edward Hallett Carr, Karl Marx: A Stud in Fanaticisir. 
(J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., London, 1934j, p. 81. 
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convinced "that, just as mankind has emerged from a state 
of communistic innocence, so it will one day return to the 
primitive ideal of a communistic society. "3 
In his state of original innocence man enjoyed perfect 
freedom. According to the myth devised by Plato the souls 
of men travel through the heavens where they are invested 
with the possibility of discerning the truth and inhabiting 
the heavens, or, failing in this, of going down to earth 
and inhabiting the human body. No soul is bound by necessity 
to fall to earth, for the soul may travel forever on its 
journey with the gods around the heavens.4 
The Biblical rryth of the Fall portrays essentially the 
same environment of freedom surrounding the first two souls. 
They exist in a state of innocence; yet there is the 
possibility of falling away, in a sense, of becoming sub- 
ject to the body. The first apparent result of their guilt 
is that they are revealed in their nakedness. In the 
beginning they exist in freedom; they are free to reject or 
obey the commandment of God, and, since they can have as 
yet no direct knowledge of the consequences of disobedience, 
their freedom is now at its greatest extent. As yet, they 
have no conception of the power of God, which is to say, 
3 Ibid., p. 82. 
4 Plato, Phaedrus, tr. R. Hackforth (Cambridge U.P., 
1952). 
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they do not yet possess the knowledge of good and evil. 
Here, it hardly seems possible to speak of "the first sin ". 
Rather, the actors in this myth are moved by a dreamy 
contemplation which conjures up for them more than the eye 
can see. The woman "seems moved by dream longing, but it 
seems to be truly in dream lassitude that he takes and eats 
the two doers know not what they do.,... "5 As a 
result of this act of disobedience, they have "stolen" 
something of the nature of God: the knowledge of good and 
evil. They becorr_e self- conscious, ashamed before each 
other and before God; the power of God is for the first 
time experienced by the soul and the sense of guilt is born 
in man. Insofar as the knowledge of good and evil is also 
the knowledge of the power of God it may be said that God 
begins at this point to exist for the soul. Freedom has 
become circumscribed. 
In The Concept of Dread, we read similarly that man 
in his innocence was "a dreaming spirit "6 and that 
"Innocence is ignorance ".7 Although Kierkegaard does not 
here use the term impatience with regard to the Fall, one 
suspects that "a sweet dread, a sweet feeling of apprehension "8 
5 Martin Buber, Images of Good and Evil (Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London, 1952 , p. 15. 
6 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 44. 
7 Ibid., p. 37. 
8 Ibid., p. 38. 
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is not inconsistent with impatience. And in The Journals 
we find the statement "Dread is nothing but impatience. "9 
Elsewhere, however, Kierkegaard regards impatience sympa- 
thetically in the sense that a man may be impatient to 
receive God's love.10 Impatience is comparable to the 
"Foreboding (which,, is the homesickness of earthly life for 
something higher, for the perception which man must have had 
in paradise.i11 God is infinite patience, the absolute 
ideal by which one measures one's earthly strivings and 
sufferings. In one of the prayers of The Journals he says: 
"Infinite patience, suffering of infinite patience. How 
many times have I not been impatient, wished to give up and 
forsake everything, wished to take the terribly easy way 
out, despair "12 
Kafka would seem to have added his support to Kierke- 
gaard. As a reader of The Journals, Kafka may well have 
had Kierkegaard in mind when he wrote: 
There are two main sins from 
which all others derive: impatience 
and indolence. It was because of 
impatience that they were expelled 
from Paradise, it is because of 
indolence that they do not return. 
9 Kierkegaard, The Journals, p. 363. 
10 Ibid., p. 268. 
11 Ibid., p. 53. 
12 Ibid., p. 361. 
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Yet perhaps there is only one 
major sin: impatience. Because 
of impatience they were expelled, 
because of irr_patience they do 
not return.13 
The impatience of man to be justified is not far 
removed from his impatience to taste the sweets of sin. 
"Job endured everything - until his friends came to comfort 
him, then he grew impatient. "14 What Kierkegaard has in 
mind here is Job's loss of freedom. Job sinned with his 
lips only after the arrival of his friends prevented the working 
out of his salvation through inwardness. Thus, in Purity 
of Heart we read that "precipitate repentance" is false 
because guilt cannot be changed even by the "passage of a 
century ".15 Inwardness can be achieved only through freedom, 
and loss of freedom (as with Job) may lead to impatience, 
just as (with Adam) impatience leads to loss of freedom. 
Again we are reminded that guilt "is the one and only thing 
that can deprive Lone, of freedom" .16 
In the freedom of innocence there is perhaps a latent 
tendency to determine the self, an inward tension demanding 
an outward expression. Freud calls attention to the 
13 Kafka, Wedding Preparations in the Country, p. 38. 
14 Kierkegaard, The Journals, p. 300. 
15 Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart is to Will One Thi. 
tr. Douglas Steere (Harper and Bros., New York, 1938 
pp. 44 -45. 
16 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 97. 
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polarity of primal emotion, the tension generated between 
love and hatred, between the passive and the active instincts. 
"Neither of these instincts is any less essential than the 
other; the phenomena of life arise from the operation of 
both together, whether acting in concert or in opposition ".17 
Such is the situation that gives birth to guilt. Yet the 
poets and dramatists understand that man has always blamed 
himself for what happened without understanding precisely 
what did happen when guilt entered the scene of life. The 
tremendous disproportion between the carelessness, indiffer- 
ence, or whatever it was that precipitated the Fall, and 
the consequences of the act have always been a stumbling 
block to the understanding. Milton considered that the 
original mistake was "due to carelessness, letting Reason 
slip for a moment, not living quite forever as in the great 
Taskmaster' s eye" .18 The "Ridiculous Man" in Dostoevsky's 
story, who brings moral corruption to paradise, cannot 
remember how it happened. 
I only know that I was the cause 
of their sin and downfall. Like a vile 
trichina, like a germ of the plague 
infecting whole kingdoms, so I contam- 
inated all the earth, so happy and 
sinless before my coming. They learnt 
to lie, grew fond of lying, and dis- 
covered the charm of falsehood. Oh, 
17 Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. V, p. 281. 
18 William Empson, Some Versions of Pastoral (Chatto 
and Windus, London, 1935), p. 180. 
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at first perhaps it began innocently, 
with a jest, coquetry, with amorous 
play, perhaps indeed with a germ, but 
that germ of falsity made its way into 
their hearts and pleased them_.'9 
An active, "Dionysiac" nature such as Nietzsche s will 
find the ambiguity and disproportion mentioned above not 
less intolerable than the dreamy indifference with which it 
came about. For Nietzsche, it was the bold theft of fire, 
not the careless, feminine plucking of an apple that 
symbolized the first act of individuation. The Promethean 
myth bestows the masculine dignity of a crime upon an "active 
sin" and, so far from stooping to explain the act, it 
justifies the act and all subsequent guilt and suffering.20 
Yet the hero does not always bring happiness, and there is 
no certainty that by daring to approach the gods man betters 
his lot. The hero exists precisely because in his guilty 
existence he needs the guilty existence of all men; in the 
hour of historical need the hero appears and calls the 
people to be saved, but, in truth, it is the people who 
save the hero. But it is otherwise with the saint, without 
whom the people cannot exist above the level of beasts of 
prey and for whoa: they will endure much suffering. The 
saint is a living reminder to men that all are to blame for 
everything, and that patience, not action, allows the 
19 Dostoevsky, An Honest Thief and Other Stories, p. 321. 
20 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 78. 
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remembrance of one's guilt to become the centre of the moral 
life. Nietzsche could not quite forgive Sophocles his saint- 
like Oedipus for whom patience was the lesson of suffering. 
Nietzsche obviously is less patient with Sophocles and 
Oedipus than with Aeschylus and Prometheus. 
Modern theories of tragedy also recognize the dispro- 
portion, even the irrelevance, of the initial tragic situa- 
tion to the tragic result. But in the initial tragic situa- 
tion itself there is neither defiant heroics nor fate -driven 
destiny. In accordance with the guilt- anxiety which under- 
lies modern life, the tragic dramatist presents a situation 
ready to explode into action at the moment the "spring and 
the trigger" are released. From an examination of the works 
of Anouilh and Giraudoux, T. R. Henn finds that in the 
tragic situation there exists "a preparatory state of 
extreme tension Mandl that the initiating action, the trigger, 
is often unrelated in its seriousness to the force released...; 
the pressure upon it may be trivial or capricious. "21 At 
the heart of this state of tension the "spring" is absolutely 
taut; forced to extremes by an almost metaphysical impatience, 
it must resolve into violent action. "Ripeness is all" is 
a truth scorned by a large part of mankind, yet it is meant 
precisely for those potentially tragic characters for whom 
21 T. R. Henn, The Harvest of Tragedy, (Methuen and 
Co., Ltd., London, 1956), pp. 62 -3. 
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"Impatience with time may become a neurotic obsession ".22 
That the patience counseled by Shakespeare is nearer to 
Christian teaching than to Stoicism is maintained by John 
F. Danby. "Patience nowadays is a negative thing," whereas 
in the Middle Ages it was the opposite of this.23 Not only 
is patience considered a negative, pessimistic response in 
a world where action seems to be the only possible response 
for many, but large numbers of men have also come to regard 
patience as repulsive, as a kind of disgusting anachronism 
impeding necessary reforms and the necessary movement of 
progress. Patience is identified with reaction rather than 
with conservatism which is its rightful relation. Patience, 
so far from being connected, as Gabriel Marcel believes it 
to be rightfully connected, with the inner sense of time 
and growth, is nowadays rather determined relative to speed 
of travel, or to the accomplishment of things in time. 
Moreover, growth, in the same way, has become synonymous 
with expansion of power and the control of man over nature. 
22 Ibid., p. 162. Philosophically speaking, this is 
the obsession that was born in the era of the great "systems" 
and later became identified with action for its own sake 
and with totalitarianism. It is the obsession Felix Weltsch 
has in mind when he explains the sin of impatience in terms 
of the inevitable desire of men to reduce the fundamental 
duality of the world to a unity which does not, and cannot 
exist. (See Weltsch's essay "Religioser Humor bei Franz 
Kafka" in Max Brod's Franz Kafkas Glauben and Lehre). 
23 John F. Danby, "King Lear and Christian Patience ", 
Cambridge Journal, I (1947 -48), p. 306. 
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Patience and a sense of guilt seem to be completely incom- 
patible in the same individual or in the same society. 
Modern Iran's pride, writes Weaver, "reveals itself in 
impatience, 'which is unwilling to bear the pain of discip- 
line".24 The "inhuman excesses" performed by modern man 
are the result of his impatience with limits, an impatience 
which finds man straining against just those human conditions 
by which he is defined as man, until his despair is really 
the despair of being hurran.25 
Patience in the modern world has degenerated into 
boredom; at best it is often simply inaction, a "conscious 
sitting -with- the -hands- folded" (to use Dostoevsky's 
expressive phrase), and at worst, it may be the lull before 
the storm. To the activist, things exist to be made ripe, 
for there is no law that guarantees ripeness will come of 
itself. Human imperfections, being exterior to gran himself, 
must be attacked violently, and thought must be wedded to 
action in the service of destroying objective imperfections. 
An activist thinker, a thinker who knows with fanatical 
certainty what must be done, is literally consumed with the 
urge to put his theories into practice. "Having ideas in 
one's head which can never be applied is a torture, a 
24 Richard Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences, (U. of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1948), D. 183. 
25 Albert Camus, The Rebel, tr. Anthony Bower (Hamish 
Hamilton, London, 1953), p. 272. 
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terrible torture. "26 On the other hand there is also the 
torture of not being able to grasp such imperious ideas. 
In direct contrast to this densely charged state of mind 
is Dostoevsky's "underground man" who continually exercises 
himself in reflection without ever gaining the least idea 
of what is to be done. With him, reflection only draws 
forth one conclusion after another, each more basic than 
the last. Thus, for him, boredom and inactivity are the 
direct, legitimate fruits of consciousness.27 
There is, on the surface, a strange similarity here to 
the ethical impasse which Kierkegaard so often discovered 
himself to be in; but the two cases must not be confused. 
"If I really have powers of reflection and am in a situation 
in which I have to act decisively - what then? My powers of 
reflection will show me exactly as many possibilities Pre 
as contra. "28 This situation, says Kierkegaard, means that 
26 The remark is apparently genuine, but it has been 
ascribed variously, by Barby to Katkov and by Monnerot to 
Tkachev. Cf. Kierkegaard's remark that there can be "no 
more terrible torture for a thinker" than to be always on 
the point of arriving at his conclusion. "If the natural 
scientist does not feel that torture he cannot be a thinker .... 
A thinker is, as it were, in hell until he has found 
spiritual certainty ...." (The Journals, p. 185). But the 
"spiritual certainty" of the scientist as well as of the 
activist thinker is in objective results. Kierkegaard 
implies this distinction in Fear and Trembling where he 
accuses "the present age" of finding its justification in 
results, (p. 95). 
27 Dostoevsky, White Nights and Other Stories, p. 62. 
28 Kierkegaard, The Journals, p. 291. 
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reflection has come up against the absurd, and that action 
from this point must be ''by virtue of the absurd ", that is, 
by faith alone. One cannot reflect at all, in Kierkegaard's 
opinion, without reaching an impasse composed of equal alter- 
natives, one as good as another. In contrast to this, the 
"underground man" would be happy to arrive at such a rela- 
tively comfortable impasse, but he cannot get that far. 
Searching, for instance, for a just rule by which he can 
avenge himself, the "underground man" is unable to believe 
in his own innocence. 
In consequence again of those 
accursed laws of consciousness, anger 
in me is subject to chemical disin- 
tegration. You look into it, the 
object flies off into air, your 
reasons evaporate, the criminal is 
not to be found, the wrong becomes 
not a wrong but a phantom, something 
like the toothache, for which no one 
is to blame ....29 
Promptly, he sinks into lethargy, and in one way or 
another, takes to punishing himself because there is no 
other object for his spleen. But Kierkegaard is not worried 
about the loss of his powers of reflection; he does not feel 
the lack of ground underfoot in the way Kafka and the "under- 
ground man" do; he is rather worried about letting his 
intellect usurp the chief position in a relation which cannot 
by its very nature allow anything so arrogantly certain as 
29 Dostoevsky, White Nights and Other Stories, pp. 62 -63. 
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pure intellect to assume authority. That relationship is 
the relationship to God, and for Kierkegaard it must be 
exclusively a relation of love, of emotion. Kierkegaard 
wants to have the daring, plus all the suffering corollary 
to the daring; he wants to throw himself completely on the 
mercy of God. With Kierkegaard, introspection and reflection 
lead inevitably to faith; in relation to action, introspection 
and reflection lead to acting on the orders of God; for the 
"underground man ", on the contrary, by these two activities 
one arrives simply "underground" where the only possible 
action is the laceration of one's own soul. This whole 
contrast is contained in the conception of "the knight of 
faith ", reserved by Kierkegaard for himself, and in the 
"insect" with which the "underground man" compared himself 
to his own disadvantage. 
Another distinction which must be made here is that 
suffering, while being a necessary part of existence for 
both, does not have the same significance for both: suffering 
for Kierkegaard tends to mean not so much a sign of guilt as 
of justification, whereas suffering for the "underground 
man" is doubt and uncertainty, it is senseless perhaps, but 
there it is; even a kind of enjoyment is to be found in 
suffering. At best, suffering may be a process of atonement, 
of "unguiltingi30 oneself. There is no doubt that Kierkegaard 
30 The expression is typically Russian. For its use 
see Gorer and Rickman, The People of Great Russia, p. 12. 
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found enjoyment in pain also, but it is essentially the 
enjoyment of certainty, of being justified. Many are the 
expressions of pain in Fear and Trembling: he writes of "the 
pain of resignation ";31 of "the pain of not being able to 
make himself intelligible to others ";32 of suffering from 
the pain of silence,33 and of being "tortured in the bondage 
of repentance ".34 With so much spiritual certainty behind 
him, Kierkegaard found reflection to be a luxury he could 
afford to cast aside. In The Present Age he pours scorn 
upon a reflective age: "Our age is essentially one of 
understanding and reflection ...X35 Even suicides cannot 
be called suicides since it is not they who take their 
lives but thought and deliberation. It is an age when one 
can hardly escape from "the coils and seductive uncertainty 
of reflection ".36 Kierkegaard's anti -rational, anti - 
philosophical temperament comes to a head in his belief 
that the "conclusions of passion are the only reliable ones, 
31 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trem_blinv, tr. Walter Lowrie, 
(Princeton U. P., Princeton, 1941), p. 73. 
32 Ibid., p. 107. 
33 Ibid., p. 143. 
34 Ibid., p. 153. 
35 Kierkegaard, The Present _ 7e, Alexander Dru and 0 W. Lowrie (Oxford U. P., 194, p. 3. 
36 Ibid., p. 4. 
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that is, the only convincing conclusions ".37 It is the 
expression -of one who knows profoundly that he lives in an 
age when God can no longer be taken for granted, that 
philosophy, which used to dispense with faith in favour of 
reason, must now abjure reason because it is no longer 
grounded upon spiritual certainty. If philosophy should 
then cease to be itself, so much the worse for philosophy. 
IN THE BURROW 
The spiritual doubts and the uncertainty experienced 
by Kierkegaard centre chiefly around the problem of how he 
is to deal with his sense of guilt according to the will of 
sod.38 He never doubts that he is guilty, or that he is 
guilty before sod; it is his intense awareness of mod that 
makes the course of action so difficult to decide. On the 
other hand, the "underground man", like the burrowing 
animal in Kafka's story, is "underground" precisely because 
he cannot find certainty; it is not simply his guilt which 
drives him underground, but the fact that he cannot discover 
a rational source for his guilt; he cannot relate it to an 
37 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 154. 
38 In an early entry in his journal he writes: "What 
I really lack is to be clear in my mind what I am to do, 
not what I am to know, except in so far as a certain under - 
stainding must precede every action. The thing is to under- 
stand myself, to see what God really wishes me to do ...." 
(The Journals, p. 15). 
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absolute principle or to a definite world -view; least of 
all can he relate his guilt to God. Therefore the "under- 
ground man" cannot act. He possesses no principles upon 
which to act; he does not consider his actions justified. 
"Underground" is quite simply the place of no action; the 
place where self -mortification and self -laceration are 
substituted for action and where the human animal feels 
himself undistinguished from the insect and the rodent. 
There in its nasty, stinking, 
underground home our insulted, crushed 
and ridiculed mouse promptly becomes 
absorbed in cold, malignant and, above 
all, everlasting spite ... spitefully 
teasing and tormenting itself ... it 
will invent unheard of things against 
itself.39 
The "underground man" is a kind of wretched, unheroic 
Hamlet whose conscience is precisely his cowardice. Yet, 
his fear is not so far advanced as the fear in Kafka's 
burrow story. There the animal not only builds his defence 
underground, but he tries to build defences around his major 
defence, the burrow; his fear and isolation are so far 
39 Dostoevsky, White Ni7hts and Other Stories, p. 57. 
Cf. Ivan's remark to Alyosha: "1 am a bug, and I reco8nize 
in all humility that I cannot understand why the world is 
arranged as it is." (The Brothers Karamazov, p. 256). The 
extreme instance of psycho -pathological morbidity is given 
in the character Svidrigailov who asks, "And what if there 
are only spiders there, or something of that sort ... what 
if eternity is one little room, like a bath house in the 
country, black and grimy and spiders in every corner, and 
that's all eternity is?" (Crime and Punishment, p. 263). 
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advanced that he fears anything and eve-fything in nature. 
His diffuse fear can be illustrated by contrasting it with 
the concept of Angst as it was understood by Kierkegaard. 
For Kierkegaard, the threats to personal existence come from 
within; possibility, Kierkegaard believed, was one's ovum 
responsibility.40 Not so with Kafka; possibility has burst 
its natural confines; angst is existential in the deepest 
sense; it is dread arising not merely from possibility in 
oneself but in nature. The fault in existence is not so 
much individual and contingent as it is universal and 
'completely irrational. Like the "underground man" who does 
not believe in the justice of his revenge, who is filled 
with doubts and uncertainties, the animal in his burrow 
surveys his defences and considers his plans without any 
confidence in them. "Suddenly I cannot comprehend my former 
plan, I can find no slightest trace of reason in what had 
seemed so reasonable .... "41 Like the former, he punishes 
40 It is true that Kierkegaard's angst was directed in 
part at existence as such, not merely at his personal 
existence. For example he writes: "The whole of existence 
frightens me ... everything is unintelligible to me, most 
of all myself; the whole of existence is poisoned in my 
sight, particularly myself." (The Journals, pp. 72 -73.) 
The afterthoughts are the most significant parts of this 
passage in that they indicate the subsequent trend of his 
ethical- religious thought and action - away from the 
abstract and to the individual. 
41 Kafka, The Great Wall of China, p. 74. 
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himself for guilt that is felt but not known. "And I tear 
myself free from all my doubts and by broad daylight rush 
to the door, quite resolved to raise it now; but I cannot, 
I rush past it and fling myself into a thorn bush for some 
sin I do not know of. "42 
The fear, the self -torment, and the isolation are 
complete. Nothing like this abstract, diffuse fear has 
ever existed in literature; it is probable that it could 
never have existed at any other time or place then twentieth 
century Europe. Dostoevsky arrives on the scene of history 
when the urge to action is everywhere, and the principles of 
action are nowhere. What torments Dostoevsky is the question 
how ir_en can act when no principles for action exist. Every 
intellectual in Russia, it seems, is writing a pamphlet on 
"Who is to Blame?" or "What is to be Done ?" It is a time 
when men are conceiving the wildest plans for the most 
grandiose, heroic actions with the utmost confidence, and 
therefore without that humility which balances theory and 
practice. Kafka enters history shortly before the world 
explodes in an orgy of action, action against enemies, 
action against the structure of society, and even action 
against human nature itself. So fanatically certain had 
men become that an outside observer must have believed that 
some supernatural revelation had miraculously impressed 
itself on their bodies. 
42 Ibid., p. 59. 
179 
THE DIRECT MAN 
The "direct man ", as Dostoevsky conceived him, is the 
antithesis of the "underground man "; rather than going mad 
from inaction the "direct man" is more likely to be going 
mad with action; he is Hamlet calling for revolution in 
Denmark and assassinating Claudius after the first appear- 
ance of the Ghost. With Hamlet, as David Daiches points out 
in his essay "Guilt and Justice in Shakespeare ",43 the whole 
tragedy turns on his being unable to find the appropriate 
action by which to restore the vision of the world sullied 
by his mother and Claudius. In a word, Hamlet, like the 
"underground man" wants his revenge but not without justice. 
In Lear, moral indignation without any possibility of action 
becomes so strong an emotion that madness is the result. 
King Lear and Hamlet are great tragedies of moral frustra- 
tion because no action is capable of restoring to their 
heroes what they have lost. Daiches also says that the 
greater the moral sensitivity the greater will be the need 
for some kind of action, and the greater will be the sense 
of frustration when action dissolves (as it does with the 
"underground man ") into mere dreams of revenge. But the 
trouble, says Daiches, with morally innocent characters like 
43 David Daiches, Literary Essays (Oliver and Boyd, 
Edinburgh, 1956). 
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Hamlet is that they can never agree to accept a slightly 
improved world in place of the one they have lost; they 
seem to demand "all or nothing ". Now, this is a demand 
which nowadays is often called irrational in the individual 
but reasonable in the collective, a fact which throws some 
light on the relation of justice to action in our day. 
Moral and "religious" heroes in the modern sense are 
precisely those who can not only find their enemies (better 
still the world's enemies) but can justify the type of 
revenge they choose. These men of action, no matter how 
sensitive their moral natures may be, always seem to be 
able to find a punishment to fit the crime and to find 
complete justice in the punishment, that is to say, in 
their revenge. 
There are those who protest that some kind of action 
is always demanded of man, and that even to do evil is 
better than to do nothing. Even in damnation, they say, 
rran may find his glory. But there must be a limit to the 
merit we apply to such damnation. This is especially true 
at the present time when our modern "heroes" are not content 
with going to their own perdition merely, but insist that 
whole multitudes go with them. If we are correct in assuming 
that a sense of guilt lies at the bottom of every moral 
decision, then it must be the case that men of action have 
somehow been able to dispose of their sense of guilt; they 
have somehow found the absolute certainty with which to 
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justify their actions. "To begin to act, you know, you 
must first have your mind completely at ease and no trace 
of doubt left in it. "44 What type of man is it, Dostoevsky 
asks, who can find the principles for action where none 
exist, and who can take revenge with a perfect sense of 
justice? In brief, he distinguishes two types of "men who 
know ": first, there is the simple, direct, normal man whose 
principles are not cerebral in the least, but rather 
instinctual, almost purely physical; then there is the man 
who understands on the intellectual level, the rationalist 
or the scientist. 
Dostoevsky, or rather the "underground man ", would 
suggest that Rousseau's noble savage is noble because his 
sense of justice is confined to the law of talion; he who 
has no sophisticated sense of justice will never be bothered 
with remorse, will never become an "underground man ". In 
this respect Dostoevsky's anthropology places him in oppo- 
sition to a trend among certain scientists to see in 
evolution itself the clue to man's ethical development. If 
this were possible, then why is it, Dostoevsky would ask, 
that man has struggled so hard to escape from a level of 
consciousness where justice took the form of immediate and 
unthinking revenge and where a gnawing sense of guilt was 
unknown? Sir Arthur Keith would seem to agree with 
44 Dostoevsky, White Nights, p. 62. 
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Dostoevsky that the antithesis of the normal man is the 
man of acute consciousness, the "retort-made man ",45 the 
hapless mouse in his underground hole. Ire exactly describes 
the history of the "underground man ": "Sooner or later the 
over -civilized mind detects the dual code in its make -up, 
becomes conscious of the contradictions involved, and so 
lands itself in a maze of worldly com_plexities.i46 
While in prison, Dostoevsky carefully observed this 
normal man unaffected by the pangs of conscience and always 
acting with complete unconcern for consequences. The 
prisoner Petrov is an excellent example of this type. "Men 
like Petrov are only ruled by reason till they have some 
strong desire. Then there is no obstacle on earth that can 
hinder them.i47 Stavrogin is, underneath his veneer of 
culture, a man who acts on the same principles of simple, 
unadorned justice. "... Nikolay Vsyevolodovitch's was one 
of those natures that knew nothing of fear .... If anyone 
had slapped him in the face, I should have expected him not 
to challenge his assailant to a duel, but to murder him on 
the spot. "48 Stavrogin confesses that fear is entirely 
45 Ibid., p. 56. 
46 Sir Arthur Keith, Essays on Human Evolution 
(Watts and Co., London, 1946), p. 119. 
47 Dostoevsky, The House of the Dead, n. 100. 
48 Dostoevsky, The Possessed, p. 189. 
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alien to him: "I had never felt fear, and all my life, 
except in this one case, I never before nor after was afraid 
of anything .... "49 The absence of fear and doubt leads to 
uninhibited action. 
With people who know how to revenge 
themselves and to stand up for themselves 
in general, how is it clone? Why, when 
they are possessed let us suppose, by the 
feeling of revenge, then for the time 
there is nothing else but that feeling 
left in their whole being. Such a 
gentleman simply dashes straight for 
his object like an infuriated bull with 
its horns down,. and nothing but a wall 
will stop him.D° 
So much for the "direct man" whose approach to justice 
is not through a heavy veil of introspection, doubts and 
bad conscience but through immediate retaliation. 
The second type of direct man, that is, of the man who 
knows, is the type possessed by an idea. Psychologically 
speaking there is a difference between these two in the way 
they reach the stage of action, but morally speaking they 
are linked together in that their ends are the same, namely 
those of justice, while their means are secondary. For 
example, in the following statement, we can see that even 
someone of intelligence, perhaps even of great moral 
conviction can achieve the same results as the si:r_ple, direct 
49 Dostoevsky, Stavrogin's Confession and the Plan of 
the Life of a Great Sinner, p. 51. 
5° Dostoevsky, White Nights, p. 56. 
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man, though by a different route. 
Briefly, I conclude that, having 
something fixed, permanent, and over- 
powering in one's mind in which one 
is terribly absorbed, one is, as it 
were, removed by it from the whole 
world, and everything that happens, 
except the one great thing, slips by 
one. Even one's impressions are hardly 
formed correctly. And what matters 
most - one always has an excuse ....51 
Having an "idea" and acting upon it with the absolute 
conviction of one's own rightness is the modern equivalent 
of acting from instinctive principles of justice. Just how 
this extraordinary step in the development of consciousness 
has been taken is a problem that even psychology has not 
solved, but philosophically and morally it is a step of 
prodigious significance. At bottom it must be related 
directly to the problem of guilt. The fear of existence 
which the "direct man" of older times subdued in himself 
was a physical fear; hence, his heightened sense of conscious- 
ness consisted in being certain that he was physically invinc- 
ible. But here we are dealing with a case of intellectual, 
perhaps even "spiritual ", invincibility, since under this 
conviction man's pride has almost no bounds. The conviction 
is that one is morally and intellectually above error, and 
that the action one commits oneself to is a necessary and 
therefore justifiable action. In this case one considers 
51 Dostoevsky, A Raw Youth, tr. Constance Garnett, 
(William Heinemann, London, 1916), p. 91. 
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oneself to be inside a closed system, hermetically sealed 
off, as it were, from any imputations of guilt. Kierkegaard 
describes such a character as an abstractor from existence 
whose "loose trousers ... are very different from the strait 
jacket of the exister".52 If it is true that existence 
itself makes one guilty, that one becomes guilty through 
existence, it must be the case that modern man finds his 
principles for action by abstracting his guilt from exis- 
tence. This, at least, seems to be what Kierkegaard has in 
mind when he complains that the speculative philosopher is 
speculative to the extent that he removes himself from the 
sphere of moral responsibility, that is, from existence. 
No, to be in error or delusion 
is ... the thing they fear least. 
One may behold amazing examples which 
illustrate this fact on a prodigious 
scale. A thinker erects an immense 
building, a system, a system which 
embraces the whole of existence and 
world -history, etc. - and if we 
contemplate his personal life, we 
discover to our astonishment this 
terrible and ludicrous fact, that he 
himself personally does not live in 
this immense high- vaulted palace, 
but in a barn alongside of it, or in 
a dog kennel, or at most in the 
porter's lodge.53 
The modern man of acute consciousness, who has suddenly 
found his principles of action outside himself, has succeeded 
52 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 469. 
53 Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, tr. W. Lowrie, 
(Oxford U.P., London, 1944), p. 68. 
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in explaining away his sense of guilt; he has, in effect, 
abstracted himself from existence. He ceases to be an "I ", 
and instead transforms his consciousness into a conscious- 
ness of "we "; or he imagines that he has divined the secret 
of history, the order of existence, and frantically throws 
himself into the stream of history. Not to be included in 
history would be a fate worse than death. Theoretically, 
the expression for this recourse to action is: "away from 
the old, bad consciousness to a new and pure consciousness ", 
but the covert, almost unconscious expression is: "backwards 
to a naive, natural consciousness ". One of the most 
significant facts to be noted about the modern conscious- 
ness is the phenomenal ability of the conscience to over- 
throw itself, to negate itself in order to accomplish its 
demands. Thus, the most positive moral sentiments may be 
converted to their opposites; pity and humanitarian feelings 
may become converted to ruthless vindictiveness. Dostoevsky 
had this fact in mind when he declared that in an age of 
transition and scepticism there existed "the possibility of 
considering oneself not as a villain - in fact almost not 
being one and yet perpetrating incontestable villainies ".54 
54 Dostoevsky, Diary of a Writer, tr. Boris Brasol, 
(Scribner's, N.Y., 1949), Vol. I, p. 149. Cf. also this 
statement by Wordsworth in his preface to "The Borderers ": 
"It has been a further object with me to shew that from abuses 
interwoven with the texture of society a bad man may be 
furnished with sophisms in support of his crimes which it 
would be difficult to answer ". (p. 348). The abuses make it 
possible for him to press "truth and falsehood into the same 
service" so that it is, in fact, almost impossible to say 
whether he is a good or a bad man. (p. 346). The Poetical 
Works of William Wordsworth, ed. E. de Selincourt, Vol. I. 
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The alternative to this transvaluation of values.is, 
of course, the life of the "underground man ", the life of 
no action. Seen in this light the "new man" of action 
appears to be but a refined form of the natural, "direct 
man ". Faced with the alternative of turning inward with 
its burden of guilt, the conscience seeks for a way out, it 
seeks to liberate guilt, usually in the manner which we have 
already discussed, that of seeking a scapegoat. The 
revolutionary transvaluation of values always seems to be 
preceded by a corresponding event in the mind of a 
revolutionary leader or thinker whose fundamental genius, 
so far from simply bringing order to a chaotic world, turns 
the chaotic elements of his own consciousness, particularly 
those of frustration and guilt, into an entirely new pattern 
of guilt and innocence. The fact that Marx, for example, 
"was obsessionally inclined to turn the existing order 
'upside down' ... "55 provides the clue to the inward 
revolution which precedes and prefigures the outward. 
Perhaps nothing in the entire history of thought or of 
man's consciousness is more remarkable than the manner in 
which the typically modern revolutionary genius is able to 
achieve for himself, the masses, and the guilt- bogged élite, 
the absolute, final solutions, which all are so desperately 
55 Barbu, Democracy and Dictatorship, p. 195. 
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seeking. If it were not that such a large part of the 
world immediately leaps with joy into this new vortex of 
activity it might be seen more clearly at the time how this 
peculiarly new type of genius consists in the marvellous 
ability to translate the myriad, chaotic problems of 
existence into a positive pattern. This faculty is called 
by Barbu the "esprit certitudien ". 
Doubt in thinking, lack of 
opinion, as well as scruples in 
action are for dHitler amongst 
the greatest evils produced by 
modern democracy ... Not only 
has he an opinion but he expresses 
it with the strongest possible 
conviction as if the whole world 
testified to its truth.56 
This suddenly achieved vortex of mental and physical 
activity is all the more remarkable because it is derived 
from a comparative vacuum, a mental state wherein no out- 
ward, tangible results of thought seem to be possible. An 
absolute abhorrence of such a vacuum is what drives the 
activist thinker to create a system in which all possible 
questions will answer themselves, nay more, in which the 
questions will never arise. Thus it is that Marx "conveys 
the impression that he knew the answer to all problems he 
deals with, before giving any thought to them. Matters 
which perplex anybody, Marx calls 'self- evident'. "57 The 
56 Ibid., p. 153. 
57 Ibid., p. 215. 
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meaninglessness of modern existence and the resultant 
diffuse sense of guilt are together the soil from which 
spring up the most fanatically certain interpretations of 
existence, different perhaps in rationalization (or lack of 
it) but alike in their capacity for liberating the sense of 
guilt and therefore the need for action. If the poverty of 
philosophy is its failure to bring about changes in the 
world, then philosophy must be put to the service of liber- 
ating those inhibitory elements, namely,frustration and the 
sense of guilt, which prevent action upon the world. Should 
it be any wonder that in so many respects the mental and 
moral changes which ensue in the adherents of activist 
philosophies exactly correspond to the inward changes of 
their leaders and founders ?58 
That which an activist philosophy endeavours to 
provide above all is an excuse for action, or more precise- 
ly, a whole system of excuses. The purpose is to turn 
58 E.g. "Marx can be considered as a unique case of 
frustrated and repressed personality." (p. 208). "Thoughts 
of aggression and persecution abound in his writings." 
(p. 213). "He more often projects this aggression] on 
various aspects of the external world .... The discontent 
and the aggression resulting from his own failures were 
projected on to various aspects of the external world as 
injustice and hostility against himself." (Barbu, on. cit., 
p. 214). Cf. Bertrand Russell's statement that Marx's 
"thinking was almost entirely inspired by hatred and that 
his chief desire was to see his enemies punished1f. (Why 
I Oppose Communism, Phoenix House Ltd., London, 1956, 
pp. 11 -12). 
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man's consciousness away from himself because in himself, 
by himself, he can find no certainty. Kierkegaard says 
that "In the accord of silence with the ideal, one word is 
lacking, the loss of which is not felt, for the thing it 
denotes does not exist: it is the word excuse ".59 But man 
without this vital accord is man without guidance and 
without principles for action; he is seeking desperately 
for an ultimate authority while living continually with the 
possibility that it may at last appear to him as an excuse 
for immediate action without the danger of incurring guilt. 
Such is the guise in which activist solutions to the problem 
of guilt make their appearance in our time. 
59 Kierkegaard, Concludin. Unscientific Postscript, p. 488. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
cxUIL'.CY OF WHAT? 
Certain biographical observations will help to 
elucidate the ways in which Kafka, Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky 
faced the problem of guilt. For example, if one asks the 
question, "Of what was Kafka guilty ?" one begins to see 
something of the amazing complexity with which this question 
presented itself to Kafka. "Sorrow and joy, guilt and 
innocence, like two hands indissolubly clasped together; one 
would have to cut through flesh, blood and bones to part 
them. "1 It is much more than a question of what David 
Daiches calls "the ambiguity of innocence, "2 a situation 
com_:ron to both Shakespeare and Dostoevsky, in which charac- 
ters like Othello and Myshkin reach tragic heights not so 
much because of moral flaws, but because in the very nature 
of things, innocence has no defence against evil. Shakes- 
peare, after all, had the advantage of writing in an age 
when a world order (a Christian world order, moreover) left 
no doubt that guilt was guilt and innocence was innocence 
even if the latter could occasionally come under the dominion 
1 Kafka, Diary 1914 -1923, p. 191. 
2 David Daiches, Literary Esses, p. 2. Kierkegaard 
also uses the expression "ambiguous innocence ". He defines 
this as the essence of genuine tragedy because guilt and 
innocence can exist together in the same character. Ancestral 
guilt, for instance, may produce in the individual a conscious- 
ness of his guilty existence, and it was such a situation that 
Kierkegaard considered himself to be in through no guilty 
fault of his own. (Either /Or, D. 117). 
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of evil. "It was far easier then' to be very wicked and 
think yourself so than to be a little wicked without a 
sense of sin. "3 If we could transpose this observation of 
Professor Tillyard's into a general formula for the world 
of morality as Dostoevsky might express it the phrase would 
run like this: It is far easier today to be very wicked and 
to think yourself innocent than to be really guiltless and 
think yourself innocent. The first half of this statement 
was the idea used by Dostoevsky in The Possessed. It 
reveals the possibility in times of spiritual indecision of 
doing evil in the name of good and of being convinced at 
the same time that one is actually good. The second half 
of the statement expresses the idea behind the tragedy of 
Myshkin, and the two together might be the formula for a 
perfect world of comedy were it not that such a world is 
even more tragic. 
Kafka was too much preoccupied with the guilt of 
innocence to understand, as Dostoevsky did, the innocence 
of guilt. The hero of Kafka's novel America lives in a 
continual state of transition between willing the good and 
seeing results to the contrary mount up on all sides. In 
spite of himself he cannot really pass through life without 
leaving a guilty trail behind. It is characteristic of 
Karl that he is never in the least aggressive; only once in 
3 E. M. W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture, 
(Chatto and Windus, London, l943 ), p. 16. 
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the story does he positively assert himself. His good 
qualities, or perhaps his neutral qualities, always land 
him in trouble; his generosity and friendliness more than 
anything are disastrous. 
As Georg Bendemann regards his father's ridiculous 
figure standing above him on the bed, the old man's final 
words to his son are: "An innocent child, yes, that you 
were, truly, but still more truly have you been a devilish 
human being: - And therefore take note: I sentence you to 
death by drowning: "4 It is of no matter to Georg whether 
this punishment fits his dubious crimes or not, for the 
words are no sooner out of his father's mouth than Georg 
runs madly from the house, impelled towards the river and 
his death by drowning. In the story "A Country Doctor ", 
the doctor is reduced to ruin and despair through a series 
of fantastic events that begin with his desire to reach a 
dying patient. Joseph K., the hero of The Trial, is arrested 
one morning while still in his bed, a singular procedure 
explained only by someone's having told lies about him. 
These characters, so far from being tragic in the ordinary 
sense, are unable at the very outset to control the least 
parts of their own destinies; they are overwhelmed by guilt 
from the first moment. One critic has referred to this as 
the most shocking of all concepts of Built, "an initial, 
4 Kafka, In the Penal Settlement, tr. Willa and Edwin 
Muir (Seeker and Warburgh, London, 1949), p. 58. 
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almost pre -natal guilt "5 which places responsibility 
irrespective of the action to which it logically belongs. 
When it comes, therefore, to describing the origins of 
guilt in these stories of Kafka, one arrives immediately 
before a blank wall, or rather, on the contrary, before a 
limitless expanse through which one might trace guilt back 
indefinitely, as Kafka himself described it, until one 
reaches "the grey Original Sin. "6 Here we are as far removed 
as possible from, say, the romantic conscience of a Lord Jirc 
who understands his guilt and sets about to restore his 
innocence as if it were a matter of balancing the scales 
through work, self -sacrifice and derring -do. The youthful 
determination of Jim once he is given the challange to 
restore his innocence is in marked contrast to the perpetual 
fear and bewilderment of Kafka's characters. To have a 
conscience is precisely to fear, to fear existence itself. 
Admittedly, and as one might expect, these characters are 
given sufficientplausibility to enable one to discover 
their flaws and venial sins. It is pointed out by some 
critics, for example, that Georg Bendemann is complacent 
and that he has neglected his old father in pursuit of his 
own advantage. Gregor Samsa seems to have lived a false 
existence, as does Joseph K., but just how they are to be 
5 Angel Flores, ed. The Kafka Problem, (New Direction, 
New York, 1946), p. 81. 
6 Kafka, Letters to Milena, tr. Tania and James Stern, 
(Seeker and Warburg, London, 1953), p. 193. 
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distinguished in this from other characters who are not 
changed into insects or called before inscrutable courts of 
law, it is difficult to say. Whatever the sins of Kafka's 
characters may be, one thing is clear - there is no intell- 
igible relation between the offence and the punishment. It 
is ridiculous to attempt to enumerate the possible sins of 
Georg Bendemann when the outcome of his life is that in the 
face of his guilt he destroys himself. If George Bendemann, 
Joseph K. or any other hero of Kafka's is senselessly driven 
to death or punishment (and they nearly all are eventually) 
it is not because a particular human sin is being expiated, 
but because the character is infinitely guilty in his own 
eyes. 
In trying to locate any particular guilt, we are always 
confronted with guilt itself, and in attempting to describe 
this guilt and how it arises, we again find nothing but the 
existence of a profoundly experienced but incomprehensible 
guilt. Nevertheless Kafka describes a situation not 
entirely devoid of meaning in respect to punishment. With 
one notable exception, namely, Gregor Samsa, Kafka's heroes 
are sentenced to death, or murdered, or tortured by some 
more or less definite human agency (as in 'The Judgement" 
and in "The Penal Colony" where the old Commandant represents 
the highest authority), or by some mysterious, unattainable 
authority (as in The Trial and The Castle). That is to 
say, the punishment either issues ultimately from some 
particular agency or person, or the hero punishes himself in 
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trying to establish the identity of the authority before 
whom he presumes himself to be guilty. 
But, if Kafka provides us with the sense of guilt 
behind existence, this was not for him an explanation; he 
may have been able to confirm for Heidegger and the French 
existentialists the tragedy of a world where God is dead, 
but from his own experience Kafka could learn nothing that 
could be said to offer a philosophical explanation of 
existence. Kafka's life both as man and artist can best be 
described as a constant striving wherein to stop and question 
guilt is tantamount to sinking deeper into the very guilt 
that everyone wades through in this life. In the words of 
the French critic, Claude- Edmonde Magn.y, " Kafka does not 
explain; he affirms. This is the fact. Es ist so. "7 
Kafka confesses that he cannot understand how "one should 
consider it possible to argue about [guilt] as about any 
ordinary arithmetical problem which is so clear that it 
produces results for daily conduct ... "8 
Since this life can be nothing more than a constant 
striving after redemption there would seem to be little 
time, if any, for what Martin Buber calls the life of 
dialogue, the meeting with the other; and it is true that 
all Kafka's strength came from within himself where only 
7 Flores, The Kafka Problem, p. 79. 
8 Kafka, Letters to Milena, p. 193. 
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silence and monologue exist. Yet his very striving, his 
refusal to acknowledge defeat for himself (although we find 
almost nothing but defeat in what he wrote) suggests that 
his strength had its source in something besides silence 
and monologue. Compare, for example, the following statement 
of Kafka's with the belief of Heidegier that the life of 
monologue or the relation of the self to itself is the only 
essential relation. 
Humility provides everyone, even 
him who despairs in solitude, with the 
strongest relationship to his fellow 
man ... It can do this because it is 
the true language of prayer, at once 
adoration and the firmest of unions. 
The relationship to one's fellow man 
is the relationship of prayer, the 
relationship of striving; it is from 
prayer that one draws the strength for 
one's striving.9 
Nevertheless, it would seem that Kafka's preoccupation with 
the True Way and the Law was determined more by Hebrew 
tradition than by any universal human need "to belong" in 
the strictly social sense, although this need was undoubtedly 
an important one in his life. All that he was denied of the 
communal life followed as a result of that original tragic 
denial, the love and acceptance of his father. In the 
"Letter to His Father ", the element of fear stands out as 
the most influential emotion bearing upon the son's relation 
with his father, a relation moreover which always existed for 
Kafka. As the opening sentence of the letter clearly 
9 Kafka, Wedding Preparations in the Country, p. 52. 
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indicates, Kafka had not outgrown this fear even at the age 
of thirty- seven: "Dearest Father, you asked me recently 
why I maintain I am afraid of you. 1110 By reason of the 
very fear which called forth the question the son could not 
answer it. 
As if in accordance with the natural reaction towards 
any object of fear Kafka once thought of entitling all his 
works The Attempt to Escape from Father. Such a reaction, 
continued as it was into adulthood, suggests the Freudian 
explanation that Kafka was not able, perhaps because of 
this excessive fear, to pass through the normal extension 
of the Oedipus- complex to the authority of the super -ego. 
Freudian theory in this case helps to provide a partial 
answer for the extreme isolation from human events which 
Kafka experienced, feeling himself, as it were, divided 
from ordinary human intercourse and from those normal social 
pursuits through which the super -ego, having taken "the 
place of the parental function ... guides" the individual.11 
Buber informs us that "All religious reality begins 
with what Biblical religion calls the 'fear of God'."12 
10 Ibid., p. 157. 
11 Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho- 
Analysis, tr. W. J. H. Sprott (Hogarth Press, London, 
1933), p. 85. 
12 Martin Buber, Eclipse of God (Victor Gollancz, 
London, 1953),.p. 50. Cf. also "... in order really to 
love God it is necessary to have feared God ..." (Kierkegaard, 
The Journals, p. 50). 
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But this fear is not, contrary to theological belief, a 
permanent thing, it is rather a "gate" through which man 
passes on his way to a spiritual condition enabling him to 
confront life fearlessly. "He loves life in the love of 
God, whom he has learned to love. "13 Obviously, such a 
condition is what Kafka strove to attain every day of his 
life, and was always to be denied because he could not pass 
through the gate of fear. The volume, Letters to Milena, 
written near the end of his life to a Jewess who was almost 
as unhappy in her married state as Kafka was in his celibacy 
attests to the pathological fear he daily experienced. "My 
nature," he writes, "is: Fear ... "14 What shall I do when 
instead of a heart this fear is beating in my body ? "15 
Page after page he gives vent to this thought, that although 
his fear is horrible he could not live without it; he pours 
himself into it, he says "with rapture.i16 In the end, the 
reader is unable to distinguish Kafka's fear from his guilt; 
they go hand in hand through every page he writes. 
To return to the problem of the limitless depth of 
man's guilt and the impossibility of describing any particular 
13 Ibid., p. 52. 
14 Kafka, Letters to Milena, p. 71. 
15 Ibid., p. 85. 
16 Ibid., p. 106. 
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guilt to Kafka's characters, we find this to be a result of 
Kafka's tragic inability to overcome the initial, almost 
primitive fear that Buber describes. But in a world where 
God is absent there is never a goal to arrive at; one cannot 
overcome that which has no end. Kafka may have believed in 
the existence of a goal,but he never gives any indication 
of what it is or how to reach it. 
The importance of Kafka's Jewish background cannot be 
overlooked; the authority of Hebrew tradition transmitted 
from father to son and the sense of belonging to a people 
chosen by a God of love and redemption were denied to him. 
As he himself wrote, he had not been given as a child the 
Christian tradition Kierkegaard received from his father, 
nor had he "caught the hem of the Jewish prayer -mantle" as 
the Zionists had.17 For this reason he speaks of "the lack 
of ground underfoot, of air, of the commandment ..."18 
Without these and without love Kafka experienced what were 
undoubtedly the most terrible torments of guilt known to 
our age. 
Modern man can discover no ultimate moral authority, 
and therefore his guilt is intensely subjective and shows 
no regard to motive or action; it is inexpiable and therefore 
irrational; if it were expiable man would stand before God, 
confess and punish himself, but to whom does one confess? 
17 Kafka, Wedding_ Preparations in the Country, p. 113. 
18 Loc. cit. 
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Who listens to the lamentations of the rabbi?19 The inner 
commandment appears senseless, as if heard in a dream, 
incoherent and unintelligible, "for I don't know whose 
corr_,rand it is and what he is aiming at ... "20 Thus does 
Kafka describe in the alienation of his own spirit the 
problem of conscience for modern man. Still, it must be 
pointed out again that he affirms for us, as the basis of 
conscience and of guilt, the existence of a "voice ", a 
"commandment" which is prior to and fundamentally independent 
of man's social condition. The opinion of Edwin Muir is that 
the admittedly important place of man within the community 
was for Kafka primarily a religious and moral problem, man's 
true place being determined not by secular but by divine 
law.21 So far as we can learn from Kafka, the original 
and ultimate ground of man's guilt is not directly connected 
with the arrangement of society on earth, but this arrange- 
ment (or disarrangement) may be a symptom of the guilt so 
clearly experienced by man in these times. 
For both Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, pride comes at 
the head of all the host of sins. "But they will not attain 
to death *22 is the judgement reserved for the proudest of 
the proud, those who, even in Hell, curse the God of life 
19 Ibid., p. 326. 
20 Ibid., p. 106. 
21 Franz Kafka, The Great Nall of China and Other 
Pieces (Seeker and Warburg, London, 1946), Introductory 
note, p. 9. 
22 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, p. 106. 
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and cry aloud for his annihilation. "Faust," says Kierke- 
gaard, "is personified doubt; "23 he is the symbol of the 
individual intellect who storms heaven alone.24 And yet in 
the last analysis it is not doubt, but rebellion against 
God that is at fault;25 insubordination and repudiation of 
rightful authority are signs of the times, an observation 
Kierkegaard might reasonably have been expected to make in 
1847. To the profoundly conservative mind any threat to 
stability on earth is a shaking of the foundations of all 
authority. The guilty man needs judgement above everything; 
therefore, the eclipse of God is for him a calamity of the 
worst kind. He is left without the possibility of either 
punishment or approbation, a situation which, spiritually 
speaking, can only be compared to original chaos. The first 
movement of confusion comes from the masses who demand a 
share of the authority exercised by the monarch. This is 
not to imply that Kierkegaard believed in the divine rule 
of kings; the whole movement is simply part of a still 
larger whole, including the generation and the age, which 
combines to overthrow not merely the established regime, but 
23 Kierkegaard, The Journals, p. 5. 
24 Kierkegaard, Either /0r, p. 73. 
25 Kierkegaard, The Journals, p. 193. See also D. 222. 
This idea occurs frequently, particularly after 1848 when 
the new Danish constitution was granted. It is rebellion 
and not doubt, after all, which is the negation of obedience, 
and obedience had always been the "form" of his relation to 
his father, his studies and his religion. Cf. The Point of 
View For My Works as an Author, p. 137. "All doubt ... is 
just simply disobedience to God." 
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the source of all authority, God.26 The religious counter- 
part of the materialistic masses who march to the barricades 
shouting "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" is the age 
itself marching to the House of God and crying defiantly 
"We shall all be blessed together all right. "27 
The study of the sin of pride has a long history, and 
perhaps no century has added more to the religious and 
philosophical side of the question than our own. Emile Zola 
once observed that the greatest strength always lies with 
the single minded; and it is precisely this pride in 
strength which Dostoevsky subjects to his profound knowledge 
of character. There is ample reason to believe that in his 
description of such wayward young men as the Raw Youth and 
Raskolnikov, Dostoevsky returned to facts of extremely 
personal origin. During his school days when separated 
from his family he had lived in silent, morbid isolation 
from his fellow students; even his family life, before his 
formal education began, was largely devoid of social inter- 
course. 28 At the time of his emergence into literary 
circles which came with the writing of Poor Folk, Dostoevsky's 
pride had swollen to ludicrous extremes (" ... if I were to 
recount to you all rry successes, I could not find enough 
26 Ibid., p.,222. 
27 Ibid., p. 223. 
28 See Carr, Dostoevs (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
London, 1931), pp. 13 and 18. 
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paper ...29). What thoughts and ideas possessed the youth's 
mind are not clear, but it seems evident that he was excited 
by ideas, and perhaps found one for himself by which he 
could justify his loneliness and isolation. In A Raw Youth 
we find a study of "possession" by the dream of power. 
Yes, I thirsted for power, I've 
thirsted for it all my life, power 
and solitude. ... almost from my 
earliest childhood, I could never 
imagine myself except in the foremost 
place, always and in every situation 
in life. ... (This: is the point of 
my idea ... that money is the one 
means by which the humblest nonentity 
may rise to the foremost place ... 
I only want what is obtained by power ... 
that is, the calm and solitary 
consciousness of strength :30 
Thus the strength of singlemindedness begins to make its 
appearance. The "idea" morally covers everything, all 
actions, no matter how revolting, are excused beforehand. 
The following excerpts from the projected Life of a Great 
Sinner indicate that Dostoevsky was planning a long tragedy 
founded on pride. 
29 Ibid., p. 29. Nearly all the letters to his brother 
prior to his arrest are painful to read, so filled with self 
praise are they. Nevertheless there is at times a redeeming 
note of objectivity: "I will frankly confess to you that I 
am quite intoxicated by my fame." Letters of Fyodor 
Michailovich Dostoevsky to His Family and Friends, tr. 
Ethel Colburn Mayne (Chatto and Windus, London, 1914), p. 32. 
30 Dostoevsky, A Raw Youth, pp. 83 - 4. 
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It is not this alone that 
isolates him from everybody, but 
really his dreams of power and 
his enormous height above every- 
thing ... Money will solve all 
questions.31 
He began saying money from 
a vague idea.32 
He is sure that he will be 
the greatest of men. And in that 
way he behaves: he is the proudest 
of the proud and behaves with the 
greatest haughtiness towards people. 
... Gold ... amassing money was 
sug.;ested to him by a usurer, a 
terrible man, the antithesis of 
Tikhon.33 
The hero of The Life is not to be taken as a portrait 
of the author, yet there is little doubt that in this last 
great novel Dostoevsky intended to make great confessions, 
to go deeper into his soul than ever before. There are 
whippings and floggings, a man is beaten to death, a lame 
girl is assaulted (as in the suppressed portion of The 
Possessed) and for a while, depravity is complete. Then 
comes a period of remorse followed again by depravity in 
what Freud calls the "Russian pattern ", implying that 
Dostoevsky was only too familiar with "risings and fallings ".34 
31 Dostoevsky, Stavrogin's Confession and The Plan of 
The Life of a Great Sinner, tr. S. S. Koteliansky and 
Virginia Woolf (Hogarth Press, Richmond, 1922), p. 93. 
32 Ibid., p. 105. 
33 Ibid., p. 113. 
34 Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. V, p. 222. 
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And this is certainly true, provided we make a distinction 
between sins of the imagination and sins of fact. In both 
Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard there are to be found sins 
committed and expiated along with sins not committed and 
yet expiated. Not only do we not know what tem_ntations 
Dostoevsky had in his heart and yet successfully overcame,35 
but we must remember that he witnessed extreme forms of 
suffering and brutality while in prison, and used this 
experience in the same way all imaginative writers do. Nor 
ought we to suppose that Dostoevsky merely describes what 
is peculiar to himself or to the Russian character. The 
universality of his psychological analysis has been far too 
firmly established for that accusation to be taken seriously. 
The same character analysis also goes into the rough 
draft of Crime and Punishment. 
Raskolnikov's idea of tremendous 
pride, of haughtiness and contempt for 
society ... Despotism is his chief 
characteristic ... He wants to dominate 
but does not know with what means to 
achieve it. ... To get power and to 
become rich. The idea of murder came 
ready made into his head ....36 
Although this picture of Raskolnikov's motives under- 
went certain developments as the writing progressed, 
Dostoevsky never altered his basic intention of revealing 
"the strength of singlem_indedness ", particularly among 
35 Ibid., p. 222. 
36 Dostoevsky, New Dostoevsky Letters, tr. S. S. 
Koteliansky (The Mandrake Press, London, n.d), p. 40. 
207 
those whose ideas were conceived in the benighted spiritual 
atmosphere of the times. He calls their "incomplete" ideas, 37 
strange, abortive notions that are taken for truth in the 
hazy but electrical air of intellectual Russia. Dostoevsky 
was always acutely aware of what is called the intellectual 
climate; his novels depend not on ingenuity for effect but 
on actuality, on the real events of the times. In his 
letters, for instance, he refers to the documentary evidence 
he has gathered in support of the bizarre details of The 
Brothers Karamazov.38 
In the beginning of the novel Crime and Punishment we 
find a character who is "in the condition that overtakes 
some monomaniacs entirely concentrated upon one thing. "39 
The first six chapters are given to a careful, step -by-step 
analysis of how seemingly natural events with exterior 
causes occur as if they had been made, by prearrangement, 
to coincide with the mental events within the character. 
Thus when Raskolnikov receives the letter from his mother 
and sees that she and Dounia are sacrificing their lives 
for him, he decides that something must be done immediately, 
done at once and done quickly,40 This letter effectively 
settles the question of action; to delay action would be 
immoral at this point. Somewhat later his destiny turns 
37 Ibid., p. 43. 
38 Ibid., p. 95. 
39 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, D. 26. 
40 Ibid., p. 42. 
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upon his walking, quite unaccountably and against his 
custom, through the Hay Market where he overhears Lizaveta's 
conversation with the huckster and his wife. This "chance" 
event presents him with the very day and hour for the 
accomplishment of the idea he has been living-with for the 
past m_onth,41 Only six weeks before, he had overheard a 
conversation about the old pawnbroker; the motive for the 
crime receives a forceful justification not only by reason 
of the conversation itself but because of its amazing 
coincidence. 
... why had he happened to hear 
such a discussion on such ideas at 
the very moment when his own brain 
was just conceiving ... the very same 
ideas? And why just at the moment 
when he had brought away the embryo 
of his idea from the old woman, had 
he dropped at once upon a conversation 
about her? This coincidence always 
seemed strange to him. This trivial 
talk in a tavern had an immense 
influence on him in his later action; 
as though there had really been in it 
something preordained, some guiding 
hint ...42 
It is this subtle, more felt than understood, conviction 
that events are moving with his purpose that lends strength 
to his casuistry and makes the moral question superfluous. 
But more than this, it provides Raskolnikov with what he 
needs above everything else - for even the moral question 
41 Ibid., p. 57. 
42 Ibid., p. 62. 
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is ancillary to this - the will to believe that 'what must 
be done can be done. There is no ideology at stake here, it 
is not a matter of action in the name of some lofty idea, 
but it is a question of will alone, "one has only to dare ".43 
The crime is coaxr_itted for himself alone. In the last 
analysis Raskolnikov is pitting himself directly against 
:god, he even seems to have a presentiment that this is the 
case, for afterwards he reveals to Sonia that the devil has 
led him on, and that not the old lady was murdered by him, 
but he, Raskolnikov, murdered himself.44 
But on the more conscious level of activity preceding 
the crime Raskolnikov succeeds in settling the moral question 
by the answer that his intention is not criminal. This is 
why he can allow himself the extraordinary omission of any 
carefully laid plan of operation. He considers not the 
material difficulties, but the psychological ones. Raskolnikov 
reasons that in the commission of any crime, the former 
difficulties are always the result a failure of will at the 
crucial moment, but since he is not involving himself in 
crime there can be no such failure. That this does indeed 
43 
Ibid., p. 377. The correctness of Dostoevsky's 
"genealogy of im_r_orality" as it is traced from Raskolnikov 
to the revolutionists of The Possessed is confirmed by the 
experience of Arthur Koestler. Ìn Darkness at Noon Koestler 
makes Ivanov criticize Raskolnikov as a criminal fool, not 
because he commits a murder, but because he does it without 
any ideological motive. Ivanov would suggest that if 
Raskolnikov had killed for the sake of the Party, his crime 
would have been justified, and the novel could not have 
been written. 
44 Ibid., p. 379. 
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become the case presents the author with the opportunity 
for a masterly analysis of conscience. 
In his study of criminal psychology, Theodor Reik 
informs us that the history of criminology presents a number 
of perfect crimes.45 As far as Dostoevsky's purposes are 
concerned it seems certain he wished to delineate from first 
to last a case in which the inevitable development of 
conscience is traced independently of the usual mechanical 
devices found in detective stories. Therefore, Raskolnikov's 
crime is the perfect crime; no one suspects him afterwards; 
no clues are left behind, and the novel must proceed along 
purely psychological lines until the voluntary recognition 
of the criminal's guilt brings about his regeneration. As 
it happens, only luck or accident enables him to leave the 
scene of the murder without detection. But Dostoevsky adds 
to the crime one highly significant sequel well known to 
criminal psychology - the return to the scene of the crime. 
Reik admits that this strange reaction cannot be entirely 
explained by psychology, although it seems clear that by 
this action the criminal is responding to a strong unconscious 
urge to betray himself and bring down the punishment his 
conscience demands.46 Reik quotes the revealing remark 
made by a certain murderer - "Somebody pursues me and it is 
45 Theodor Reik, The Unknown Murderer, tr. Dr. Katherine 
Jones (Hogarth Press, London, 1936), pp. 69 -70. 
46 Ibid., pp. 88 -9. 
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myself" .47 Surprisingly enough, the Furies do not spare 
even the most violent type of criminal; they attack him on 
a lower level of consciousness, or in the unconscious itself. 
Dostoevsky rrust have been aware of this psychological truth, 
for in The House of the Dead he makes the observation that 
nearly all the criminals were unaware of conscience pangs 
and remorse.48 Yet we notice that he reserves his greatest 
sympathy and respect for precisely these men; his contempt, 
on the other hand, falls on quite another variety of 
criminal. Dostoevsky's attitude toward the sensualists 
Fyodor and Drr_itri Karamazov is in contract to his deep -felt 
scorn for the revolutionary- minded Rakitin and Sm_erdyakov. 
The implications of this attitude become quite clear when 
we re- examine the development of pride in Raskolnikov. 
First in this process from crime to punishment comes a 
desire to dominate, to wield power. But there is the 
question of how to do this, as well as the necessity for 
some event which will release his enertia and present him 
with a cause for action. This is provided by his mother's 
letter; he is positively frenzied by the relief this letter 
affords, despite the fact that it contains nothing that is 
not in itself bad news. Next comes the conversation over- 
heard in the Hay Market, a chance occurrence which inevitably 
brings to his mind another conversation he had chanced to 
47 Ibid., p. 88. 
48 Dostoevsky, The House of the Dead, tr. Constance 
Garnett (William Heinemann, London, 1915), p. 13. 
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hear only six weeks before and which, acting upon an already 
superstitious mind, impresses him by its mysterious coin- 
cidence. Events seem to be moving with his purpose; he 
is literally being compelled by unknown forces to fashion a 
noose for the axe and to provide himself with a wooden 
pledge so that when the moment of action arrives these 
necessary tools for the crime will appear, at the right 
time, almost as if by magic, as if designed not by his own 
hands but by Providence. The impulse to power seems to 
contain as part of its nature a certain myth -making genius 
which creates a different world where events conform to the 
desires of the monomaniac. This dream -like world is the 
prelude to an even more difficult existence, for what 
Raskolnikov discovers after the murders is that to live as 
a murderer is to live in another world from ordinary men. 
It is from this world that the criminal's unconscious 
longing to confess and give himself up to justice cries out. 
Raskolnikov seems to have been a conception standing some- 
where between the extreme criminals of The House of the Dead 
and the revolutionary murderers of The Possessed. Deadly 
chills pass over his soul, and he becomes suddenly aware, 
after telling a lie, that he has passed irrevocably into a 
world with its own laws where "he would never again be able 
to speak of anything to anyone ".49 Like "the mysterious 
visitor" in Zossima's story, he learns that "you can pass 
49 Dostoevsky Crime and Punishment, p. 203. 
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through the world doing wrong, but there's no turning back.i50 
Yet, for the great heroes of Dostoevsky, as indeed for 
all great tragic heroes, light is not denied. Out of dark- 
ness comes light if only the image of God has not been 
destroyed. In the portraits of Father Zossima, Alyosha 
Kararrzov and Myshkin, there is such vivid contrast with the 
depths of the heroes that it may well pay to look briefly 
at Dostoevsky's purest conceptions and to ask in what this 
purity consists. The answer is not difficult to find. In 
the same measure with which pride consumes the heroes, the 
pure characters actively cultivate humility, and the word 
cultivate has special significance since the earth and 
religion are mysteriously connected in Russian thought. 
Two Russian critics of Dostoevsky, Nikolai Zernov and 
V. Ivanov, have written of the importance of the Mother Earth 
conception in Russian life. The whole culture and psychology 
of the people has been influenced by the vastness of sky and 
landscape,51 and the earth is conceded a mystical attachment 
to the meaning of nature and the "Passion of Christ ".52 
European critics on the contrary are accustomed to note the 
lack of a sense of space in Dostoevsky, a deficiency which 
they hold up against Tolstoi's large canvases. However just 
50 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, p. 327. 
51 Nikolai Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, (S. C. M. 
Press Ltd., London, 1944), p. 16. 
52 Vyacheslav Ivanov, Freedom and the Tragic Life, 
tr. Norman Cameron (Harwill Press, London, 1952), p. 45. 
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this comparison may be, both writers recognized a spiritual 
force in the peasants precisely because of their bond with 
the earth. The word "deracinate ", which has come to have 
great importance for contemporary social thought, could 
have conveyed only one thing to Tolstoi and Dostoevsky - 
uprootedness from the earth and therefore lack of faith. 
In his audience with Utavrogin, Father Tikhon whispers "you 
are uprooted, you do not believe. "53 Zossima cautions 
against even that pride which raises man above the animals; 
men defile the earth with their pride.54 Myshkin, "the 
idiot ", is always ready to forgive. Through his intense 
self -consciousness he is convinced that to hold any 
suspicion of anyone would be shameful and dishonourable. 
No more ironic title could have been given to lyshkin, for 
to be an idiot in this sense is to possess powers of self - 
reflection and self-criticism founded upon a true sense of 
guilt. Only against surroundings of violent self -punishment 
(as in Nastasya Fillippovna) and explosive guilt (as in 
Ippolit) could Myshkin's "idiocy" be appreciated. It only 
needs to be added that Dostoevsky could not have conceived 
the idea of Myshkin without the image of Christ before him. 
53 Dostoevsky, Stavroin's Confession and The Plan of 
The Life of a Great Sinner, p. 80. 
54 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, p. 339. 
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CHAPTER IX 
GUILT AND HUMOUR 
On the surface, the connection between melancholy and 
wit is perhaps not so obscure as that between guilt and 
humour. In the first case, the examples are not infrequent 
in literature: Byron, Pope, Schopenhauer and Swift being 
obvious representatives of the bitter wit and satire school. 
But the intimate relation between Kierkegaard's guilt and 
his melancholy is not easily explained in terms of the wit, 
humour and irony he was able to weave into his literary 
productions. From an early age, according to a journal 
entry, he was aware of the power behind his wit which he 
used as a defénce against the physically stronger boys of 
his age.' As time went on, he began to turn his wit against 
almost everything that crossed his path, so that eventually 
he became frightened of his own versalitity with wit. As a 
young man he had already begun to fight against the destruc- 
tive tendencies of his wit. Lowrie informs us that he spoke 
"disparagingly not only of irony but of humour" at this time.2 
"Irony," he wrote in 1838, "is an abnormal growth; like the 
abnormally enlarged liver of the Strasburg goose it ends by 
killing the individual.i3 But irony is not so much the 
1 Lowrie, Kierkegaard, p. 46. 
2 Ibid., p. 161. 
3 Kierkegaard, The Journals, p. 55. 
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cause as the effect of "abnormality" in the individual. 
Freud discovered a close connection between wit produc- 
tion and neurotic diseases. In Lichtenberg he found an 
example of the wit created by hypochondria and other 
eccentricities; several of the jests analysed by Freud came 
frog: Li.chtenberg's pen.4 So in Kierkegaard's guilt and 
melancholy there i.:ay have been, to use Freud's term, the 
subjective determination of wit. Yet something essential 
is missing unless we take account of the positive way in 
which Kierkegaard understood his guilt, for as we shall have 
occasion to note, there is humour in Kafka also, but humour 
of a different sort. Just as his guilt was differently 
understood so was Kafka's humour differently expressed. 
It is in the Concluding Postscript that Kierkegaard 
uses the concept of humour to elucidate the whole pathos of 
religious suffering, including the deepest element of that 
suffering; guilt. "Humour," we are told in that book, 
"comprehends guilt as a totality. "5 It is the peculiar 
nature of humour that is "discovers the comic "6 in the human 
situation by juxtaposing its relativities against the 
4 Sigmund Freud, Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious 
(Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, English edition, 
n.d.), p. 218. Freud did not, however, maintain that a 
neurotic disease was a necessary condition for wit production. 
Kierkegaard was a staunch admirer of Lichtenberg and read him 
with great enthusiasm. See Kierkegaard's Journals, p. 49 for 
an expression of his admiration. 
5 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 491. 
6 Ibid., p. 493. Cf. Freud, op. cit.: t °Nit is made, 
while the comical is found ..." (p. 289) . 
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absolute, the total guilt. Seen horizontally, as it were, the 
human situation with its mock- heroics and pride has no room for 
the comic in the sense discovered by Kierkegaard. Only when 
the whole "comedy ", the whole human situation is discovered to 
be resting upon an existential situation, namely, total guilt, 
is the comic manifest. It will be seen that Kierkegaard has 
simply applied the basic law of humour to this situation: 
"The law for the comical is quite simple: it exists wherever 
there is contradiction. "7 In this comical discovery of 
Kierkegaard's it is perhaps possible to see more clearly the 
essential meaning of the often repeated allusions to man's 
greatness and his insignificance, his sublime importance as 
well as his meanness, those Janus -like qualities which enable 
man to find tears in laughter and laughter in tears. And Freud 
himself refers to the "Janus -like double -facedness" of wit, a 
terminology which has more than one fruitful application,8 as 
7 Ibid., p. 466. 
8 Freud, ,off. cit., p. 382. Kierkegaard's understanding of 
humour was noticeably substantiated by Freud, especially in the 
final analysis that humour is a pleasure found, in its purest 
form, only in childhood. With reference to "the mechanism of 
humoristic pleasure" Freud says that humour in all of its 
manifestations is the striving for "the state of our childhood 
in which we did not know the comic, were incapable of wit, and 
did not need humour to make us happy." (p. 384). Thus Kierke- 
gaard uses the example of humour which shows itself in a child- 
like longing for the past. "The humorist," he says, "possesses 
the childlike quality but is not possessed by it ..." Not 
childishness dominates the humorist, but a state of longing 
which recognizes in childhood its happiness. "Precisely because 
the pleasantry of humour consists in revocation ... it naturally 
is often a regression to childhood." (The Concludin;? Unscien- 
tific Postscript, pp. 490 -91). However, humour also turns the 
longing for childhood itself to its own advantage and the 
melancholy longing for childhood is again humourously compared 
to the recollection of eternal guilt. 
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in the formula of Lipps quoted by Freud: "The comic is the 
greatness and smallness of the same "9 or that of Melinand: 
"Ce qui fait rire c'est qui est d la fois, d'un cóté, 
absurde et de l'autre, familier."10 If it is true that 
the wit producer requires a foil to raise laughter in himself" 
then Kierkegaard needed a third person, his reader, in order 
to weep. "I too have fused tragedy and comedy: I make 
jokes, people laugh - I weep12 ... I laugh with one face, I 
weep with another. "13 
In order to understand how it was possible for Kierke- 
gaard to discover the comic in anything so apparently tragic 
as total guilt we need first inquire how the comic itself is 
evoked. Turning to Freud again we find that, among other 
theories of the comic, he mentions Kuno Fischer's insight 
that a force is needed to bring the comic situation to light, 
a force which he calls judgement and which produces the 
contrast known as wit. A further clarification of this 
principle in its aesthetic form leads to the conclusion that 
"wit is a playful judgement. "14 At this point we seem to be 
9 Freud, óm. cit., p. 383. 
10 Freud, 2E. cit., p. 382. 
11 Freud, R. cit., p. 241. "We can only suspect that 
... we must impart our witticisms to others for the reason 
that we ourselves are unable to laugh over them." 
12 Kierkegaard, The Journals, p. 50. 
13 Ibid., D. 47. 
14 Freud, óp. cit.,pp. 4 -6. This opinion was also confirmed 
by La Rochefoucauld who wrote: "The making a Difference between 
Wit and Judgement is a Vulgar Error. Judgement is nothing else 
but the exceeding Brightness of 'Wit ..." (Maxim XVCIII). 
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approaching a clearer conception of Kierkegaardian wit; 
yet the idea of a "playful judgement" is not completely 
consistent with wit that so often tended toward irony, satire 
and even sarcasm. It is perhaps best to heed the warning 
of Arthur Koestler, in his analysis of the comic, that 
behind the emotions carried forth by the comic there are 
"mixed feelings," some concealed and others m_anifest.15 In 
the case of Kierkegaard the idea of a pathetic, rather than 
a playful judgement, would seem to be more adequate, since 
it is precisely existential pathos which he illuminates 
through humour. It appears, therefore, that a missing link 
exists in the analysis thus far; wit is undoubtedly the 
result of some kind of judgement, but the judgement itself 
must be based upon a standard of judgement, an ultimate 
reference towards which all the incongruities and inconsis- 
tencies of wit are oriented. Since Kierkegaard found the 
greatest opportunities for the display of his wit within 
the religious sphere, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
this sphere presented him with the standards which he so 
brilliantly applied in his elucidation of what it is to be 
a Christian; and since (for him) practically no one of his 
contemporaries was a Christian, the incongruous all the 
more easily became the obvious. 
We may now say that the recognition of the comic in 
the totality of guilt could only have been accomplished by 
15 Koestler, Insight and Outlook, p. 116. 
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someone who clearly recognized that, ultimately, man can 
only be guilty before God. Only after this is perceived 
does it appear comic that the relativism of great and small 
among men should rest upon a situation (i.e., totality of 
guilt) which ought, in virtue of its sheer authority, to 
annihilate all qualitative differences among men. Thus, 
Kierkegaard's power of discovering the comic reflects the 
certainty of his standard of judgement. God not only exists, 
but His existence is so certain "that if God could forget 
rthe woridi it would instantly cease to be. "16 That an 
incomparable world for the production of wit, a world in 
which people are always and everywhere forgetting a sod 
whose very awareness of them is the promise of their 
existence. 
The question arises whether Kafka could have seen, as 
Kierkegaard did, the element of humour in the totality of 
guilt. In the novel The Metamorphosis, the protagonist, 
Gregor Samsa, awakes one morning to find himself "changed 
in his bed to some monstrous kind of vermin. "17 Nothing is 
16 Kierkegaard, The Journals, p. 46. See also p. 164: 
"Ethics and reliji on are the only certainties." Kierke- 
gaard makes this point in another way by suggesting that 
the Middle Ages had its humour too, particularly in virtue 
of the authority behind the Church. This also explains why 
"a section of the modern humorists became Catholics, 
desired once again to have a community, a foot -hold, which 
they could not find within themselves." (p. 47). 
17 Franz Kafka, The Metarr_or hosis, tr. A. L. Loyd 
(The Parton Press, London, 1937), p. 1. 
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said about Gregor's guilt; indeed he seems to have had, 
before his metamorphosis, fewer sins to account for than 
rr:ost commercial travellers. Yet, unless we assume that the 
author night have chosen an even more unfortunate trans- 
formation for his character, Gregor's guilt is certainly, 
in every sense of the term, total. It seems that a gulf 
which threatens to be almost impassable has opened up 
between Kafka's conception of guilt on the one hand and 
Kierkegaard's on the other. Kafka's sense of guilt goes 
downward and backward, downward aesthetically and psycho- 
logically, and backward morphologically. The only way in 
which Kierkegaard's conception may be compared with this is 
that his sense of guilt does travel backward in order to 
complete the eternal recollection of guilt, but at the 
same time the individual's relation to an eternal happiness 
increases. Strangely enough - and most conveniently for 
our comparison - Kierkegaard also uses the word metamor- 
phosis to describe this change, but it is a change which - 
so far from being the irreversable, backward and downward 
metamorphosis of Kafka - is actually humorously contrasted 
with "a specimen of an animal species. "18 This qualitative 
metamorphosis has its origin in the eternal consciousness 
of guilt, and for that very reason, humour is able to 
discover the contrast with animals. "For, religiously 
regarded, the species is a lower category than the 
18 In the Samlede Vaerker, edition of 1925, Vol. VII, 
p. 544. The reference in the English edition is to p. 492. 
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individual ... "19 Kafka, on the contrary, has made Gregor 
Samsa assume the shape of a loathsome bug as a penalty for 
his guilt. Critics have pointed out the ways in which Kafka 
identified himself with his characters, not merely in the 
ordinary sense of artistic empathy, but to the extent of 
forcing an unmistakable resemblance between the name of the 
character and the name Kafka, as in the use of Joseph K. or 
simply K. One notices the occasions in which the character's 
last name has five letters, neither more nor less, as in 
Samsa. After completing "The Judgement" Kafka remarked in 
his Diary that "Georg has the same number of letters as 
Franz rand Bende mann', has exactly the same number of 
letters as Kafka, and the vowel e occurs in the same places 
as does the vowel a in Kafka."20 It is clear that wherever 
the insect or animal occurs in Kafka's writings, and in 
proportion to his identification with the character, the 
essential expression is one of unresolved guilt. 
Although there may be something almost comic in the 
situation of an insect living as a son and brother in the 
midst of a normal family, or in the agitation and fear of 
an animal in his burrow, this is certainly not playful 
judgement, but rather self-laceration. The French writer, 
Daniel -Rops, contrasting Kafka's world with that of Kierke- 
gaard or Pascal, finds that the former lacks a sense of 
19 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 492. 
20 Kafka, The Diaries 1910- 1913, p. 279. 
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responsibility; guilt is carried to such absurd extremes 
that it means nothing, has no religious significance.21 If 
this view is true it would seem that guilt in Kafka s world 
is so complete that it defeats itself, just as pain, if it 
is intense enough, will kill a man. On the other hand, most 
critics are convinced that Kafka has only carried respons- 
ibility to an extreme which in itself is consistent with an 
absurd world. 
In order to perceive the humorously incongruous, a 
standard of judgement must be available to the humorist. If 
he is to see the humour in total guilt the humourist must 
believe that man is totally guilty, and that his guilt 
invariably stands in a definite relation to an equally 
definite subject. But for Kafka guilt is inexplicable, man 
is so completely guilty that no standard of judgement can 
be applied to him; he is guilty, and he tail neither discover 
whence his guilt arises nor who condemns him. The law of 
guilt may be said to operate something like this: 
A singular judicial procedure. The 
condemned man is stabbed to death in his 
room by the executioner with no other 
person present. He is seated at his 
table finishing a letter in which he 
writes: 0 loved ones, 0 angels, at what 
height do you hover, unknowing, beyond 
the reach of my earthly hand ...22 
Another critic, Edwin Berry Burgum, who approaches 
21 Flores, The Kafka Problem, p. 191. 
22 Kafka, The Diaries 1914 -1923, pp. 160 -1. 
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Kafka frorr_ the political left, is convinced the normal 
reader will find "The Burrow" repulsive. This story, he 
believes, indicates that Kafka has approached the psychotic. 
Burgum must accept "The Burrow" as basically humorous in 
its absurdity if only to protect himself: "to take it as 
funny is to alienate one's self from contarr_ination.i23 
The official biography of Kafka, however, describes 
occasions when Kafka's readings brought laughter to his 
friends; "a metaphysical sigile so to speak" was produced 
among them because Kafka magnified the duality in life which 
is the subject matter of all hum_our.24 His English, trans- 
lator, Edwin Muir, also finds the basis of a serious and 
original humour in Kafka, a conception that agrees with the 
ideas put forth by the philosopher and friend of Kafka, 
Felix Weltsch. In his essay, "Religiöser Humor bei Franz 
Kafka," =Veltsch recognizes an incompatible Duality in the 
world which man continually overlooks in his need for Unity. 
Kafka's "poetic humour" consists in pointing out this super- 
ficial Unity as a Duality in a way which conforms to the 
normal pattern for "jokes" as described by Freud, Bergson 
and others. But the humour of Kafka is neither witty, 
satiric nor jovial; it is bitterly serious. 
23 Flores, The Kafka Problem, p. 303. 
24 max Brod, The Biography of Franz Kafka, tr. G. Humphrey 
Roberts (Secker and Warburg, London, 1947), p. 105. 
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Gewiss, es sind keine Witze and 
keine Spasse, aber er ist, so darf 
man wohl sagen, ein ernster, ein 
bitter ernster Humor, das Ernstnehmen 
der Zweiheit durch das Lacherlichmachen 
der oberflachlichen Einheit.25 
Neither Kafka nor Kierkegaard would have thought of 
bringing their humour to bear against God; for Kafka, satire, 
when directed against religion or ethics, became a low form 
of humour; for Kierkegaard, satire was a weapon against the 
age, against mass psychology and against the Church. To a 
certain extent humour manifests itself in both writers 
because "existence is both comical and pathetic; pathetic 
because the striving is endless, comical because it is a 
deliberate distortion and debasement of self. "26 But if 
behind Kierkegaard's humour there is the certainty of hope 
and forgiveness in God, Kafka shows us the certainty of 
despair and absurdity combined with the utter seriousness 
of being in despair. The certainty of despair means the 
uncertainty of man's life, the shortness of life and the 
danger of losing one's way. Kierkegaard managed to triumph 
25 Felix Weltsch, "Religitsser Humor bei Franz Kafka" 
in Franz Kafkas Glauben und Lehre, Eine Studie von Max 
Brod (Mondial- Verlag AG, Winterthur, 1948), p. 129. The 
situation here represented is also described by Max Brod in 
his biography of Kafka: "The eternal misunderstanding 
between God and man induces Kafka to represent the dispro- 
portion again and again in the picture of two worlds which 
can never, never understand one another ..." (p. 137). 
26 Flores, The Kafka Problem, p. 239. Apparently 
Thomas Mann also considered Kafka to be a religious homo wrist 
(see p. 428 for a reference to this). 
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over despair not because his life was longer (he died, like 
Kafka, at 42), but because he thoroughly understood the 
origin and meaning of his guilt and knew that it could be 
(and would be) resolved. Kafka remained certain only in 
his uncertainty, and this factor, if anything, created for 
him the possibility of now and then rising to the level of 
humour, but almost never of irony or satire. If the ironist 
must be certain, the satirist mast be even more so. It is 
essential either for the ironist to know, or to know (like 
Socrates) that he doesn't know; a sense of firmness is in 
any case necessary for the ironist.27 As for Kierkegaard's 
irony there are to be considered two significant things: 
his own statement that "In irony there is no sympathy, 
there is self -assurance ",28 and the fact that his irony 
grew exactly in proportion to his self -assurance. His 
journals seem to reveal a progression from playful humour 
and wit mingled with delicate imagination to a final stage 
where humour has been almost entirely replaced by vindictive 
satire. The words used to express his aggressive wit in the 
latter part of The Journals are seldom those that appear in 
27 A situation of this sort may be said to be the basis 
of modern irony. Our irony might be said to be "based on 
the dualism and ambivalence which are the result of the 
interplay of a heightened skepticism with a heightened 
idealism, the result of a struggle between a more firm 
vision of the ideal, particularly of the social ideal, with 
a growing despair of achieving it." (The Kafka Problem, 
p. 443). 
28 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
p. 491. 
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the humorous entries of the first part. Words, for 
example, like "filth," disgusting," (perhaps the commonest), 
"Malicious," "loathsome," "stink," "vermin," can be found 
once or twice in the entries of the last year of The Journals. 
These are the words that replace the clever witticisms and 
humorous jibes of the first ten years of The Journals.. 
Religious certainty seems to desiccate his natural tendency 
to humour, and sympathy becomes more and more rare. 
It is interesting to remark therefore that humour in 
Kafka always maintains an equilibrium, never falling into 
maudlin self -pity on the one hand or aggressive wit on the 
other, but invariably remaining poetic, humane and (where it 
does become satirical) self- cr.itical.29 To some extent 
Kafka resembles Dostoevsky in this respect because neither 
of them knew absolute religious certainty, but always sought 
for it, and were poetic, sympathetic and humane almost in 
proportion to their uncertainty. It is sufficient to note, 
with Carr, that Dostoevsky possessed "the smallest possible 
capacity for sustained humour, "30 that on one occasion the 
young writer precipitously fled from the company of taunts 
and jibes because (in his own words) "my weak nerves make 
it hard for me to tolerate and answer questions with a 
29 Freud's examples of wit are largely depen3ent on 
Jewish lore, and since Kafka was a Jew, it is also inter- 
esting to note Freud's assertion that Jews are unsurpassed 
in their ability to crake jokes at their own expense. 
30 Carr, Dostoevsky, p. 84. 
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double entendre, hard not to be infuriated by the mere fact 
of the double entendre, and most of all infuriated at my 
own inability to treat them as straightforward well-meant 
questions ... "31 Wherever. Dostoevsky is satirical or ironic 
(or attempts to be) we may be sure that he has an idea, that 
some strong conviction is finding expression, as in The 
Notes from Underground or in The Possessed. 
Having seen that Kierkegaard was able to discover the 
hy/ 
comic in total guilt virtue of his certain understanding of 
his own guilt, we turned to Kafka for an example of unresolved 
guilt, the tragic case where guilt divides a man against 
himself because it offers no certainty except the fact of 
guilt alone. 'Whereas Kierkegaard exercised a pathetic 
judgement in his humour only until he knew his guilt had 
been resolved by sod, Kafka's humour may consistently be 
31 Ibid., p. 36. It is noteworthy that Dostoevsky 
often referred with great admiration to Don Quixote. On 
the other hand we can be sure that he did not find the 
sorrowful knight merely funny. Carr points out that the 
Spanish classic had always been a powerful figure in Russian 
literature, and we do not need Freud's statement that Don 
Quixote is too humanly pathetic to be a consistent comic 
figure to see that what Dostoevsky admired in the knight was 
precisely the great ideal embodied in him. In a letter 
quoted by Carr (p. 205) Dostoevsky places Don Quixote at 
the very pinnacle of those difficult attempts in literature 
to create perfect men. At the time of the letter he is 
writing The Idiot under the conscious influence of the 
Christ of the gospels and Don .Quixote (p. 206). In this 
letter there is this significant sentence: " The rousing 
of compassion is the secret of humour." Don Quixote is 
"the bitterest irony which man was capable of conceiving 
(p. 260) ... the grandest and saddest book conceived by the 
genius of man ..." (The Diary of a Writer, p. 836). 
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identified with pathos and despair. ',Vith Dostoevsky also 
there 13 no humour where guilt is concerned,, but Dostoevsky 
may become satirical and ironic wherever he is convinced 
that someone is guilty through an action of which he dis- 
approves. Otherwise, guilt drives both men to sympathy and 
tolerance. To hang themselves voluntarily on the tenterhooks 
of ..;wilt, to look agonizingly for salvation but not to give 
way to any facile answer was the path of. Dostoevsky and 
Kafka. If Dostoevsky rose to greater heights it was due both 
to his greater ability to understand his guilt and to his 
firm position in the Christian tradition. 
To the extent that each writer was able to understand 
and resolve his guilt, he was able to rake use of irony and 
satire; to the extent that his guilt remained an enigma he 
could, at best, reach the level of trenchant humour. 
Starting frou_ this simple formula one might expect to trace 
the cource of religious certainty and its uses for humour 
and irony. Beginning with Kierkegaard, there is, at first, 
a superabundance of wit and appropriate irony, and at the 
same time, an awareness that wit is a destroyer which must 
be exercised with caution and control. The judiciousness 
of this opinion is part of a broader, more sympathetic and 
more poetic outlook which rests upon a strong, personal 
consciousness of guilt. Kierkegaard at this stage possesses 
all the essentials for irony - seriousness, keen intelli- 
gence, and a sympathy which accounts oneself as equal with 
the victims of one's irony. But with the increase of 
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religious certainty; particularly with the assurance that 
God had forgiven and forgotten his guilt, these qualities 
are stifled in Kierkegaard until at last the poet in him is 
dead, and only sarcasm and invective remain. The poetic as 
well as the moral world is a world of sympathy, without 
prejudice; it certainly cannot tolerate invective. 
Dostoevsky's first published story, Poor Folk, is a 
piece of sheer, humanitarian sympathy. It is without any 
great idea, without touches of melodrama, and even without 
action; yet it is filled with pathos and sympathy. This 
story, in effect, pointed the general way for his subse- 
quent thought, and it can be said that Dostoevsky never 
lost the original poetic impulse of Poor Folk. He always 
remained serious, in work after work, and even where he 
became dogmatic, as in The Possessed, he gave no sign of 
fanatical certainty. The very lack of dogmatic certainty 
is what preserves Dostoevsky's art, for if The Possessed 
is in any way inferior to the other great novels it is due 
to the writer's assertive tendencies. Of course, Dostoevsky 
is a writer of strong conviction; it is difficult to imagine 
a great poet without serious conviction, but to subject 
one's conviction to constant questioning, to live with 
doubt and never quite overcome a bad conscience is to 
remain, as far as possible, innocent of those tendencies 
that destroy one's integrity as an artist and thinker. 
There is enough religious conviction for seriousness 
in Dostoevsky, conviction enough for occasional irony and 
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also satire, but there is not enough to destroy sympathy 
and turn his conviction into sarcasm or. invective. His 
irony saves itself by turning its face not one way but 
several ways. All convictions, and especially religious 
convictions, which are apt to be emotional, need to be 
tempered by the awareness of alternatives. The thinker as 
well as the novelist must always turn himself round and 
round, exhibiting without shame just those aspects of his 
thought which are most threatened by alternatives. 
This was the special faculty that Kierkegaard recog- 
nized as objectivity before one's own subjectivity, and it 
surely is a part of all great humour and irony. In 
Dostoevsky it may be discovered throughout his works. Even 
with a matter so attractive to him as the idea of a Russian 
God, he could level the alternative against himself. In 
The Possessed it is Shatov who carries the burden of many 
of Dostoevsky's personal ideas. When Shatov gives expression 
to this particular idea, Stavrogin accuses him of reducing 
God to "A simple attribute of nationality.i32 
In Kafka we find one whose humour, such as it was, 
depended upon a negative conviction, negative because it 
produced no catharsis for his fear and guilt. It has been 
said that Kafka was never a paradoxicalist, and if this is 
taken to mean that he differed from Kierkegaard in the uses 
32 Dostoevsky, The Possessed, p. 234. 
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of humour, it must be so. The paradox, like the comic, is 
the discovery of the man who knows. Kafka is unable to see, 
like Kierkegaard, an infinite number of paradoxes which 
derive from one fundamental paradox; he sees only something 
like an infinite separation between himself and that which 
he desires. It is a case of paradox raised to its uttermost 
limits where all contrast is lost, and the incongruous 
becomes the incomprehensible. In this situation lies the 
bitter humour of Kafka and the comic quality of his world. 
"Such a world, a world about which nothing can be said that 
cannot in the same breath be as plausibly contradicted, is 
a quintessentially comic world. "33 
Yet, Kafka never fully accepted this world; his own 
creative life is evidence of this refusal to come to final 
terms with absurdity. Like Kierkegaard, like Ivan Karamazov, 
he would have refused a compromise; since the guilt was his, 
his also must be the punishment and the final atonement. 




The semantic confusion now prevailing over the efforts 
to discover a common basis of understanding in regard to 
the problem of guilt would seem to derive from the mistaken 
assumption that the problem is reducible to specialized or 
academic concepts. Guilt, however, is not primarily a 
conceptual problem, but an existential problem. In asserting 
the existential priority of the sense of suilt, we thereby 
imply that this problem must ultimately be reduced to the 
level of individual existence. Concepts will be valid here 
only if they are developed from a study faithful to the 
facts of individual existence and avoiding the terminological 
temptatiomof the sciences as well as the activist tempta- 
tiors so characteristic of our time.1 Philosophy should 
accept this task, but it must do so with humility. This 
means that it must renounce the desire to reach final, apoca- 
lyptic solutions; it must realize that every activist, ideo- 
logical attempt to deal with the problem of guilt (and all 
activist philosophies are, at bottom, nothing else) is bound 
to fail tragically. Activist systems and ideologies are, by 
their nature, powerless to solve the problem of guilt 
1 The correct approach to such a study was indicated 
by William James: "I think, therefore, that however 
particular questions connected with our individual destinies 
may be answered, it is only by acknowledging them as genuine 
questions, and living in the sphere of thought which they 
open up, that we become profound." (The Varieties of 
Religious Experience, p. 490). 
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because it exists on a level not reached by these planetary 
solutions. The very fact of modern man's isolation and 
inwardness means that he has turned instinctively in the 
direction of the true origin of guilt. In that place and 
on that level there is no vital contact with the merely 
social aspects of existence. 
With the present burden of guilt weighing upon the 
contemporary world there would seem to be a very real possi- 
bility that political and social philosophies, world -views 
and ideologies will tend to be increasingly activist, either 
towards irrationality or super -rationality. Such activist 
philosophies demand scapegoats on which to release the guilt 
which is their motivating power. But they are unable to 
solve the problem. Not only do they fail to lift from man 
the burden of his guilt, butsdue to the violence and hatred 
they are capable of generating on a wide scale, these 
activist systems actually exacerbate an already guilt - 
tortured consciousness. 
Yet, the tragedy of modern man is that he does not 
establish a vital contact within himself alone; the inner 
reality is as barren as the outer. Turning inward upon him- 
self in response to an instinctive awareness, man neverthe- 
less fails to reach that spiritual ground upon which his 
experience of love and freedom are founded. He hears the 
accusing call to become transformed; he feels the guilt, 
but he cannot answer. The first and essential call of the 
spiritual life is the call to transform oneself, to make oneself 
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better, but man can answer this call only in relation to a 
Being for whoa_ he freely wills to change himself. Failing 
in his effort to establish this contact, and becoming 
impatient with the suffering required by the effort, man 
listens to the seductive sounds of another and different 
call, the call to change the world. But the call to change 
the world is only the secondary, not the primary call; it 
is not by itself a false call, but it becomes false if it 
is heard and accepted as the primary call. Meanwhile, man 
suffers in his isolation and despairs of finding again his 
freedom in the Being with whom he has his primary relation. 
If this Being is not present to man then this freedom is 
likewise absent; that God is dead or absent from the world 
means that freedom and love are absent, and this is what we 
observe everywhere in the world - the death of freedom and 
the absence of love. Even the problem of loving one's 
neighbour becomes irrelevant in the face of the basic problem 
of finding one's way again, out of this morass of shame and 
guilt, to self- respect and a love of life. 
Concerning the relation of guilt to love, a psychiatrist 
recently said that "Beyond the region of neurosis, beyond the 
psychological altogether, the problem of guilt is the problem 
of love. "2 Guilty man, bereft of God, is unable to love. 
That dual nature of freedom by which man experiences his 
risings and fallings is crippled without its divine guarantee; 
2 Karl Stern, The Third Revolution, p. 177. 
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the polarity of freedom is unbalanced so that man cannot 
emerge from himself except by the violent effort of revo- 
lution. The nether pole of freedom draws man down inside 
himself where only the darkness of possibility can be known. 
This is why freedom has become an unbearable torture in the 
modern world. On one level of existence, the masses of men 
and the élite are eager to relinquish this terrible freedom 
to an activist ideology and to a supreme header whose power 
guarantees it while on another level individual men use the 
last remnants of freedom to torture themselves and others. 
The totalitarian Leader could arise and flourish only in a 
world where men have ceased to love freedom, and where for 
that reason they have ceased to be men. Personal love 
could never have become such a subtle instrument of torture 
if freedom had not first become weakened. On every level 
of human relationships the reaction to freedom_ is the same - 
it is the assumption by man of the part of a god in relation 
to his fellow men. 
Man has learned that there can be found through freedom 
the most exquisite avenues to self- tarture; he has discovered, 
as only the ingeniousness of a guilty self can discover, 
that love and freedom can be perverted to mere techniques 
of power, and these techniques he applies against himself 
and others in a manner which clearly reflects his guilt and 
his anger at the absence of 'sod. For as sod in His absence 
has withdrawn his love for man, so man withholds his love 
for his fellow men, and in his isolation uses the gifts of 
237 
God to abuse himself and others. The guilt of being love- 
less, of being thrown into a hostile world, is both turned 
against the self and also used to destroy the innocence of 
others. 
In this spiritual impasse man is weighed down by a 
sense of fear which may take either one of two common forms. 
On the one hand a large part of the world is isolated by 
its fear in the cul de sac of the individual self, while 
another part is isolated from reality by its naive faith in 
collective strength, or faith in history, or in reality 
itself. This also is an impasse born of fear; it is a 
reaction against fear which ends by denying the possibility 
of evil, either from within or from without. The last 
refuge of a tortured humanity is often in a "fairy tale" 
world, a world from which the sources of fear have been 
exorcized. (Only what "we" do counts; what the "others" 
may do is of no concern because history and truth are 
against them). It is this type of strength in fear that 
offers such a fertile field to the sowers of collective 
ideologies. But this is just what ought to be feared most: 
the possibility of losing oneself by abstracting oneself 
from existence. Ideologies of the future will present 
tremendous temptations since they are certain to exert an 
increasingly greater power over the minds and emotions of 
men. These ideologies will appear as secular systems of 
control, that is to say, in precisely the form of power 
which will appear to those united by fear in a "fairy tale" 
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world as the historical justification for that world. Thus, 
it will be a simple hatter for certain men to persuade them- 
selves that crimes which are committed by them or by their 
"side" are forgiven by history even before the crimes are 
conceived. Men will see in history, or in evolution, the 
judgement they need, for man cannot co without a judge. 
If fear must exist in the world, and it seems that so 
long as an abstract consciousness of guilt exists there will 
be fear, then the problem of fear, which is closely related 
to the problem of guilt, consists in discovering methods of 
containing fear within the self. Pear is not necessarily 
harmful to the self. It may well be that fear and fear 
alone has taught man the essential knowledge of survival, 
the preservation of individual life and the life of the 
species. Fear has always given man the knowledge to survive 
in a hostile world, and fear is undoubtedly in the world now 
for that purpose. Fear may not be pleasant, but it is a 
necessary condition of survival. Under certain circumstances 
fear may be a realistic response to an existing threat to 
personal survival. If any type of fear can be called 
realistic it is that direct fort of fear which rises in 
defence of the self in order to preserve the self as an 
individual self. Although in our time man is not able to 
resolve the impasse of inwardness, the true instinct of 
inwardness is a response to a state of danger or of help- 
lessness. 
This danger appears in every conceivable quarter of 
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of existence; never before has there been such an utter loss 
of individuality as in our time; never before has the threat 
of personal annihilation and of death been so real. Against 
this diffuse threat to its existence the self reacts with a 
diffuse fear by moving deeper in that direction whence it 
has always found security and religious reality. Moreover, 
by this movement of inwardness the self preserves at least 
something of that which is most vital to its survival, namely, 
freedom, the freedom of the self to be its self and to 
discover by its self the way out of its impasse.3 Fear then, 
in so far as it is identical with self -preservation is also 
related to the religious impulse and to the love of life.4 
The inward movement of the self is related to a love of 
life, whereas the outward, activist movements of our time 
lead to a rejection of life and of reality. That inwardness 
corresponds to love of life rather than the opposite is 
shown negatively by the impulse to suicide which may occur 
among those who bear their guilt passively rather than 
actively. Here, the impulse is to destroy only self - 
consciousness, not the reality behind consciousness; aggression 
and anger are directed not against life itself, but against 
3 "The thing is to discover by oneself the whole possi- 
bility of danger, and by oneself to discover every instant 
its reality ...." ( Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, p. 425). 
Both Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky are absolutely agreed that 
the essence of morality is to discover guilt by oneself and 
to punish oneself for this guilt. 
4 Cf. William James's reference to Bender's statement in 
his Wesen der Religion: "Religion is that activity of the 
human impulse towards self- preservation ...." (The Varieties 
of Religious Experience, p. 497). 
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one's failure to achieve a complete life. Such is the 
existential situation in which murder and suicide have come 
to be philosophical problems of the greatest magnitude. By 
the act of inwardness man does not reject either reality or 
life; that which is rejected is the temptation to become a 
god, to assume the right of punishment in relation to the 
world and to one's fellow Oren. Inwardness of the self is 
none other than the affirmation that God must be re- discovered 
if men are ever to become individual men with respect for 
each other and for life. 
The powerful, activist temptations existing in the 
modern consciousness can be clearly seen in the belief that 
man must completely overturn his values, must put away his 
old gods altogether, and create a new morality. But surely 
it is not given to man to create in this way. Man has never 
created his moral values, nor has he created his gods; he 
has only discovered them. Moral regeneration will begin 
with the rediscovery of God because only by discovery in this 
case can the freedom of the self be preserved. Our study of 
guilt has shown that it is the free act of limiting the 
possibilities of aggression and hatred inherent in human 
nature which is the essence of the consciousness of moral 
reality. When the ambivalence of the two primary emotions 
was first resolved into an awareness of guilt, the first 
moral advance was made. Inward reality modified itself 
consciously and made its first step upward. Such is the 
consciousness of true moral victory as man has always 
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experienced it. 
The act of inwardness is therefore the attempt of the 
self to rediscover moral reality by itself in freedom, and 
it is at the same time the rejection of the temptation to 
destroy outward reality. What is rejected, in effect, is 
the insane conviction that moral victory can only mean 
victory over the outer reality. That moral consciousness 
and a sense of moral victory can only be experienced through 
changing the outer reality is, we assert, á profound delusion 
arising out of a feeling of contempt and even of hatred for 
that reality. We assert that the only real moral victory 
given to man is the victory over his own individual nature; 
the consciousness of this victory is itself the assurance 
of moral reality; this is the true victory, all else is 
delusion. If this victory is a kind of secret, egoistic 
hedonism, it is at least opposed to that hedonism of 
personal superiority which is fed by the sensation of new 
desires and the kaleidoscope of events. For this is nothing 
more than the hedonism of moral superiority based on the 
identification of consciousness with action. Consciousness 
here has become no more than a synaptic centre where new 
sensations succeed each other in a tumultuous influx, and 
where the illusion of progress is the justification for the 
unending rush of new varieties of sensation. The onrush of 
new objects to destroy or conquer helps to create a conscious- 
ness which cannot afford to look back or inward upon itself 
because this would mean doubt of one's superiority. 
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Inwardness then is the instinctive journey of the 
self to ground itself "in the Power which posited it.r5 By 
this movement the self renounces the prerogatives of an 
angry god in relation to the world, and instead declares 
that God must be rediscovered, that God must be reborn in 
us before we can be reborn as men. If those ancient myth- 
ological motifs of spiritual rebirth - the night journey 
and the descent of the hero - have any meaning for modern 
man it is that man, in order to be an individual man again, 
must rediscover God. For the great heroes of the universal 
myths neither created gods nor became gods themselves, but 
they became heroes when the god was reborn in them.6 
That activist temptations have made large incursions 
in the modern consciousness can also be seen in the distrust 
of all purely individualist solutions.? One notices today 
a certain antipathy, even a disgust, for the fact of 
individual conversion. According to the activist doctrines 
of our day one cannot appropriate truth inwardly; truth 
must be like a stone wall, absolutely material, and one 
must have run full tilt against it in order to appropriate 
it. This is the way in which a large part of modern man 
5 Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 19. 
6 Jung, Symbols of Transformation, pp. 335 -6. 
7 Compare, e.g., Kierkegaard's motto to The Concept of 
Dread: "The age of distinctions is past and gone, the 
System has overcome it. He who in our age loves distinctions 
is an eccentric man whose soul clings to that which has long 
vanished." 
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demands to be converted. What is particularly helpful 
after running into a stone wall nowadays is to discover 
that it corresponds to a universal law valid for all time. 
It is almost a delight just to pick oneself off the ground 
and run at the wall again in order to feel its solidity. 
In the absence of an absolute moral authority, freedom is a 
source of fear which sends the individual self in terror 
toward whatever is solid and mechanical. The idealist's 
need for an inward certainty has thus become the material- 
ist's need for an outward certainty. It is a matter of 
spiritual economy, so to speak, a matter of what can be 
afforded at a given time. 
The need for certainty is, at bottom, the need for 
judgement; man cannot do without a judge or without judge- 
ment. But what will be the nature of this judgement for 
which man yearns? The activist, totalitarian solutions of 
our time suggest that judgement is to be wrenched from the 
possession of heaven and brought down to earth; man will 
deny to God the right of judgement and of punishment by 
creating with violence and redirecting by force that essen- 
tially vertical relationship which stands behind his exper- 
ience of the upward and downward way. The unprecedented 
violence of the modern world is in direct proportion to the 
magnitude of the task of reforging the pattern of guilt and 
innocence. Freedom, which is inseparable from the possi- 
bility óf an upward and downward way, is the first to suffer 
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in this violent attack. Even without the craving for imme- 
diate action and immediate results, what can be the effect 
of this determination to reduce all human problems to 
scientific, earth -bound problems? Does not man require some- 
thing above society, something "More" (to use James's term) 
than society? May it not be the case that man's fundamental 
difficulty is that he cannot find his place in the world, in 
the universe? aan is shaped by important influences which 
are not in the least social; his primary orientation is 
spiritual rather than social. There is, as Berdyaev has 
said "a spiritual principle in the individual which does not 
depend on the com,r_unity.i8 Is this not the reason why Sir 
Walter Moberly, Arthur Koestler, Lewis Mumford, and Martin 
Buber believe that a change must come from within, from the 
depths? ''Only in one place can an immediate renewal begin: 
that is within the person ... Our first need is not for 
organization but for orientation: a change in direction and 
attitude.i9 Ian has an undeniable spiritual sense which 
tells him that judgement does not originate in society, but 
has its source outside and above society. Society itself 
is subject to this judgement, and, therefore, man's ultimate 
faith. can only be in something absolute, something eternal.10 
8 Nicolas Berdyaev, The Origin of Russian Communism, 
tr. R. M. French (Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary Press, 
London, 1937), p. 184. 
9 Lewis Mumford, The Condition 
and Warburg Ltd., London, 
10 Cf. William James' 
knower can we finally be 
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Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard are never in doubt about the 
origin of moral ideals; there is complete agreement between 
them that man's largest moral aspirations, his utopian 
dreams, and his yearning for universal moral perfection have 
their humble beginning in the individual desire for self - 
perfection. Dostoevsky would say that these universal moral 
aspirations could not possibly exist independently of the 
desire for personal self- perfection. Kierkegaard, for his 
part, would deny that man's primary orientation is to the 
universal, that is, to a group consciousness no matter how 
all -inclusive. Rather, rr_an's relation to the universal is 
determined by his relation to that which is above the 
universal, but which is yet, to man, more directly known 
than the universal. Our study of the problem of guilt has 
given us no reason to doubt the general truth of these hypo - 
thetical statements. We would, in fact, go even farther and 
state that a purely social conscience is a delusion; it does 
not exist. Quite probably a strictly earth -bound orientation 
of the conscience will never exist. An exclusively terres- 
trial, natural and, in this sense, antonomous conscience 
would seem to belong to the millennium. Taken simply as a 
popular, enthusiastic doctrine, the social conscience is a 
mirage, a passionate delusion which arose in response to man's 
desperate need to focus his guilt in relation to something 
concrete, observable and historical. It was a delusion 
gratefully accepted by a guilty consciousness as a providential 
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stick with which to beat itself and so satisfy its need for 
expiation, after which the same consciousness used the same 
stick to belabour the enemies of society while congratulating 
itself on being saved. True guilt, that is, guilt which is 
the self -questioning and self -accusing aspect of conscious- 
ness cannot exist on a merely natural plane; it cannot exist 
as a simple, earth- bound, linear relationship to the one, the 
individual, no more than to the many, the class, the universal. 
That part of the pattern of guilt- innocence which the con- 
sciousness experiences as social guilt does indeed legiti- 
mately exist, but only as a refraction, as a deflection, from 
the fundamental orientation of this pattern. 
The emergence in our time of totalitarian methods of 
control signifies the attempt to reforge the pattern of 
guilt- innocence, a task whose violence and magnitude are 
clearly seen in the co- existence of crimes so incredibly vast 
that they pass beyond the limits of guilt and innocence and 
deprive those concepts of objective meaning. Yet, even if 
man is able, through terror and the threat of annihilation 
from his own kind, to so revolutionize the guilt pattern of 
his consciousness that guilt and innocence are at last purged 
of mystery and the vagueness of otherworldliness, even then, 
will man rid the earth of gods? Are not the words of the 
Grand Inquisitor manifestly true in our time? "And so it will 
be to the end of the world, even when gods disappear from the 
earth men will fall down before idols just the same. "7.1 Only 
ll Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, p. 268. 
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the new idols will not be clay, but flesh and blood and 
iron and steel; and flesh and blood alone may decree the 
answer to the universal question: "Who are the guilty?" 
while iron and steel will inflict the punishment. 
248 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
LIST OF PRINCIPAL WORKS CONSULTED 
Abrahamsen, David. Who Are the Guilty? Victor Gollancz, 
London, 1954. 
Arbon, Dominique. Dostoevski, "Le Coupable ". René Julliard, 
Paris, 1953. 
Arendt, Hannah. The Burden of Our Time. Secker and Warburg, 
London, 1951. 
Aristotle. The 'Works of Aristotle: Politica, tr. Benjamin 
Jowett. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1921. 
The Metaphysics, tr. Hugh Tredennick: The Oeconomica 
and The Magna Moralia. tr. G. Cyril Armstrong. 
William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1935. 
Aron, Raymond. The Century of Total War. tr. E. W. Dickes 
and O. S. Griffiths. Derek Verschoyle, London, 1954. 
Barbu, Zevedei. Democracy and Dictatorship. Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London, 1956. 
Baudelaire, Charles. My Heart Laid Bare. tr. Norman Cameron; 
ed. Peter Quennell. George Weidenfeld and Nicolson 
Ltd., London, 1950. 
Bauer, Raymond A. The New Man in Soviet Psychology. Howard 
U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1952. 
Beck, F. and W. Godin. Russian Purge and the Extraction of 
Confession. tr. Eric Mosbacher and David Porter. 
Hurst and Blackett Ltd., London, 1951. 
Benda, Julien. The Great Betrayal. tr. Richard Aldington. 
George Routledge and Sons Ltd., London, 1928. 
Berdyaev Nicolas. The Russian Idea. Geoffrey Bles, 
The Centenary Press, London, 1947. 
, Nicolas. The Origin of Russian Communism. 
tr. R.M. French. Geoffrey Bles, The Centenary 
Press, London, 1937. 
Berlin, Isaiah. The Hedgehog and the Fox. Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London, 1953. 
Berman, Harold J. Justice in Russia. Harvard U. P., 
Cambridge, Mass., 1950. 
249 
Bevan, Edwyn. Symbolism and Belief. Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1938. 
Bodkin, Maud. Studies of. Type -Images in Poetry, Religion 
and Philosophy. Geoffrey Cumberlede, Oxford 
U. P., 1951. 
, Mud. Archetypal Patterns in Poetry. Oxford 
U. P., London, 1934. 
Bowlby, John. Child Care and the Growth of Love. Pelican 
Books, London, 1953. 
Bramstedt, E. K. Dictatorship and Political Police. Kegan 
Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., London, 1945. 
Breasted, James Jenry. The Dawn of Conscience. Charles 
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1934. 
Breton. André. What is Surrealism? tr. David Gascoyne. 
Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1936. 
Brierley, Marjorie. Trends in Psycho- Analysis. The Hogarth 
Press and The Institute of Psycho- Analysis, 
London, 1951. 
Brod, Max. Franz Kafkas Glauben und Lehre. Mondial- Verlag 
AG. Winterthur, 1948. 
, Max. The Biography of Franz Kafka, tr. G. Humphreys 
Roberts, Seeker and Warburg, London, 1947. 
Buber, Margarete. Under Two Dictators. tr. Edward Fitzgerald. 
Victor Gollancz, London, 1949. 
Buber, Martin. Between Man and Man. tr. R. G. Smith. Kegan 
Paul, London, 1947. 
, Martin. Eclipse of God. various translators. 
Victor Gollancz, London, 1953. 
, Martin. Images of Good and Evil. tr. M. Bullock. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1952. 
Bullock, Alan. Hitler - A Study in Tyranny. Odhams Press 
Ltd., London, 1952. 
Butler, E. M. The Myth of the Magus. Cambridge U.P., 1948. 
Bychowski, Gustavo Dictators and Disciples. International 
Universities Press, New York, 1948. 
Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus. tr. Justin O'Brien, 
Hamish Hamilton, London, 1955. 
250 
Camus, Albert. The Rebel. tr. Anthony Bower, Hamish 
Hamilton, London, 1953. 
Carr, Edward H. Dostoevsky. George,Allen and Unwin, London, 
1931. 
, Edward H. Karl Marx: A Study in Fanaticism. 
J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., London, 1934. 
Chase, Richard. quest for Myth. Louisiana State U. P., 
Baton Rouge, La., 1949. 
Chisholm., Archibald. Conscience: Its Nature and Authority. 
Nisbet Co. Ltd., London, 1934. 
Ciliga, Anton. The Russian Er4 g . tr. Fernand G. Reiner 
and Anne Cliff. George Routledge and Sons Ltd., 
London, 1940. 
Cohen, Elie A. Human Behaviour in the Concentration Cam. 
tr. M. H. Braaksma. Jonathan Cape, London, 1954. 
Collins, James. The Mind of Kierkenaard. Henry Regnery, 
Chicago, 1953. 
Cornford, F. M. The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays, 
Cambridge U. P., 1950. 
Coorr_eraswairy, Ananda K. Elements of Buddhist Icono-raphy. 
Harvard U. P., Cambridge, Mass., 1935. 
Daiches, David. Literary Essays. Oliver and Boyd, 
Edinburgh, 1956. 
Dallin, David J. and Boris I. Nicolaevsky. Forced Labor in 
Soviet Russia. Hollis and Carter, London, 1948. 
Dawson, Christopher. Religion and Culture. Sheed and 'Nard, 
London, 1948. 
Digby, George Wingfield. Meaning and Symbol. Faber and 
Faber Ltd., London, 1955. 
Dostoevsky, F. M. Letters of F,yodor Michailovitch Dostoevsky 
to His Family and Friends. tr. Ethel Colburne Mayne. 
Chatto and Windus, London, 1914. 
, F. I. New Dostoevsky Letters, tr. S.S. Koteliansky. 
The Mandrake Press, London, n.d. 
F. M. Stavrogin's Confession and The Plan .of 
The Life of a Great Sinner. tr. S.S. Koteliansky 
and Virginia Woolf. The Hogarth Press, Richmond, 1922. 
Dostoevsky, F. M. A Raw Youth. tr. Constance Garnett. 
William Heinemann, London, 1916. 
, F. M. The Brothers Karamazov. tr. Constance 
Garnett. William Heinemann, London, 1912. 
F M 
Garnett. 
, F. M. 
William 
Crime and Punishment. tr. Constance 
William Heinemann, London, 1914. 
The Idiot. tr. Constance Garnett. 
Heinemann, London, 1913. 
251 
, F. M. The Possessed. tr. Constance Garnett, 
William Heinemann, London, 1913. 
F. M. White Nights and Other Stories. tr. 
Constance Garnett, William Heinemann, London, 1913. 
This volume includes: 
"Notés From Underground" 
"A Faint Heart" 
"A Christmas Tree and a Wedding" 
"Polzunkov" 
"A Little Hero" 
"Mr. Prohartchin" 
F. rA. The Eternal Husband and Other Stories. 
tr. Constance Garnett, William Heinemann, London, 1917. 
This volume includes: 
"The Double" 
"A Gentle Spirit" 
F. M. An Honest Thief and Other Stories. tr. 
Constance Garnett, William Heinemann, London, 1919. 
This volume includes: 
"The Dreac of a Ridiculous Man" 
, F. M. Diary of a Writer. tr. Boris Brasol. 
Scribner's, New York, 1949. 
, F. M. The House of the Dead. tr. Constance 
Garnett, William Heinemann, London, 1915. 
, F. M. The Gambler. tr. Constance Garnett. 
William Heinemann, London, 1917. 
This volume includes: 
"Poor People" 
"The Landlady" 
, F. M. The Eternal Husband. tr. Constance Garnett. 
William Heinemann, London, 1917. 
This volume includes: 
"The Double" 
252 
Dufay, Francis and Douglas Hyde. Red Star Versus the Cross. 
Paternoster Publications, London, 1954. 
Durbin, E.F.M. and John Bowlby. Personal Aggressiveness 
and War. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 
Ltd., London, 1939. 
Eastman, Max. Marx, Lenin and the Science of Revolution. 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1926. 
Empson, William. Some Versions of Pastoral. Chatto and 
Hindus , London, 1935. 
Fearing, Kenneth. Afternoon of a Pawnbroker and Other Poems. 
Harcourt Brace and Co., New York, 1943. 
Fenichel, Otto. The Collected Papers of Otto Fenichel 
(Second Series). Collected and edited by Hanna 
Fenichel and David Rapapart. Routledge and Kegan 
Paul Ltd., London, 1955. 
Feuer, Levis Samuel. Psychoanalysis and Ethics. Charles C. 
Thomas, Publisher, Springfield, Ill., 1955. 
Flores, Angel. (ed.) The Kafka Problem. New Directions, 
New York, 1946. 
Flugel, J.C. Man, Morals and Society. Duckworth, London, 1945. 
Frazer, J. G. The Golden Bough. Macmillan and Co., 
London, 1900. 
J.G. Aftermath: A Supplement to the Golden Bough. 
Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London, 1936. 
Freud, Anna. The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence. tr. Cecil 
Baines. Hogarth Press, London, 1937. 
Freud, Sigmund. Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety. tr. 
A. Strachey, Hogarth Press, 1936. 
, Sigmund. Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious 
tr. A.A. Brill. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and 
Co., n.d. 
, Sigmund. Moses and Monotheism. tr. Katherine 
Jones. Hogarth Press, 1939. 
, Sigmund. New Introductory Lectures on Psycho - 
Analysis. tr. W. J J.H. Sprott, Hogarth Press, 
London, 1933. 
, Sigmund. Group Psychology and the Analysis of 
the Ego. tr. James Strachey. Hogarth Press, 
London, 1949. 
253 
Freud, Sigmund. Collected Papers. Vol. V. ed. James 
Strachey. Hogarth Press, London, 1950. 
, Sigmund. Civilization and Its Discontents. 
tr. Joan Riviere. Hogarth Press and The Institute 
of Psycho -Analysis, London, 1930. 
, Sigmund. Totem and Taboo. tr. A.A. Brill, 
George Routledge and Sons Ltd., London, 1919. 
Friedman, Maurice. Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1955. 
Friedman, Rudolph. Kierkegaard: The Analysis of -the Psycho - 
logical Personality. Peter Nevill Ltd,, London, 1949. 
Friedrich, Carl J. and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Totalitarian 
Dictatorship and Autocracy. Harvard U. P., 
Cambridge, Mass., 1956. 
Frohock, W. M. André Muir. aux and the Tragic Imagination. 
Stanford U.P., Stanford, Calif., 1952. 
Fromm, Erich. The Fear of Freedom. Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner and Co., Ltd., London, 1942. 
Gide, André. Oedipus and Theseus. tr. John Russell. Seeker 
and Warburg, London, 1950. 
, André. The Journals of André Gide. tr. Justin 
O'Brien. Seeker and Warburg, London, 1948. 
, André. Dostoevsky. tr. Arnold Bennett. 
J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., London, 1925. 
Gilbert, G.M. Nuremburg Diary. Eyre and Spóttiswoode, 
London, 1948. 
Glover, Edward. The Dangers of Being Human. George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., London, 1936. 
Dorer, Geoffrey. The Life and Ideas of the Marquis de Sade. 
Peter Owen Ltd., London, 1953. 
Geoffrey and John Rickman. The People of Great 
Russia. The Cresset Press, London, 1949. 
Gray, Ronald. Kafka's Castle. Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 1956. 
Grygier, Tadeusz. Oppression: A Study in Social and Criminal 
Psychology. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 
London, 1954. 
Haldane, Charlotte. Truth Will Out. George Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson Ltd., London, 1949. 
254 
Halévy, Elie. The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism. 
tr. Mary Morris. Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1928. 
Hawton, Hector. et. al. Reason in Action. ed. Hector Hawton. 
Watts, London, 1956. 
, Hector. The Feast of Unreason. Watts and Co., 
London, 1952. 
Hayek, F.A. (ed). Capitalism_ and the Historians. (various 
essays) Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1954. 
Hegel, G.F.W. The Phenomenology of Mind. tr. J.B. Baillie. 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1931. 
, G.F.W. Hegel's Philosophy of Right. tr. T.M. 
Knox. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1942. 




T.R. The Harvest 
London, 1956. 
Richard. 
of Tragedy. Methuen and Co., Ltd., 
Chance and Symbol. The U. of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1948. 
Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. tr. James Murphy. Hurst and 
Blackett Ltd., London, 1942. 
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1929. 
, Thomas. The Elements of Law. Cambridge U.P., 
Cambridge, 1928. 
Hole, Christina. A Mirror of Witchcraft. Chatto and Windus, 
London, 1957. 
Hook, Sidney. From Hegel to Marx. Victor Gollancz, 
London, 1936. 
Hooten, Earnest Albert. Crime and the Man. Harvard U. 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1939. 
Houselander, Caryll. Guilt. Sheed and Ward, London, 1952. 
Huizinga, J. In the Shadow of Tomorrow. tr. J.H. Huizinga. 
William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1936. 
Hume, David. The Natural History of Religion. ed. H.E. Root. 
Adam and Charles Black, London, 1956. 
255 
Huxley, Aldous. Grey Eminence. Chatto and ;Vindus, London, 
1941. 
Huxley, T.H. and Julian. Evolution and Ethics 1893 -1943. 
The Pilot Press, London, 1947. 
Ibsen, Henrik. Peer Gynt. tr. Norman Ginsbury. Hammond, 
Hammond and Co., Ltd., 1945. 
, Henrik. The Correspondence of Henrik Ibsen. 
tr. Mary Morison. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1905. 
Ivanov, Vyacheslay. Preedorc and the Tragic Life. tr. Norman 
Cameron. Harvill Press, London, 1952. 
Jaeger, Werner. Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. 
tr. Gilbert Highet. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1939. 
James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience. 
Longmans Green, London, 1952. 
Janouch, Gustay. Conversations With Kafka. tr. Goronwy Rees. 
Derek Verschoyle, London, 1953. 
Jaspers, Karl. Tragedy is Not Enough. tr. Harald A.T. Reiche, 
Harry T. Moore and Karl W. Deutsch. Victor Gollancz, 
London, 1953. 
, Karl. Die Schuldfrage. Artemis -Verlag, Zurick, 
1947. 
Joyce, James. Exiles. Jonathan Cape, London, 1952. 
, James. Dubliners. Jonathan Cape, London, 1956. 
Jouvenel, Bertrand de. Power: The Natural History of Its 
Growth. tr. J.F. Huntington. Hutchinson and Co., 
Ltd., London, 1948. 
Jung, C.G. Symbols of Transformation. Vol. V of The 
Collected 'Works of. c.a. Jung. tr. R.F.C. Hull. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1956. 
, C.G. Psychology and Religion. Yale U. Press, 
New Haven, Conn., 1938. 
, C.G. Essa s on Contemporary Events. tr. Elizabeth 
Welsh, Barbara Hannah and Mary Briner. Kegan Paul, 
London, 1947. 
, C.G. The Integration of the Personality. 
tr. S. Dell, Kegan Paul, 1940. 
256 
Kafka, Franz. Wedding Preparations in the Country. tr. Ernest 
Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins. Seeker and Warburg, 
London, 1954. 
This volume includes: 
Reflections on Sin, Suffering, Hope and the 
True 4ay 
The Eight Octavo Notebooks 
Letter to His Father 
Fragments 
, Franz. The Great Wall of China and Other Pieces. 
tr. Willa and Edwin Muir. Secker and Warburg, 
London, 1946. 
This volume includes: 
"Investigations of a Dog" 
"The Burrow" 
"The Giant Mole" 
, Franz. The Castle. tr. Willa and Edwin Muir. Secker 
and Warburg, London, 1953. 
, Franz. In the Penal Settlement. tr. `,Tilla and Edwin 
Muir. Secker and Warburg, London, 1949. 
This volume includes: 
"The Judgement" 
"The Transformation" 
"A Country Doctor" 
"A Hunger Artist" 
, Franz. The Trial. tr. Willa and Edwin Muir. Secker 
and Warburg, London, 1945. 
, Franz. The Metamorphosis. tr. A.L. Loyd. The Parton 
Press, London, 1937. 
, Franz. The Diaries of Franz Kafka 1910 -1913 (Vol. I); 
1914 -1923 (Vol. II.) ed. Max Brod; tr. Martin 
Greenberg with Hannah Arendt. Secker and Warburg, 
London, 1949. 
Franz. Letters to Milena. ed. Willi Haas; tr. Tania 
and Jarres Stern, Secker and Warburg, London, 1953. 
, Franz. America. tr. Willa and Edwin Muir. Secker 
and Warburg, London, 1949. 
Keith, Sir. Arthur. Essays on Human Evolution. Watts and 
Co., London, 1946. 
, Sir Arthur. A New Theory of Human Evolution. Watts 
and Co., London, 1948. 
257 
Kierkegaard, Soren. Either /Or. Vol.I. tr. David F. and 
Lillian M. Swenson. Oxford U.P., London, 1944. 
, Soren. Either /Or. Vol. II. tr. Walter Lowrie, 
Oxford U.P., London, 1944. 
, Soren. Kierkaard's Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript. tr. David F. Swenson and (after his 
death) completed by Walter Lowrie. Oxford U.P., 
London, 1941. 
Soren. The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard. ed. 
and tr. Alexander Dru, Oxford U.P., London, 1938. 
, Soren. The Concept of. Dread. tr. 'Walter Lowrie. 
Oxford U.P., London, 1944. 
, Soren. Stages on Life's Wax. tr. Walter Lowrie. 
Oxford U.P., London, 1940. 
, Soren. Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing. 
tr. Douglas Steere. Harper and Brothers, New York, 
1938. 
, Soren. The Present Age. tr. Alexander Dru and 
Walter Lowrie. Oxford U.P., 1940. 
, Soren. Fear and Trembling. tr. Walter Lowrie. 
Princeton U.P., Princeton, 1941. 
, Soren. The Sickness Unto Death. tr. Walter 
Lowrie. Oxford U.P., London, 1944. 
, Soren. The Point of View For my Work As An Author 
tr. Walter Lowrie. Oxford U.P., London, 1939. 
, Soren. Gospel of Sufferings. tr. A.S. Aldworth 
and M.S. Ferrie. James Clark & Co., London, 1955 
, Soren. Works of Love. tr. David and Lillian 
Swenson. Princeton U.P., Princeton, N.J., 1946. 
Kitto, H.D.F. Form and Meaning in Drama. Methuen and Co., 
Ltd., London, 1956. 
Klein, Melanie and Joan Riviere. Love, Hate and Reparation. 
Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho -Analysis, 
London, 1937. 
Koestler, Arthur. Spanish Testament. Victor Gollancz Ltd., 
London, 1937, 
, Arthur. Scum of the Earth. Collins with Hanish 
Hamilton, London, 1955. 
Koestler, Arthur. Darkness at Noon. tr. Daphne Hardy. 
Jonathon Cape, London, 1940. 
, Arthur. Arrow in the Blue. Collins with 
Hamish Hamilton, London, 1952. 
258 
, Arthur. Insight and Outlook. Macmillan and 
Co., London, 1949. 
, Arthur. et. al. The God That Failed. Hamish 
Hamilton, London, 1950. 
Kogan, Eugen. The Theory and Practice of Hell. tr. Heinz 
Norden. Seeker. and Warburg, London, 1950. 
Konstantinovsky, Boris A. Soviet Law in Action. ed. Harold 
J. Berman. Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1953. 
La Rochefoucauld. Moral Maxims and Reflections. Methuen 
and Co., London, 1904. 
Lasswell, Harold Dwight. Power and Personality. W.W. Norton 
and Co., Inc., New York, 1948. 
, Harold Dwight and Abraham Kaplan. Power and 
Society. Yale U.P., New Haven, Conn., 1950. 
Le Bon, Gustave. The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. 
T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1896. 
, Gustave. The Psychology of Revolution. tr. Bernard 
Miall. T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1913. 
Lewis, H.D. Morals and the New Theology. Victor Gollancz, 
London, 1947. 
Lewis, John. Marxism and the Irrationalists. Lawrence and 
Wishart, London, 1955. 
Lingens- Reiner, Ella. Prisoners of Fear. Victor Gollancz 
Ltd., London, 1948. 
Lorand, Sändor (ed.) Psycho- Analysis Today. George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., London, 1948. 
Lassky, N.O. Freedom of Will. tr. Natalie Duddinton. 
Willia,r_s and Norgate Ltd., London, 1932. 
Lowrie, Walter. Kierkegaard. Oxford U.P., London, 1938. 
Lucas, F.L. Literature and Psychology. Cassell and Co., Ltd., 
London, 1951. 
, F.L. The Delights of Dictatorship. W. Heffer 
and Sons Ltd., Cambridge, 1938. 
259 
Mairet, Philip. Christian Essays in Psychiatry. Philosophical 
Library, New York, 1956. 
Malraux, André. The Psychology of Art: The Creative Art. 
tr. Stuart Gilbert. A. Zwemarer, London, 1949. 
Marcel, Gabriel. The Decline of 'Wisdom. tr. Manya Harari, 
The Ha rwill Press, London, 1954. 
Martin, P.W. Experiment in Depth. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London, 1955. 
Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. The Communist Manifesto. 
Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1948. 
Meerloo, Major A.M. Total War and the Human Mind. George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1944. 
Michel, Daniel. Ayenbite of Inwit. Early English Text 
Society, ed. William Morris, London, 1865. 
Milton, John. The Works of John Milton. general ed. Frank 
A. Patterson. Columbia U.P., New York, 1931. 
Mirsky, D.S. A History of Russian Literature. ed. and 
abridged by Francis J. Whitfield. Routledge and 
Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1949. 
Moberly, Sir Walter. Responsibility. Riddell Memorial 
Lectures. Oxford U.P., London, 1951. 
Money- Kyrle, R.T. Psychoanalysis and Politics. Gerald 
Duckworth and Co., Ltd., London, 1951. 
Monnerot, Jules. Sociology of Conn_unism_. tr. Jane Degras 
and Richard Rees. George Allen and Urruin Ltd., 
London, 1953. 
Moore, Barrington Jr. Terror and Progress U.S.S.R. 
Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1950. 
, Barrington Jr. Soviet Politics - The Dilemma of Power. 
Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1950. 
Mumford, Lewis. The Condition of Man. i4artin Secker and 
Warburg Ltd., London, 1944. 
Neitzsche, Friedrich. The Complete Words of Friedrich Nietzsche. 
ed. Dr. Oscar Levy. T.N. Foulis, Edinburgh, 1909. 
Nomad, Max. Apostle of Revolution. Becker and Warburg, 
London, 1939. 
260 
Nuttin, Joseph. Psychoanalysis and Personality. tr. George 
Lamb. Sheed and Ward, London, 1954. 
Peyre, Henri. The Contemporary French Novel. Oxford U.P., 
New York, 1955. 
Pieper, Josef. The End of Time. Michael Bullock. Faber 
and Faber Ltd., London, 1954. 
Plato. The Laws of Plato. tr. A.E. Taylor. Dent and 
Sons, London, 1934. 
. Phaedrus. tr. R. Hackforth. Cambridge U.P., 1952. 
Poliakov, Léon. Harvest of Hate. Elek Books Ltd., London, 1956. 
Rauschning, Hermann. Makers of Destruction. tr. E.W. Dickes. 
Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1942. 
Read, Herbert. A Coat of Many Colours. Routledge 'c Sons, 
London, 1945. 
, Herbert. Coleride as Critic. Faber and Faber, 
London, 1930. 
Reik, Theodor. The Unknown Murderer. tr. Dr. Katherine Jones. 
The International Psycho -analytical Library and 
Hogarth Press, London, 1936. 
Reitlinger, Gerald. The Final Solution. Vallentine, Mitchell 
and Co., London, 1953. 
Robinson, N.G.H. Christ and Conscience. James Nisbet and 
Co., Ltd., London, 1956. 
Roe, Ivan. The Breath of Corruption: An Interpretation of 
Dostoevsky. Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., London, n.d. 
Rousset, David. A World Apart. tr. Yvonne Mayse and Roger . 
Senhóuse. Secker and Warburg, London, 1951. 
Sargant, William. The Battle for the Mind. W. Heinemann Ltd., 
London, 1957. 
Sartre, Jean -Paul. Three Plays: Crime Passionnel. Men Without 
Shadows and The Respectable Prostitute. tr. Kitty 
Black. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1949. 
, Jean -Paul. The Flies and In Camara. tr. Stuart 
Gilbert. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1946. 
, Jean -Paul. Portrait of the Anti -Semite. tr. Erik de 
Mauny. Secker and Warburg and Lindsay Drummond 
Ltd., London, 1948. 
261 
Sartre, Jean -Paul. Literary and Philosophical Essays. 
tr. Annette Michelson. Rider and Co., London, 1955. 
Scott, Nathan. Rehearsals of Discomposure. John Lehman, 
London, 1952. 
Scott, Sir Walter. Letters on Demonology and Witchcraft. 
John Murray, London, 1831. 
Shestov, Leo. All Things Are Possible. tr. S.8. Koteliansky. 
Martin Seeker, London, 1920. 
Shils, Edward A. The Torment of Secrecy. 'William Heinemann 
Ltd., London, 1956. 
Sorel, Georges. Reflections on Violence. tr. T.E. Hulme. 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1916. 
Spearman, Diana. Modern Dictatorship. Jonathon Cape, 
London, 1939. 
Stanford, W.B. The Ulysses Theme. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1954. 
Stern, Karl. The Third Revolution. Michael Joseph, London, 1955. 
Strachey, Alix. The Unconscious Motives of War. George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., London, 1957. 
Grace. Conscience and Reason. George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd., London, 1951. 
Herbert. Franz Kafka: An Interpretation of His Work. 
Seeker and Warburg, London, 1948. 
Paul. The Cour &e To Be. Nisbet and Co., Ltd., 
London, 1952. 





Tillyard, E.M.W. The Elizabethan World Picture. Chatto and 
Windus, London, 1943. 
Toynbee, Arnold J. A Stud of History. Oxford U.P., 
Humphrey Milford, London, 1935. 
Utley, Freda. Lost Illusion. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
London, 1949. 
Unamuno, Miguel De. The Tragic Sense of Life. tr. J.E. 
Crawford Flitch. Macmillan and Co., London, 1921. 
Vivas, Eliseo. Creation and Discovery. The Noonday Press, 
New York, 1955. 
262 
Warner, Rex. The Cult of Power. John Lane, The Bodley Head, 
London, 1946. 
Weaver, Richard. Ideas Have Consequences. U. Chicago Press, 
Chicagoi, 1948. 
Webb, Beatrice. My Aurenticeshi . Longmans Green and Co., 
London, 1950. 
Weissberg, Alex. Conspiracy of Silence. Hamish Hamilton, 
London, 1952. 
Werkmeister, W.H. A Philosophy of Science. Harper and 
Brothers, New York, 1940. 
,veston, Jessie L. The quest of the Holy Grail. 'x. Bell and 
Sons, London, 1913. 
White, Victor. God and the Unconscious. The Harvill Press, 
London, 1952. 
.Vordsworth, William. The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth. 
ed. E. de Selincourt. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1940. 
Zernov, Nicolas. Three Russian Prophets. S.C.M. Press Ltd., 
London, 1944. 
Zilboorg, Gregory. The Psychology of the Criminal Act and 
Punishment. The Hogarth Press and The Institute 
of Psycho -analysis, London, 1955. 
Zim_ier, Heinrich. Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and 
Civilization. ed. Joseph Campbell. The Bollingen 
Series VI, Pantheon Books, Washington, D.C., 1946. 
PUBLICATIONS 
Bettelheim_, Bruno. "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme 
Situation." The Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, XXXVIII (1943, 417 -452. 
Bondy, Curt. "Problems of Internrent Camps." The Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XXXVIII (1943), 
453 -475. 
Danby, John F. "King Lear and Christian Patience." The 
Cambridge Journal, I (1947 -48), 305 -320. 
Dreyer, James. "Philosophy and Psychology." Universities 
Quarterly, IV (1949 -50), 126 -130. 
263 
Grygier, T. "Critical Notice: The Psychological Problems 
of Soviet Russia ". The British Journal of 
Psychology, XLII (1951), 180 -184. 
Grygier, Tadeusz. "Soviet Views on Western Crime and 
Criminology." The British Journal of Delinquency, 
I (1950 -51), 283 -92. 
Heller, Erich. "The World of Franz Kafka." The Cambridge 
Journal, II No. 1. (1948), 11 -32. 
Jaspers, Karl. "The Renewal of. the University." The Christi r 
News Letter, No. 225 -250 (1945), No. 247, 5 -12. 
Jefferson, Geoffrey et. al. "The Relation of Brain to Mind ". 
The Advancement of Science, VII No. 25 (1950), 46 -56. 
Jones, Ernest. "Evolution and Revolution." The International 
Journal of Psycho- Analysis, XXII (1941) 193 -208. 
Karprr_an, Ben. "Conscience in the Psychopath: Another 
Version." American Journal of Orthop sychiatrL, 
XVIII (1948), 455 -91. 
Kennedy, Alexander. "Brain Structure and Moral Values." 
The Advancement of Science, VII No. 25 (1950), 53 -56. 
Lewis, Aubrey. "Philosophy and Psychiatry." Philosophy, 
XXIV (1949), 99 -117. 
Lewis, H.D. "Morality and Religion." Philosophy, XXIV 
(1949), 34 -55. 
Lifton, Robert J. "'Thought Reform' of Western Civilians 
in Chinese Communist Prisons." Psychyatrz, 19 
(1956), 173 -195. 
Lindzey, Csardne.r. "An Experimental Examination of the 
Scapegoat Theory of Prejudice." The Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLV (1950), 296 -309. 
MacDonald, J.E. "The Concept of Responsibility ". The Journal 
of Mental Science, CI (1955), 704 -17. 
Moloney, James Clark. "Psychic Self -Abandon and Extortion 
of Confessions ". The International Journal of 
Psycho- Analysis, XXXVI (1955), 53 -60. 
Money- Kyrle, R.E. "Psycho- Analysis and Ethics." The 
International Journal of Psycho -Analysis, XXXIII 
C95 T, 225 -34. 
Reik, Theodor. "Aggression from Anxiety." The Internationgl 
Journal of. Psycho- Analysis, XXII (1941 ) 7 -16. 
Schein, Edgar H. "The Chinese Indocitrination Program for 
Prisoners of War." Psychtry, 19 (1955), 149 -172. 
SchOnberger, Stephen. "Disordersof the Ego in Wartime." 
The British Journal of Medical Psychology, XXI 
947 -8), 248 -53. 
Stark, W. "Kierkegaard on Capitalism." The Sociological 
Review, XLII (1950), 87 -114. 
Strauss, E.B. "Quo Vadirrus." The British Journal of Medical 
Psychology, XXI (1947-.), 1 -11. 
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE BOOKS AND OTHER SOURCES 
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1957) 
The Oxford English Dictionary. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1933. 
A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principle Indo- 
European Langua es. Carl Darling Buck with the 
co- operation of colleagues and assistants. The 
U. Chicago Press, 1949. 
Nazi Conspiracy. and Aggression. Office of United States 
Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. 
United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C., 1946. 
Royal Commission On the Law Relating to Mental Illness and 
Mental Deficiency 1954 -1957. Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, London, 1957. 
Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea. Ministry of 
Defence, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1955. 
Mental Abnormality and Crime. ed. L. Radzinowicz and J.W.C. 
Turner. English Studies in Criminal Science, 
Macmillan and Co., London, 1945. Vol. II. 
The Modern Approach to Criminal Law. ed. L. Radzinowicz .and 
J.W.C. Turner. English Studies in Criminal Science, 
Macmillan and Co., London, 1945, Vol. IV. 
Kerygma and Myth. tr. Reginald H. Fuller; ed. Hans Werner 
Bartsch. S.P.C.K., London, 1953. 
Why I Oppose Communism. Bertrand Russell et. al. Phoenix 
House Ltd., London, 1956. 
265 
"Pourquoi La Guerre?" Correspondence between Albert Einstein 
and Sigmund Freud. Société des Nations: Coopération 
Intellectuelle, 1933. 
The Dark Side of the Moon. (author unnamed) Preface by 
T.S. Eliot. Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1946. 
Totalitarianism: Proceedings of a Conference held at the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences. ed. Carl J. 
Friedrich. Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1954. 
